









NARRATIVE TECHNIQUES IN THE NOVELS OF IRIS MURDOCH 
By Roslyn Lee Sulcas 
A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Arts, University of Cape 
Town, in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of 
Arts. 
Cape Town: September 1988. 
The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












Abstract .......................................... i 
Acknowledgements .................................. ii 
Editions Used ..................................... iii 
Preface ........................................... iv 
CHAPTER ONE ....•............••...•.•..•........... 1 
CHAPTER TWO ...........•.•..•.•......•.••.......... 2 2 
CHAPTER THREE •...•.....•.•...•••.•.••.•........•..• 6 6 
CHAPTER FOUR ..•...•.•••..••...••.••..•••.•.•••.•.. 11 3 
CONCLUSION ..........•.•........•..•...•.....•.•... 148 




In this thesis I have departed from the prevalent critical concentration 
on the affiliations between Murdoch's fiction and philosophy, and have 
attempted to explore the relationship between her narrative techniques and 
the conventions of realism. In doing so, I use the narrative theory of 
Dorrit Cohn, who proposes that novelists concerned to render a sense of 
"reality" are also those who construct the most elaborate and artificial 
fictive worlds and characters. I propose that Murdoch's "real-isation" of 
her fictional world incorporates the problems of access to, and 
representation of the real. This links her to two ostensibly antithetical 
traditions: that of British realism (within which she would place 
herself), and also a fictional mode consonant with the poststructuralist 
writing that focuses on such problems. 
An examination of the early novels in terms of the correlation between 
"realism" and technical sophistication implied by Cohn reveals a division 
of narrative purpose that Murdoch has herself described in the early part 
of her career as an alternation between "open" and "closed" novels. I 
suggest in the thesis that these two fictional modes are deliberate choices 
of style on Murdoch's part, rather than a "failed" realism, and that their 
different readerly rewards are compounded by the successful merging of 
these competing .views of the real in the later novels. My narratological 
emphasis in this dissertation indicates also the ways in which Murdoch's 
fiction incorporates the comedic, the romantic and the gothic into a 
framework of orthodox verisimilitude, utilising the clashes between these 
genres to foreground the difficulties of a unified view. This is 
particularly successful in the first-person novels, where the overt 
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PREFACE 
This thesis aims to consider the technical strategies that 
underlie Iris Murdoch's commitment to the traditional realist novel 
and simultaneous awareness of the difficulty of representing, or 
gaining access to, the "real". In the introductory chapter I 
discuss Murdoch's relationship to both the realist tradition and 
the poststructuralist critique of that tradition, and place her 
writings in their context of post-war literary trends in England 
and France. I also outline the development of narrative theory as 
a branch of fictional poetics, and consider the utility of its 
insights for a study of the particular components and effects of 
Murdoch's work. In Chapter Two, using Dorrit Cohn's theoretical 
categories, I look at two early third-person novels, The Bell and 
The Unicorn, as examples of Murdoch's employment of both realist 
and romance conventions; an alternation of styles evident in her 
early work and which, I argue, are successfully combined in the 
later novel, An Accidental Man. In Chapter Three I again use 
Cohn's categories to discuss first-person narration in Under the 
Net and The Black Prince, and propose that this mode offers Murdoch 
a means of reconciling the tensions between competing views of 
reality. This brings me to a detailed study of The Sea, The Sea in 
Chapter Four, where I move from a technically specific discussion 
of Murdoch's fictional strategies to the broader questions of 
formal organisation and genre. In conclusion, I briefly consider 
Murdoch's most recent work, and relate its developments to my 
earlier discussions. 
"Only art explains, and that cannot itself be explained." 
(Iris Murdoch, The Black Prince) 
V 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
In the period since the publication of her first novel, Under the 
Net, in 1954, Iris Murdoch has emerged as one of the most important 
and productive English novelists of her generation as well as a 
leading moral philosopher and the author of a number of influential 
articles on contemporary fiction. In both her novels and her 
critical writings she has attempted to grapple with the 
difficulties and potentialities of contemporary fiction, 
emphasising her intention to write as a realist in an identifiable 
tradition of English and European fiction, while acknowledging the 
virtual impossibility of doing so in an age of aesthetic and 
epistemological uncertainty. Critical response to this dually-
focused enterprise has been understandably schizophrenic from the 
start: "Under the Net is a winner", wrote Kingsley Amis, reviewing 
the novel in 1954, while The New Statesman dismissed the same novel 
as "cafe writing"., Subsequent readers, alienated by Murdoch's 
middle-class milieux and proliferation of civil servants have 
demonstrated marked hostility at this recalcitrantly old-fashioned 
subject matter at an historical moment of deep scepticism about 
social continuity and the possibility of its literary 
representation. On the other hand, the puzzling texture and exotic 
patterning of the novels has led to cries of betrayal from 
reviewers who value what Bernard Bergonzi has called "the English 
Quoted by McEwan, Neil, The Survival of the Novel. Macmillan: 
London 1981, 38. 
L 
2 
Ideology"; 2 a sense of English literary culture as untheoretical 
and of the nineteenth century realist text as a literary paradigm 
for the contemporary novel. 
That Murdoch's consistently stated desire to write within a 
realist tradition 3 is not an argument for a return to the 
nineteenth century, but for a literature that is nourished by its 
ancestry, is a distinction largely ignored by both of these 
captious groupings, who have equally plundered her theoretical 
writing for handy critical ammunition. The impulse behind 
nineteenth-century realism was the attentive perception and 
depiction of the history of characters and milieux: original 
polemical statements of realism fought hard to assert that the 
realist writer was merely a scribe for society; that the author's 
production was a mirror of life reflecting "the blue of the skies 
and the mire of the road below". 4 Murdoch's sense of an artistic 
tradition of realism, within which she would hope to situate her 
own work, is clearly broader than the particular historical 
developments peculiar to the novel and would include Shakespeare 
and great artists of every period who have attempted to render a 




Bergonzi, Bernard, The Situation of 
London 1970, 60. 
the Novel. Macmillan: -
see Rose, W.K., "Iris Murdoch, Informally", London Magazine, 
8(June 1968), 59-73; Bellamy, Michael 0., "An Interview with 
Iris Murdoch", Contemporary Literature, XXVIII, no.2, 129-140; 
Haffenden, John, Novelists in Interview. Methuen: London and 
new York 1985, 191-209. 
Quoted in the Introduction to Stendhal, Scarlet and Black. 
Penguin: Harmonsworth 1981, 11. 
L 
3 
"true" perception of the world, is a development of Platonic 
thought and is fundamentally alien to a conventional literary 
realism in its acknowledgement of the world's incomprehensibility 
and the difficulty of perceiving it accurately. The search for 
reality in her fiction is less historical (although she is arguably 
attempting to portray the condition of a certain segment of English 
society that Conradi names "the chattering classes" {8}) than 
transcendental; involving the hopeless quest for knowledge, for the 
good, for an acceptance of the world that we live in rather than 
the one we continually create by our infinite store of illusions. 
The practice of realism is thus, for Murdoch, a moral practice 
involving careful attention (a term she borrows from Simone Weil) 
to the presentation of character within a dynamic picture of human 
society that constitutes a "steady and opaque framework". 5 
Her achievement is, then, a difficult one to assess, and not 
merely in the way that all contemporary writing is properly 
resistant to objective critical scrutiny. She is both a f-werfully 
intellectual, allusive writer and the possessor of a seductive 
narrative drive: both concerned to reveal the particularity and 
contingency of character and action and to question the elements 
and assumptions which go into their making. As Peter Conradi 
points out, Murdoch, like her near-contemporary, John Fowles, 
attempts to find a form in which the contingent moral agent can be 
5 Murdoch, Iris, 
February 1957. 
"Important Things", The Sunday Times, 17 
L 
4 
freed from the myth that must necessarily contain him; 6 an 
enterprise doomed to defeat, if at best fairly honourably so (to 
paraphrase the title of her thirteenth novel). Fowles's commitment 
to the "authentication" of characters and readers has led to his 
overt exposure of the text as a fictional construct; a strategy 
increasingly adopted by contemporary writers anxious to absolve 
literature of its ontological guilt. By contrast, Murdoch 
struggles against the lure of the Romantic legacy of emancipation 
that Fowlesian "metafiction" has so oddly married to this 
epistemological scepticism, 7 perceiving in it too simple a division 
between a coherent self and an "external" society: "An unexamined 
sense of the strength of the machine is combined with an illusion 
of leaping out Of it", 8 she writes in a discussion of 
existentialism as the philosophic disseminator of this conception 
of the isolated and freely choosing will. 
Murdoch has criticised both existentialism and liberalism for 
their adherence to this Romantic conception of the human 
personality in terms that oddly concur with a poststructuralist 
critique of literary realism. In Critical Practice, Catherine 




Conradi, Peter, John Fowles. Methuen: London and New York 
1982, 29. As I will refer to Dr Conradi's book on Murdoch, Iris 
Murdoch: The Saint and the Artist, far more frequently, I will 
provide the date in any subsequent references to his other 
critical writings. 
I will discuss metafiction and 
work in Chapter Three. 
its relationship to Murdoch's 
Murdoch, 
48. 
Iris, The Sovereignty of Good. Ark Paperbacks 1985, 
L 
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realism "is more than coincidental"; 9 that both depend on the 
ideology of liberal humanism in which the individual is construed 
as a "free, unified, autonomous subjectivity" (Belsey, 67). 
Similarly, Murdoch writes that "We have bought the Liberal theory 
[of personality] as it stands, because we have wished to encourage 
people to think of themselves as free, at the cost of surrendering 
the background", 10 and that existentialism "is a natural mode of 
being in the capitalist era. It is attractive, and indeed to most 
of us still natural, because it suggests individualism, self-
reliance, private conscience, and what we ordinarily think of as 
political freedom". 11 Whereas Belsey would like to deconstruct the 
"Liberal theory of personality" in order to reveal the 
"interpellation of the subject" (67) by the correlative ideologies 
of liberalism and realism, Murdoch maintains that the persistent 
exploration and expansion of a theory of personality can itself 
perform a revelatory function by potentially exposing us to a world 
larger than the one our conditioning has taught us to believe in. 
Both, in essence, are critical of an unquestioning and complacent 
response to fiction, despite their very different critical 
orientations. Belsey's description of realism as a "model of 




Belsey, Catherine, Critical Practice. Methuen: London and New 
York 1980, 7. 
Murdoch, Iris, "Against Dryness", Encounter, 
All further references to this article will 
AD. 
January 1961, 18. 
be abbreviated as 
Murdoch, Iris, "Existentialists 
(ed.), Essays and Poems Presented 
1970. 
and Mystics", in Robson, W. 
to Lord David Cecil. London 
L 
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which re-presents the world" and which "is the guarantee not only 
of the truth of the text but of the reader's existence as an 
autonomous and knowing subject in a world of knowing subjects" 
(69), is paralleled by Murdoch's conviction that the realist artist 
must not succumb to the re-presentation of what science or 
psychology has told us to be true, nor pander to readers' 
expectations: 
literature ... has taken over some of the tasks formerly 
performed by philosophy. Through literature we can re-
discover a sense of the density of our lives. Literature can 
arm us against consolation and fantasy and can help us to 
recover from the ailments of Romanticism. If it can be said 
to have a task now, that surely is its task. (AD, 20) 
Like any realist project, this enterprise cannot avoid immersion 
in the difficulties of authorial responsibility and involvement, 
and the ironies of "telling the truth" through the forms of 
fiction. This is, of course, a major theoretical problem for self-
styled realists: realism as an idea is essentially at odds with 
itself in that it must transform unstructured, quotidian life into 
an aesthetically unified representation of events. At the same 
time it involves the necessary retreat of the authorial voice, the 
hypothetical emptying of the author's power and personality from 
the work of art in order to create the illusion of autonomy. This 
is evidently an impossible undertaking; every realist writer must 
tangle with the concrete problems of narration, point of view, 
closure, temporality, and all the other terms in our vocabulary of 
form, whilst attempting to render an unmediated "reality". The 
size of this technical task - the evocation of formlessness through 




new set of fictional techniques, ironically bringing the novel to 
terms with is own artifice. This is evident in a letter written by 
Flaubert in 1852 while working on Madame Bovary, today regarded as 
a classic realist text: "What seems beautiful to me, what I should 
like to write, is a book about nothing, a book dependent on nothing 
external, which would be held together by the internal strength of 
its style". Later in the same letter, he comments that "from the 
standpoint of pure Art one might almost establish the axiom that 
there is not such a thing as subject 
absolute manner of seeing things". 12 
style in itself being an 
In an interview with Michael 0. Bellamy, Murdoch points out her 
thematisation of this paradox in the recurrent opposition of the 
false form-making artist and the truth-telling religious figure, as 
in the pairing of Jake and Hugo in Under the Net, Anne and Randall 
in An Unofficial Rose, and Tallis and Julius in A Fairly Honourable 
Defeat., 3 This tension is also, however, apparent in the puzzling 
texture of the novels, combining as they do both ironic comedic 
entertainment and a more stringent moral intent: while her oeuvre 
(twenty-three novels to date) illustrates her commitment to the 
craft of the novel, her games, tricks and ironies indicate her 
reluctant acquiescence to the artifice and unreality of this formal 
coercion of the world. Murdoch's practice of her own brand of 
realism means, in effect, a demonstration of the difficulty of any 
, 2 
, 3 
Steegmuller, Francis (ed. and transl.), The Letters of Gustave 
Flaubert 1830-1857. Faber and Faber: London 1979, 154. 
Bellamy, Michael 0., "An Interview with 




access to "reality", and to this end she juxtaposes the comic, the 
mythical, and the fantastic against the containing realistic 
structure that plays uneasy host to them, creating novels 
paradoxically "liable to the charge of colluding with the 
bewitchment they lament" (Conradi 1982, 30). 
The attempt to negotiate some kind of rapprochement between a 
socially engaged mimetic form and the sense of relativism that 
increasingly permeates Western culture marks much contemporary 
English fiction. Until fairly recently, however, the prevailing 
critical view has been that the English novel "is no longer novel" 
(Bergonzi, 25) - that it has retreated into a cosy provincialism 
and conservatism as it maintains the last bastion of realism amidst 
increasing disdain in both France and America for the traditional 
liberal idea of character as a free and growing agent, and for plot 
as a significant ordering of experience. This "reaction against 
experiment" (as an American critic entitled his book about the 
post-war English novel' 4 ) can be seen as a response to the formal 
and stylistic artifice of Modernism by a new generation of writers 
who espoused the altered values of a welfare state. As Malcolm 
Bradbury and David Palmer satirically remark of this post-war 
period, "the characteristic English novel became a contemplation of 
a working-class or lower middle-class youth wandering in a state of 
solemn but remediable social anguish along a canal bank near 





New York 1967. 
Experiment in the 
L 
9 
Wakefield". 15 Once again, the correlation between realism and 
liberalism - both proposing a parity between the personal and the 
public - is seen as apparent in these socially-concerned novels by 
the "angry young men" (with whom Murdoch was grouped) of the 1950s; 
the preoccupations of authors like Kingsley Amis, Alan Silitoe and 
David Storey with character, social class and morality set 
(approvingly) against the modernist shift of emphasis to the 
mythical and the symbolic. The novel's main theme was perceived to 
be the representation of society, and its mood for all the 
appellations of anger - perhaps epitomised by the title of Kingsley 
Amis's I Like It Here (1958), which devoted itself to mocking the 
experimental and expatriate tradition in the novel "while 
indicating how much better England was than anywhere fancy abroad" 
(Bradbury and Palmer, 10). 
This return to a concern with society and its representation was 
strongly approved by the characteristically moral and prescriptive 
literary criticism of the nineteen-forties and fifties, when the 
first really innovative studies began to grant to the novel the 
centrality as a modern form that Henry James had claimed for it at 
the turn of the century. F.R. Leavis's The Great Tradition (1948), 
Ian Watt's The Rise of the Novel (1957), and John Bayley's The 
Characters of Love (1960) - among others - were committed to an 
interpretation of the novel as a socio-moral form to an extent that 
A.S. Byatt suggests has to do with "the decline of religion and the 
1 5 Bradbury, Malcolm, and Palmer, David, (eds.), The Contemporary 







substitution of a Religion of Humanity"' 6 in the form of the 
realist texts of the Great Tradition. Perhaps for this reason 
critics largely ignored the emergence of a fiction constructed in 
terms of an inbuilt aesthetic discourse with this literary 
tradition; a discourse with what Nathalie Sarraute called the true 
enemy of good art: "the only real, the deadly danger, the great 
works of the past". ' 7 The need to simultaneously absorb and reject 
the fictive past has of course always been a matter of concern for 
the writer: here, however, the peculiar intensity of "the anxiety 
of influence"' 8 seems to have acted as a stimulus to a newly self-
aware fiction. The decade of 1950-60 saw the publication of novels 
by Murdoch, Doris Lessing, Angus Wilson, William Golding, Lawrence 
Durrell, Muriel Spark and Antony Burgess; all "very doubtful 
members of any realist first eleven" (Bradbury and Palmer, 13) in 
their reactivation of the stress on art as forgery and on the 
surreal and fabulous dimension that partly constitutes the 
modernist impulse. A concomitant sense of the relativity of value 
and perception is evident during the sixties in the emergence of 
the work of John Fowles and B.S. Johnson. "We can no longer take 
language for granted as a medium of communication", says Murdoch in 





of a window without noticing the glass - and then one day began 
Byatt, A.S., "People in Paper Houses", in Bradbury and Palmer 
(ed), The Contemporary English Novel, 21. 
Quoted by Byatt, A.S., "People in Paper Houses", 21. 
Bloom, Harold, The 
New York 1973. 
Anxiety of Influence: a Theory of Poetry. 
11 
to notice this too". ' 9 The categorisation of Murdoch as an "angry 
young man", after the publication of Under the Net in 1954, points 
in fact to the persistent critical desire for social realism, since 
she was in fact none of the above (that is, angry, particularly 
young or male!): the dedication to Raymond Queneau alone might 
have brought to more notice the novel's decidedly surrealistic 
qualities and vein of comic fantasy. Although this is largely to 
do with Murdoch's own background and interests, it also points to 
the influence of a new internationalism of form and perspective in 
the English novel. Writing about Queneau, the enormously 
influential French literary critic and theorist, Roland Barthes, 
comments on the paradox "which, perhaps, defines our literature 
today: he assumes the literary mask but simultaneously points at 
it"; 20 a description that would serve the wide literary debts and 
distinctly cosmopolitan flavour of Under the Net too. 
That form is never neutral and realism a myth of unified vision 
that is "the essential enemy, the bourgeois norm", 21 is the central 
thrust of a series of brilliant works by Barthes that directly and 
indirectly added to the challenge to the British novel's relations 
with its own tradition and realism. In Le Degre zero de 
1 'ecriture, Barthes demonstrates how the usage of the past tense 





London 1 96 7 . 
Iris, Sartre: Romantic Rationalist. Fontana: 
Quoted by Josipovici, Gabriel, "The Balzac of Barthes and de 
Guermantes", in Lerner, Laurence (ed.), Reconstructing 
Literature. Basil Blackwell: Oxford 1983, 105. 
Quoted by McEwan, The Survival of the Novel, p.10. 
12 
enshrine "meaning" in a safely historicised narrative: "La 
finalite commune du Roman et de l'Histoire narree, c'est d'aliener 
les faits: le passe simple est l'acte meme de possession de la 
societe sur son passe et son possible" ( Josipovici, 84). 22 
Barthes, writes Neil McEwan in a book defending the contemporary 
British novel from its reactionary reputation, 23 "was the champion 
over the last twenty-five years, of the cause of freeing literature 
from common sense and of separating modern fiction from all past 
traditions", supporting the writings of the French nouveaux 
romanciers in their attempts to abandon the conventions of 
nineteenth-century fiction. Alain Robbe-Grillet, Michel Butor and 
Nathalie Sarraute, amongst others, attempted to question the 
aesthetic, epistemological and linguistic implications of reality 
in order to "free" the reader from an authorial "meaning" and force 
a personal reconstruction of the text. To this end, language is 
made to foreground certain elements in the text - states of mind, 
objects of description - to the point where they exceed their 
apparent function and redefine literary parameters. "I live in the 
age of Alain Robbe-Grillet and Roland Barthes", John Fowles writes 
in The French Lieutenant's Woman; "if this is a novel, it cannot be 




Josipovici translates this as "The ultimate purpose of the 
novel and of narrated history is to estrange us from events: the 
passe simple is the act itself of possession by society of its 
past and its possibilities." 
See footnote 1. 
Fowles, John, The French Lieutenant's Woman. Pan Books: 
London 1987 (first published by Jonathen Cape Ltd 1969), 85. 
13 
This creative uncertainty about the relationship between language 
and its referents is discussed in Robert Scholes's The Fabulators 
(1967), in which he discusses a number of contemporary novelists 
concerned with exploiting the artificial nature of fiction and the 
"fictional" modes of allegory and romance. Scholes argues that we 
have been led to equate "narrative" with the nineteenth-century 
tradition by the "realist" orientation of works like Eric 
Auerbach's Mimesis; a tradition that now depends upon an eroded 
relationship between language and the world and which is no longer 
tenable. He notes approvingly that writers are therefore turning 
towards alternative modes of writing, like romance and allegory, in 
"an attempt to find a more subtle correspondence between the 
reality which is fiction and the fiction which is reality". 25 For 
Scholes, as I have already suggested to be the cas€ ~or Fowles, an 
avowedly "fictional" narrative is more "truthful" than a 
purportedly representational one, and serves to emancipate the 
contemporary writer from the duty of emulating George Eliot or 
Henry James: a critical shift that parallels the trend towards 
thematised self-reflexiveness in such novels as Doris Lessing's The 
Golden Notebook (1962), Muriel Spark's The Comforters (1963), John 
Fowles's already noted The French Lieutenant's Woman (1969), and 
Murdoch's The Black Prince (1973). 
Discussing The Fabulators in "The Novelist at the Crossroads", 
David Lodge supports the notion of the contemporary novel as a 
25 Scholes, Robert, Fabulation and Metafiction. University of 







synthesis of pre-existing narrative modes, but suggests that the 
binding element is realism, "which holds history, romance and 
allegory together in precarious synthesis, making a bridge between 
the world of discrete facts (history) and the patterned, economised 
world of art and imagination (allegory and romance)''. 26 From this 
point of view, it is the conflict of interests between these worlds 
that characterises and energises much contemporary British fiction 
while it continues - generally - to operate "on the assumption that 
the reality which realism imitates actually exists" (Lodge, 109). 
This tension between realist collaboration with the political and 
epistemological status quo, and fictive subversion of its 
conventions has led, in Murdoch's case, to a literature in which 
"formal aporia and hesitation coexist. with immense formal energy 
and inventiveness" (Con~~di 1982, 21); a literature that displays 
its self-awareness in a manner that paradoxically intensifies its 
own illusionism. How this is achieved, and with what measure of 
success, is the aim of this study, which will attempt a departure 
from the prevalent critical concentration on the relationship 
between Murdoch's philosophy and its manifestation in her fictional 
writings; an emphasis which seems to me to sacrifice a 
consideration of the bountiful pleasures of the novels to an 
academic hunting of "sources" that does little to illuminate the 
way in which they work. To this end, I will give detailed 
consideration to her complex and shifting narrative voice as it 
partakes of, and in, the ambiguities of realism. 
26 Lodge, 
Today, 86. 





The concept of narrative voice was introduced by Wayne Booth in 
The Rhetoric of Fiction (1961), a book that articulated critical 
distinctions that were both widely accepted and used within the 
Anglo-American critical tradition. Booth's emphasis is on 
novelistic techniques, "the rhetorical resources available to the 
writer ... as he tries, consciously or unconsciously to impose his 
fictional world upon the reader". 27 Although he advocates the 
author's use of all available technical means, his polemical 
emphasis is on the uses of the author's voice; he shows the 
usefulness of direct authorial commentary and argues that even when 
this is renounced "the author's voice is still dominant in a 
dialogue that is at the heart of all experience with fiction." 
This thesis may seem markedly simplistic to us today, taking as it 
does an unproblematised conception of literature as a reflection of 
life - indeed of the author's conception of life - and treating 
language as a straightforwardly utilitarian means of realising 
novelistic intention. Despite the unsophisticated equation of 
narrative voice with the author's voice in its various technical 
and intentional embodiments, Booth performs an important function 
here in pointing to the embedding of different discourses within a 
fictional work, and to their revelatory quality when considering 
the work as a whole. In order to utilise this concept, however, it 
is necessary to briefly review the development of narrative poetics 
since the publication of The Rhetoric of Fiction and to situate its 
insights within contemporary critical thought. To examine the 
27 Booth, Wayne, The Rhetoric of Fiction. University of Chicago 
Press: Chicago and London 1961 (Preface). 
L 
16 
state of current narrative poetics, however, we need first to 
recall Aristotle's Poetics and its importance in any theory of the 
novel. 
The orientation of The Rhetoric of Fiction is fundamentally 
mimetic, taking as its model the act of vision and perception. 
This model is central to the Poetics, where a distinction is made 
between the means of imitation (the medium, such as painting or 
language), the object of imitation (some aspect of human action), 
and the mode of imitation (how something is imitated). Thus, the 
object is perceived through the means and the mode, which work 
together to re-present, to "show" it to an audience. Although 
Aristotle's conception of mimesis applies primarily to theatrical 
performance, 28 the practitioners of the emerging novel clearly 
"perceived" their work in mimetic terms: "A novel," writes 
Smollett, "is a large diffused picture"; for Trollope, creating 
character involves filling "the canvas" with "real portraits"; 
George Eliot describes narration as demonstrating ''the superior 
mastery of images and pictures in grasping the attention. 1129 It 
was, however, Henry James who elevated the analogy into a theory of 
narration: "The novelist can only fall back on his recognition 
that man's constant demand for what he has to offer is simply man's 




It was later 
sculpture. 
extended to include imitations in painting and 
All of these are quoted by Bordwell, David, Narration in the 
Fiction Film. Methuen: London and New York 1986, 7. 
James, Henry, The Future of the Novel. New York 1956, 33. 
r 
17 
technical devices as including "reflectors", strategies of "framing 
and encircling" and the use of "point of view", linking the novel 
to post-Renaissance theatre's similar concern with the continuous 
employment of perspective as the key to the construction of an 
ideal viewer's orientation toward an enacted story. Dwelling in 
"the house of fiction," looking through windows that give on to 
"the human scene," the writer examines the world and proceeds to 
obey James's famous injunction: "dramatize, dramatize!" 31 
James's principal disseminator, Percy Lubbock, develops these 
pictorial and theatrical metaphors into a set of narratorial 
categories: the pictorial represents the action in the mirror of a 
character's consciousness, and the dramatic neutrally presents ''the 
visible and audible facts of the case. 1132 The novel, in Lubbock's 
theory, synthesises the stability of the perspective painting and 
the temporal unfolding of drama. What both James and Lubbock - and 
their inheritors ignore is the fact that the novel is a 
linguistic form; it is made up of words and must thus always have a 
"speaker", or less anthropomorphically, an "enunciator." It is of 
course ironic that James's own technical innovations - the creation 
of a "centre of consciousness", whose restricted point of view 
motivates the sensory and psychological texture of the novel - work 
to refine and heighten the verbal fabric, foregrounding language as 
a vehicle for "vision." 
31 
32 
James, Henry, The Art of the Novel. New York 1934, 46. 
Lubbock, Percy, The Craft of Fiction. New York 1962, 71. 
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If Aristotle may be credited with founding the mimetic tradition 
of narrative representation, Plato is the principal ancient 
spokesman for the conception that narration is fundamentally a 
linguistic activity. In book 3 of the Republic, he distinguishes 
between two principal types of storytelling, but gives both a 
linguistic emphasis: pure narrative, or diegesis, where "the poet 
himself is the speaker and does not even attempt to suggest to us 
that anyone else is speaking"; and imitative narrative (mimesis), 
where the poet speaks through his characters "as if he were someone 
else." 33 This intimation that literature is above all the affair 
of language was taken up in the 1920s - the same time that Lubbock 
and other Anglo-American critics were promoting mimetic theories of 
narration - by the Russian Formalist critics who contended that 
representation is an effect of literary discourse, an effect of 
rhetoricity rather than a naive notion of referentiality. As such, 
the novel draws attention to its own "literariness" and its ability 
therein to "impart the sensation of things" 34 by making them 
"strange" through their fictional conscription. Mikhail Bahktin, 
too, pointed out that the novel is not a spectacle organised around 
Jamesian sight lines, but is a polyphony of different registers of 
speech and written language, a montage of "voices." 
The Russian Formalist conception of the primacy of literary 
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structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure. Saussure 
postulated the inherent arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, 
suggesting that the bond between language (sign) and the world 
(referent) is a matter of convention and agreement rather than 
immanent relation. What this overwhelmingly implies is that our 
very ability to read literature, to recognise certain discourses as 
literature, depends on these conventions and agreements; that there 
is a metaphoric "grammar" of literature which permits us to convert 
linguistic units into literary meaning. The recognition that 
by different sets of literature is animated and "created" 
conventions led to a new emphasis on the process by which we 
produce intelligible "readings" of both life and literature. 35 
This engendered a critical move toward.the construction of a theory 
of "narratology"; an examination of the communication process 
whereby the narrative as message is transmitted through the 
activities of selection and arrangement in order to achieve 
specific time-bound effects on a perceiver. The work of Kate 
Hamburger, Franz Stanzel, Gerard Genette, Tzvetsan Todorov, Seymour 
Chatman and Dorrit Cohn, amongst many others, has contributed to an 
understanding of both the ways in which authors utilise narrative 
strategies, and of how we, as readers, interpret and construct 
these in order to produce meaning. Moving from an attempt to 
35 The application of Saussure's theory of signification to non-
linguistic systems, such as fashion and advertising, produced 
analyses of media which had seemed exclusively mimetically 
referential and showed them as analogous to verbal language. 
"It is far from certain," wrote Roland Barthes, "that in the 
social life of today there are to be found any extensive systems 
of signs outside human language." (Barthes, Writing Degree 
Zero. Boston 1970, 9.) 
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distinguish between types of the novel or modes of narration, these 
theorists have proposed various models of literary transmission 
which attempt to formulate a systematic theory of narration; that 
is, an analysis of the formal components which, through combination 
and variation, produce a narrative fiction. 
Only Dorrit Cohn, however, has drawn attention to and focused 
upon the correlation between realistic intent and the creation of 
imaginary psychologies: that novelists concerned to render 
"reality" are also those who construct the most elaborate and 
artificial fictive worlds and characters in order to produce what 
Barthes calls 1 'effet de reel 36 - a "reality effect" achieved by a 
superfluity of detail which "confirm[s] the mimetic contract and 
assure[s] the reader that he can interpret the text as about a real 
world." (Culler, 193) Drawing upon Hamburger's Logic of 
Literature, Cohn emphasises "the importance of the mimesis of 
consciousness for the history of the novel" and observes that the 
need to convey the inner life of characters has been a recurrent 
preoccupation of narrative art that has tended to re-assert itself 
whenever the novel has become "mind-less", "whenever its characters 
get hyper-active, its world too cluttered, its orientation too 
veristic." 37 It is my contention that Murdoch's "real-isation" of 
her fictional world involves a growing attention to both the 
extensive presentation of the inner life and its worldly context 
36 
37 
quoted by Culler, Jonathan, Structuralist Poetics. 
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and that this works paradoxically to focus attention on its highly 
artificial and structured nature. As Cohn attends exclusively and 
sensitively to the effects - realistic or otherwise - of different 
narrative techniques, and formulates a succinct and accurate 
typology for these, I have chosen to remain primarily within her 
theoretical framework in the next two chapters, which will examine 






Lucinda can't read poetry. She's good 
Sort of, at novels, though. The words, you know, 
Don't sort of get in like Lucinda's way. 
And then the story, well, you know, about 
Real people, fall in love, like that, and all 
Sort of makes you think, Lucinda thinks. 
George Khairallah, "Our Latest Master of the Arts"., 
The illusion that words don't get in the way of "the story" is 
the fundamental premise of realism, which attempts to convey a 
sense of impartial observation; of communicating actions and events 
that exist independently of the narrative that "speaks" them. 
Frank Kermode cites a perfect example of compliance to this model 
in an essay "On Reading Novels": 
The Athenaeum, reviewing [Adam Bede] when it came out, 
demonstrated the effect of a totally obedient reading: the 
reader feels 'as though he had made acquaintance with real 
human beings: the story is not a story, but a true account of 
a place and people who have really lived ... that everything 
happened here as set down we have no doubt in the world.' 
( Kermode, 11 8) 
This illustrates neatly the fundamental self-destruct mechanism of 
realism; the novel's very success is measured in terms of its 
fictional dissolution, "leaving readers with the impression that 
they have not been reading but meeting people and visiting places." 
( Kermode, 11 8 ) 
Dorrit Cohn points to this conundrum through the title of her 
book Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting 
Quoted by Kermode, Frank, Essays on Fiction 1971-82, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul: London 1983, 133. 
...... ---------- ~--
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Consciousness in Fiction suggesting that transparency is in fact 
always an illusion that is carefully constructed by the various 
(and particular) means at an author's disposal. What Transparent 
Minds in fact indicates is that there is a direct correlation 
between the reader's presentiment of "reality" and the "artifice" 
of the technique (although in a sense all fictional techniques are 
equally "artificial"): Cohn clearly demonstrates that the most 
indirect and traditional mode of narration - what critics have 
called "omniscient narration" and she calls "psycho-narration" - is 
best able to portray the least conscious strata of psychic life 
because it can articulate unconscious depths that are "outside" of 
language, whereas a "stream of consciousness" technique, or 
"interior monologue" is by definition limited to the linguistic 
activity of the mind. Ironically, and contrary to the critical 
confusion of "disorganised" manner with unconscious matter, "the 
novelist who wishes to portray the least conscious strata of 
psychic life is forced to do so by way of the most indirect and the 
most traditional of the available modes" (Cohn, 56). A 
consideration of Murdoch's narrative modes and techniques will 
investigate this correlation, allowing us to assess her particular 
brand of realism. Rather than offering a theoretical summary as 
preface to a discussion of the novels, I will use an early third-
person text, The Bell (1958) - generally felt to be Murdoch's first 
"characteristic" novel 2 - to illustrate my conceptual framework. 
2 A.S. Byatt describes it in Degrees of Freedom (Chatto and 
Windus: London 1970, 73) as "a novel which has the solid life 
that Miss Murdoch praises in the great nineteenth-century 
novels." Elizabeth Dipple, in Iris Murdoch: Work for the Spirit 
(Methuen: London 1982, 242) sees the novel as revealing 
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In her book, Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics, 3 Shlomith 
Rimmon-Kenan suggests that the term "narration" implies a 
communication process whereby the narrative - practically, the book 
we are reading - as message, is transmitted from addresser to 
addressee: thus an examination of narrative techniques is a close 
look at the way in which certain ideas and preoccupations are 
conveyed to the reader. We might, for example, be aware after 
reading The Bell that Murdoch is concerned (or that we interpret 
her as concerned) with a moral discrimination between characters: 
the way in which we become aware of this is a function of those 
properties that inhere in narrative fictions and which, often 
overlooked in an analysis of character or theme, nevertheless form 
the basis for any such discussion. Rudimentary structural 
components (even in the nouveau roman) such as beginnings and 
endings, type of narration, selection of events and choices of 
point of view all reveal, directly or obliquely, a view of the 
world - even if we argue that it is not necessarily the author's 
own. It is through attention to formal methods that we may 
discover how authorial power is put to use: 
indicates what choices a writer may have. 
narrative theory 
3 
"(Murdoch's) own voice... (with) a clarity of intention its 
predecessors did not quite have" and marking "Murdoch's first 
approach to the style which (she] believe[s) will define her 
reputation as one of the foremost novelists writing in English 
in the twentieth-century." 
Rimmon-Kenan, 
Poetics. Methuen: 
Shlomith, Narrative Fiction: 
London and New York 1983. 
Contemporary 
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Following Genette, 4 Rimmon-Kenan classifies the constituents of 
narrative fiction (that is, a novel, short story or narrative poem) 
as comprising "story" ( the events), "text" (their verbal 
representation), and "narration" (the act of telling/writing). The 
concept of story is an abstract but useful one - the continuum of 
events presupposing a mythical set of all conceivable details, and 
its manifestation "in" the text (probably out of strictly 
chronological order and possibly filtered through a mediating 
consciousness) revealing the processes of selection and arrangement 
performed by the fictional discourse and articulated through the 
narration. In an abstract sense, then, narrative theory seeks to 
reveal the relationship between "story" and its textual 
representation. 
une way of doing this is to look at the discordance between 
story-chronology and the disposition of events in the text. 
Genette terms this anachrony, which may be subdivided into 
prolepsis and analepsis; the evocation of events prior to or after 
their occurrence in the story. While prolepsis is not used very 
frequently in our narrative tradition (as it was for example in the 
epic tradition), analepsis constitutes a major part of many novels, 
particularly those that strive for realism through detailed 
evocation of character, setting and atmosphere. The Bell only 
progresses through one paragraph before offering an analepsis as 
Dora is "placed" for the reader: "She came of a lower middle-class 
4 Genette, Gerard, Narrative Discourse (trans. Lewin, Jane E. ). 
Basil Blackwell: Oxford 1986. ( First published as Di scours du 
recit. Editions du Seuil, 1972.) 
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London family ... " (7). Whereas the lapse into retrospection is 
recurrent, but conventionally accepted as "normal" within 
particular codes for reading novels, prolepsis draws attention to 
the determining authorial voice in its single occurrence in The 
Bell: "This was one thing they were never fated to discuss" (106). 
Its emergence here suggests the qualities of wisdom and author-ity 
that are associated with the "authorial" mode, where the narrative 
voice offers a guide to the moral truths both within the book and 
in the world outside of it: where the fictional world claims to be 
part of the real world or its historically verifiable copy, "the 
authorial narrator is viewed as a guarantor of authenticity and 
truth of the narrative material."~ Although the authorial mode is 
reinforced in other ways that I will discuss, the proleptic self-
restraint of the text suggests a desire to neutralise its effects 
and maintain a sense of the "transparency" of the tale. 
The text thus serves up its "version" of the "story" through 
temporal choices among others. The story is also, however, 
mediated by the perspective(s) or point(s) of view that the 
narrative process adopts that is, the narrative voice or voices: 
the choice of an overt or covert narrator, our access, or lack of 
it, to the consciousness of different characters, the way in which 
thought processes are conveyed, all clearly influence the reading 
process and our intuition of authorial purpose. In the context of 
third-person narration, Cohn identifies three modes of presentation 
of consciousness, which I will discuss in turn. Psycho-narration, 
Stanzel, Franz, Narrative Situations in 
University Press 1971, 41. 
the Novel, Indiana 
r 
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"the narrator's discourse about a character's consciousness" (Cohn, 
14), is the mode with which The Bell begins, making us immediately 
aware that the complexity of human thought and action will be an 
important concern in this novel: "Dora Greenfield left her husband 
because she was afraid of him. She decided six months later to 
return to him for the same reason." (7) Cohn terms this non-
empathetic focus on a figural mind dissonant psycho-narration, a 
mode closely related to the authorial narrative voice of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth-century novel, but which transfers the 
emotional and intellectual energy formerly lodged with the overt 
narrator to the characters. The narrating voice of the opening 
section is both omniscient and wise, yet impersonal; without 
location in a narrator-figure the bias of author-ity is again made 
to r1::-,pear as general truth: "Dora was still very young"; "Thif' was 
something she did not put clearly to herself at the time"; "How 
misplaced is the sympathy lavished on adolescents. There is a yet 
more difficult age which comes later, when one has less to hope for 
and less ability to change ... ", and so on. This voice remains 
distinct throughout the novel, discursive and very sure of human 
motivation and reaction: 
Those who hope, by retiring from the world, to earn a holiday 
from human frailty, in themselves and others, are usually 
disappointed. ( 85) 
The talk of lovers who have just declared their love is one of 
life's most sweet delights. Each vies with the other in 
humility, in amazement at being so valued. (104) 
Toby had 
earliest 
received, though not 
lessons of adult life: 
any moment one can be removed 
yet digested, one of the 
that one is never secure. At 
from a state of guileless 
I The 
serenity and plunged into its 
the waters rise of our own and 
( 160) 
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opposite, so high about us do 
other people's imperfection. 
effect of gnomic truth that Murdoch achieves here is 
reinforced by an alternating mode of consonant psycho-narration, 
where the narrating voice is further effaced through fusion with 
the consciousness it presents: "After he had gone Michael sat 
quite still in the dark. He knew in that moment that he was lost: 
the touch of Nick's hand had given to him a joy so intense, he 
would have wished to say so pure, if the word had here not rung a 
little strangely" (103; my emphasis). Here the displacement of 
emotional energy from narrator to character is seen at its 
greatest; even the act of verbalisation is given to Michael, 
suggesting an analogy between the fictional act and lived 
experience - as though one "narrates" one's life to oneself - that 
further reinforces the illusion of transparency. 
In this last example, the narrative voice tells us what Michael 
"would have wished to say", but retains the ability to speak for 
him. The citation of a character's own thoughts and inner voice 
seems only to have become a fully established technique around the 
middle of the nineteenth century (Cohn, 58), the heroes and 
heroines of earlier novels monologising only on exceptional 
occasions, after elaborate authorial introductions and in clearly 
audible fashion; "he cried," "she exclaimed," and so on. The 
growing interest in individual psychology at the end of the 
nineteenth century is likely to have influenced the Realist novel's 
frequent usage of this inner voice in tandem with the protagonists 
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"real" experiences and encounters, rather than in moments set aside 
for contemplation and debate. Cohn points out that the novel which 
perhaps brought about the most radical change in the integration of 
quoted monologue - as she calls "a character's mental discourse" 
(Cohn, 14) - with the surrounding text is James Joyce's Ulysses. 
Here for the first time, the inner discourse is no longer separated 
from its third-person context by introductory phrases or graphic 
signs of any kind, although changes in tense and "person" do act as 
grammatical signs. 
In whichever way an inner voice is presented, however, the 
monologist's content is always subordinated to the context of the 
utterance; our evaluation of what he/she says to him/herself always 
remains tied to the perspective created by the narrative voice (if 
it is not tied to any such perspective, it becomes a first-person 
genre which we know as "interior monologue". ) 6 In Chapter 12 of 
The Bell, Toby's thoughts of fear and repugnance after Michael has 
kissed him are qualified by authorial pronunciation - ''like all 
inexperienced people, Toby tended to make all-or-nothing 
judgements" (161) - drawing our attention to the naivety of the 
figural consciousness on display. Less obviously directive but 
again indicative of how to "read" the quoted monologue, is the 
narrative information given after Dora's thoughts on the train in 
the opening chapter: 
6 This is not to confuse our evaluation of the "speaking" 
character with the readerly reconstruction of the "implied 
author" that Wayne Booth discusses in The Rhetoric of Fiction; a 
concept that is liable to critical misuse and serves little 
exegetic purpose. 
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Dora stopped listening because a dreadful thought had struck 
her. She ought to give up her seat. She rejected the thought, 
but it came back. There was no doubt about it ... . She sat 
still and considered the matter. There was no point in being 
hasty .... The old lady would be perfectly all right in the 
corridor. The corridor was full of old ladies anyway, and no 
one else seemed bothered by this, least of all the old ladies 
themselves! Dora hated pointless sacrifices .... She decided 
not to give up her seat. 
She got up and said to the standing lady "Do sit down here 
please. I'm not going very far, and I'd much rather stand 
anyway. ( 1 6-17; my emphases) 
This presentation of quoted monologue as thoughts deliberately 
articulated in the service of conscious rationalisation is one way 
of utilising the unease over the very concept of mental language; 
in fact it suggests that we only think in this "self-conscious" 
manner when trying to avoid the promptings of the unconscious. 
Whether we really think in words is a thorny psycho-linguistic 
problem which both authors and readers may sense intuitively. This 
would explain the elaborate prefiguring of the emotional condition 
that necessitates "thinking aloud" in pre-realist novels that do 
not take an inner voice for granted, 7 the ironic usage of the mode 
as seen above, and the qualifications that often gloss a quoted 
monologue, suggesting that it is an authorial transcript of 
inchoate figural thoughts which may be composed of other "mind 
stuff" 0 as well as language: 
7 
B 
Dora was always moved by the pictures. 
but in a new way .... It occurred to her 
something real and something perfect. 
about perfection and reality being in 
was something her consciousness could 
Today she was moved, 
that here at last was 
Who had said that, 
the same place? Here 
not wretchedly devour, 
A point made by Cohn, 
Wilhelm Meister. 
who cites examples from Tom Jones and 




and by making it part of her fantasy make it worthless. Even 
Paul, she thought, only existed now as someone she dreamt 
about or else as a vague external menace never really 
encountered and understood .... When the world had seemed to be 
subjective it had seemed to be without interest or value. But 
now there was something else in it after all. 
These thoughts, not clearly articulated, flitted through 
Dora's mind. She had never thought about the pictures in this 
way before; nor did she now draw any explicit moral. Yet she 
felt that she had a revelation. (190-1; my emphasis) 
Dissonant psycho-narration takes care to acknowledge the 
unlikeliness of such "clearly articulated" insight, but the usage 
of quoted monologue has ensured that we at least draw some kind of 
moral from the incident. 
The directly linguistic presentation of thought processes is 
clearly problematic in many ways, despite the evolution of 
narrative technique from obligatory inquit phrases ("he said to 
himself") to a potential Joycean stream of consciousness. Indeed, 
in both passages that I have used to discuss this technique, it is 
used in conjunction with a third narrative mode which mediates 
between the knowing external perspective of psycho-narration and 
the directness of quoted monologue to create an effect of 
indeterminacy with regard to the consciousness of expression. This 
is achieved by using the same tense for the narrator's reporting 
language and the characters reflecting language and is thus termed 
by Cohn narrated monologue, "a name that suggests its position 
astride narration and quotation" (Cohn, 14): 
Toby was rather disappointed to discover that the community 
had women members. That, somehow, was not quite right. Still, 
everyone appeared to be extremely nice, except that Dr 
Greenfield man was a trifle rebarbative. (This was a word 
which Toby had recently learnt at school and now could not 
conceive of doing without. ) ( 48) 
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Toby neither "says" nor "thinks" this, yet we are aware that his 
consciousness has appropriated the narrative, as it were; even the 
opening sentence of psycho-narration is "coloured" ( through 
"rather") by the figural idiom which prevails in the next two, 
clearly evoking the sensation of unformulated thought ("That, 
somehow, was not quite right") and initial impressions ("that Dr 
Greenfield man".) In fact, the narrative commentary makes explicit 
here the internally focalized 9 perspective of the previous 
sentences; indeed, "authorises" Toby's use of a word that we might 
feel to be outside of his vocabulary. Usually, however, the 
relationship between words and thoughts is left latent, the figural 
consciousness suspended on the threshold of verbalisation in a way 
that could not be achieved by direct quotation or narrative 
commentary: 
The 
The good weather was holding. How very large and peaceful 
the scene was outside. Michael rested his eyes upon it with 
relief .... The lake was a brilliant yet gentle colour of which 
it was hard to say whether it was light blue or an extremely 
luminous grey. A slight warm breeze took the edge off the 
heat. To the left along the drive Paul and Dora Greenfield 
could be seen returning from their walk. (97; my emphasis) 
point of the technique is, of course, that Michael's 
simultaneous impressions of the lake's colour are conveyed without 
either the narrating voice or character having "to say." 
By blurring the immediacy of quotation and the mediacy of 
narration, narrated monologue clearly makes itself the province of 
9 Rimmon-Kenan, following Genette, uses the term "focalization" 
as a substitute for "point of view", arguing that the latter 
does not make the crucial distinction between "who speaks?" and 
"who sees?" 
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subtlety and ambiguity: the casting of a subjective mind into the 
grammar of objective narration often demonstrates the mendacity 
inherent in a character's formulation of inchoate feelings, the 
fending off of disturbing truths by the conscious mind: 
On a piece of straight road he ventured to look down at 
Toby. The boy was curled against him, his legs drawn up, his 
hands touchingly folded, his head lying now between Michael's 
shoulder and the back of the seat. The white laundered shirt 
hung open almost to his waist. As Michael looked at him, and 
then returned his gaze to the road, he had a very distinct 
impulse to thrust his hand into the front of Toby's shirt 
.... Michael felt a deep need to build, to retain, his 
friendship with Toby; there was no reason why such a 
friendship should not be fruitful for both of them; and he 
felt a serene confidence in his own most scrupulous 
discretion. (156) 
Psycho-narration makes explicit here the sexual attraction implicit 
in the prior physical description ("he had a very distinct impulse 
to thrust his hand into the front of Toby's shirt''), whose 
selective details are clearly of Michael's perception - but his own 
formulation of this emotion succeeds in sublimating and rendering 
more neutral these deeper feelings about Toby: "there was no 
reason why such a friendship should not be fruitful for both of 
them." Almost immediately after this he kisses the boy, and is 
retrospectively "stunned" by his action: we, however, have had 
sufficient indication through these discrepancies to be less 
surprised. 
Because narrated monologue can both amplify emotional notes and 
throw the figural mind into ironic relief, it is peculiarly 
dependent on the narrative voice that surrounds and mediates it: 
in the proximity of the dissonant psycho-narration that 
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characterises the authorial mode of The Bell, narrated monologue 
tends to counterpoint (as we have seen above) inadequate character-
assessment of self or situation with implicit or explicit 
narratorial information. We identify with and follow Michael's 
inner struggle most closely, since it is in conjunction with the 
presentation of his consciousness that narrated monologue is most 
often used. At the same time, however, the emergence of his "own" 
voice tends to reinforce our sense of him as trapped within his own 
"character": from the first instance - couched in the furtherly 
subjective context of a dream - we are aware of the concentration 
of self on past guilt, and of his inability to escape from its 
pernicious hold. Paradoxically the in-sight draws our attention to 
the (con)text: Nick, for example, is only seen through Michael's 
reflections on the past events that connect them, and our awareness 
of this lack of "perspective", of attention to the adult Nick in 
the Imber community, prefigures Michael's realisation of the 
dangerous limitations of this kind of introspection after Nick's 
suicide. This tension between identification and distance is 
created and maintained by the synthesis that narrated monologue 
achieves between "objective" (in this case) authorial narration, 
and subjective figural evocation. 
The sense of an external authorial focus at work in the novel, 
despite a fairly extensive use of narrated monologue, is reinforced 
by "producing" the "story" through the consciousnesses of Dora and 
Toby, as well as Michael. Although our sense is usually that of 
moving through their thoughts and emotions with them as events 
unfold, Murdoch chiefly employs psycho-narration; the narrative 
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voice tells us about these thoughts and emotions, often modulating 
briefly into narrated monologue in the course of such commentary. 
As such, we are never fully immersed in any one character's 
consciousness, but retain the narratorial perspective, absorbing 
the characters' appraisals of one another, often aware of 
circumstances that they do not know. The meeting between Toby and 
Dora in Chapter Fifteen, for instance, is given additional 
resonance by our awareness of Toby's recent incarnation of her as 
an image of female desirability, and of the reasons for this. Our 
sympathy for the three mediating characters rests on this awareness 
of the "whole story", and the sense the partial views convey to us 
of the human struggle to "see" people and events correctly. 
That there is never a "whole story", but always a "narrative" of 
events is of course part of the point: by the end of the novel, 
the narrative voice has withdrawn from the characters, explicitly 
summing up events in a detached and analytic fashion, but suddenly 
shifts into Michael's consciousness in an analeptic exploration of 
his reaction to Nick's death. "Objective" events are transformed 
into a highly personalised "version" as Michael explores their 
implications for himself whilst aware that this is precisely what 
he had done with the earlier events that related to Nick. The 
narrative withdrawal from Toby and Dora signals the end of their 
"story" - at least for us - and this is made explicit by the text: 
Toby writes from Oxford, where "already Imber had become a story" 
(306), and Dora thinks in the last line of the novel that "Tonight 
she would be telling the story to Sally." (317) Only Michael is 
left "unresolved", without a story, suffering and indeterminate, 
36 
his isolation confirmed by Dora's misapprehension of his feelings 
for Catherine. Thus does Murdoch satisfy the demand of the 
realistic novel for both a satisfying story and a sense that life 
is not like a satisfying story while of course making the 
paradoxical point that life is like that in so far as people do try 
to order and shape their experience, often to the detriment of real 
perception of that experience. 
The Bell is one of Murdoch's most critically acclaimed novels, 
praised for achieving a fine balance between the elaborate plotting 
and patterning that characterises her writing, and a sympathetic, 
"religious" and moral approach that is seen as compatible with her 
stated desire to work in the tradition of the great Realist 
writers. An examination of the narrative techniques of the novel 
has shown that this is achieved through the juxtaposition of an 
authoritative, omniscient narrative voice, calling up a concrete 
and knowable world populated by recognisable characters, and an 
inner perspective that reveals the subjective nature of "telling 
the story" and the essential isolation of the individual. This 
balance of two essentially opposing modes of fiction, authorial and 
figural, demonstrates a masterly appropriation of the twentieth-
century concern with individual psychology our notion of 
"realism" - to a traditional narrative mode which subliminally 
reassures by retaining control. The effect of tones from different 
eras corresponds to the two quite different cultural styles in the 
novel; the sense of incongruity we feel in the explicit connection 
of a 1950s present (exemplified by Dora) and a nineteenth-century 
past (Imber, both as a house and as a religious community: that 
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there is no real sustaining religious or social background for the 
characters is made clear by the precarious nature of the Imber 
world the chapel in the drawing-room, Patchway's respect for 
Michael as owner rather than as spiritual leader.) The interplay 
of an authorial, morally prescriptive narrative voice and the 
subjective, almost existential sense of relativity that emerges 
through the mediating perspectives emphasises the characters' 
tenuous connection with a bygone cultural and social order; reveals 
them as vulnerably separate from it, while reaffirming our 
"belongingness" through our ability to "read" these implications. 
*** 
The Bell has, as Peter Conradi puts it, "been claimed for 
'realism'" 10 and perhaps not coincidentally as "the clearest 
foreshadowing of Murdoch's real style, the one she was to choose 
from her several possibilities" (Dipple, 135). "Real style" can 
perhaps be read in two ways here; Dipple is ostensibly alluding, 
one presumes, to Murdoch's later novels, but also indicating that 
their "style" partakes of and reproduces "reality" in a way that, 
again presumably, some of the earlier novels do not. Read in this 
way, the comment offers an oblique acknowledgement of Murdoch's 
"un-real style", and indeed, Dipple goes on to divide the pre-1968 
(the year in which The Nice and the Good was published) novels 
into three dominant categories; the "novel of tricks", the 
, 0 Conradi, Peter, Iris 
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"ruminative novel", and the "religious novel", with "ruminative" 
slotting into critical first place. An examination of The Bell's 
narrative techniques has, I hope, demonstrated Murdoch's 
achievement in successfully combining an authoritative comedic 
plotting and complexity of theme with a subjective and emotive 
depth, and it is certainly true that she thereby succeeds in 
synthesising features of her writing that tend to dominate singly 
in The Bell's predecessors. It is precisely in this synthesis, 
however, that the strength of the novel lies; all three 
"categories" are, as it were, combined, as they will be in the best 
of Murdoch's mature fiction. To suggest, as Dipple does here, that 
Murdoch's "real style" is found in the ruminative novel, which is 
"characterised by deepening of character", is to leave out of 
account the way in which the· comedic, the "romantic" and the gothic 
(by no means an exclusive list) inform and enrich her work and 
constitute her own distinctive "style-of-the-real". An examination 
of the other "possibilities" will be useful in considering both how 
these elements are put to work locally and in the context of her 
oeuvre, and to this end I will now consider an apparently very 
different early novel, The Unicorn (1963). 
Both The Bell and The Unicorn review the value and the necessity 
of spiritual aspiration and interrogate the relationship between 
religion and enchantment. "Human beings are essentially finders of 
substitutes," says Julius King in A Fairly Honourable Defeat 
(1970), and the titles of both these novels points to the central 
need of the characters to create symbolic meaning and order in 
their lives through the imaginative sublimation of both objects and 
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other people to their own ends. Like "the bell", the point about 
the unicorn symbol is that it is empty, its attributes bestowed 
upon it by the characters rather than the author in an act 
analogous to the critical task of finding the novel's "centre", or 
"meaning". Both novels, too, are situated in the remote enclosure 
of romance and concern events in two discrete but connected houses 
(Imber, the Abbey; Gaze and Riders), and in both the present is 
held tragically in thrall by the past. Structurally and 
generically, however, they exemplify very different approaches to 
thematically similar materials: whereas the rural setting and 
recognisable religious community of The Bell call upon, as earlier 
discussed, the whole tradition of the realistic novel, The Unicorn 
utilises a stylised gothic mode and makes striking use of its 
atmospheric trappings. 
The novel is set "in a prototypical 'horrid' province of European 
Romanticism" (Conradi, 122), in an "appalling" landscape that is 
both intractable and pointedly hostile; the sea kills, the bog - in 
itself an image of the dark unknown floods at seven-year 
intervals, the very plants are "carnivorous". The self-conscious 
significance of the landscape is both like and more artificial than 
it is in Emily Bronte's Wuthering Heights, both part of the 
romantic, metaphoric "myth" that Murdoch is using and also the 
metonymic signifier of a finally irreducible, unassimilable reality 
that resists the "attempt ... to put the text back into the total 
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context from which it derives".'' This resistance is perhaps part 
of our perception of the novel as "unrealistic", and is part of 
Murdoch's attempt to show us the "power of our inherited collective 
view of the world" 12 which can exclude both its beauty and its 
horror. Paradoxically, the visual and tonal stylisation of the 
gothic mode becomes the means by which we are made to pay attention 
to the "real" world, to all that the self cannot tame or make sense 
of. 
Murdoch discusses the expansion of the blinkered enclosed self in 
confrontation with the world's particulars in her philosophical 
writings as the "sublime"; " a realisation of a vast and varied 
reality outside ourselves which brings about a sense initially of 
terror and when properly understood, of exhilaration and spiritual 
power" ( SER, 268). This attribution of value to the failure to 
understand opposes Sartre's "nausea" at the contingent unstable 
nature of the world by setting apprehension against explanation: 
our inability to "write" the world, to name all, becomes a spur to 
the attempt to "read" it with due attention and care even while 
knowing the futility of a quest for totality. The clash between 
mind and world, between the form-making imagination and the 
formless, become here a cause for celebration in much the same way 
that post-structuralist criticism celebrates aporia and 
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"differance". In a recent introduction to deconstructive 
criticism, Vincent B. Leitch notes that "To construct a narrative 
of experience is to produce fissures in that experience. Criticism 
is such a perpetual displacement from that immediacy". 13 The 
gothic, then, is used in The Unicorn as a "significantly" 
artificial and closed form, pointing to the alliance between story 
and enchantment and then to the schism between fiction and reality: 
"real" fiction (that we read) stands in here for our inevitable 
fictionalising of our lives, our inability to realise "a vast and 
varied reality outside ourselves". 
Like The Bell, The Unicorn is written in the third person and 
mediated through the consciousness of selected characters. In 
keeping with its narrower, more subjective world, however, there 
are only two centres of consciousness who remain consistently 
external to and alienated from the gothic character of the "story", 
and the calmly assured "placing" authorial voice has almost 
entirely withdrawn. Written in seven parts, like the seven-year 
cycle of events it recounts, the narrative alternates between the 
perspective of Marian Taylor, who has accepted the post of 
governess at Gaze Castle, but finds her "pupil" to be the fey, 
enigmatic mistress of the house, Hannah Crean-Smith, 14 and that of 
Effingham Cooper, a frequent guest at the neighbouring house, 
Riders, who complacently worships Hannah from afar. Both Marian 
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and Effingham belong to the quotidian, "secular" world in a way 
that the other characters - the beautiful imprisoned Hannah, the 
menacing Gerald Scottow, the eerie Violet Evercreech, silent Denis 
Nolan - do not, and both attempt to "read" the other characters in 
terms of this quotidian "reality"; to "explain away" the mysterious 
situation that they find at Gaze. In this attempt to assimilate 
and sublimate the gothic, they become surrogates for the reader, 
who must however, in turn, "read" Marion and Effingham through the 
imaginative inferences they make about the events they perceive. 
Murdoch's accomplishment here is to suggest through her narrative 
techniques that a psychomachia (Dipple, 267) is being carried on in 
which the two outsiders undergo the ordeals of the "story" and are 
forced - at least for its duration through an instructive 
enchantment/disenchantment that acts a~ a ritual passage back to 
the realm of the limited and the ordinary. That is, despite their 
retention of narrative perspective, we are made to see how the 
story acts upon them, as well as how they are able - or unable - to 
interpret it. 
The Unicorn opens, like many other Murdoch novels, with a 
dialogue that inserts us into the "story". The identity of the 
speakers, narratorial perspective and circumstances are all 
initially ambiguous, becoming only slightly less so as the 
narrative point of view is located with the anonymous "she". This 
linkage of subjectivity and anonymity subtly suggests both the 
literary archetypality of the situation - a lone woman in an alien 
"uncivilised" place - and that this will be "her" story in so far 





In other words, we are alerted in the opening pages to the use of 
opposing literary codes; Marian is both a Jane Eyre-like "literary" 
figure, a gothic governess already "written" by Henry James in "The 
Turn of the Screw", and a "realistic" character whose passage 
through the story will be in some sense a model of the reader's 
own. Through her we meet and receive impressions about the other 
characters, while "reading" her both through these impressions and 
her own ruminations about herself and her past. Both of these are 
predominantly conveyed through consonant psycho-narration, where 
little disparity is evident between the narrating and the figural 
consciousness: 
Marian now saw that Mrs Crean-Smith was barefoot. This 
observation at once defined the yellow robe as a dressing-
gown; and with this there came to her a general sense of 
something very slightly unkempt, the hair a little tousled, 
the finger-nails not quite clean, the lovely face a little 
tired, a little sallow and greasy, like that of a person long 
ill. Marian wondered at once whether Mrs Crean-Smith were not 
in fact somehow ill, and she had a guilty little feeling of 
revulsion. Yet she felt too relief and immediate liking. 
This person was harmless. (30) 
Despite the reportorial mode of observation and description, the 
perception here is clearly Marian's as an omniscient comment 
("there came to her a general sense ... ") is followed by a listing 
of physical details that conveys the sense of the process of 
observation. The subjectivity of impression is further underlined 
by the intertwining of thoughts and feelings in the next two 
sentences, leading to the final thought: "This person was 
harmless". Marian has good cause later to revise this opinion, and 
even at this point the gothic "markers" (which Marian too is 




"oddness" is in no way sinister) - the landscape, the anomalous 
characters, the sense of enclosure, of Gaze as a "prison" - suggest 
its possible inaccuracy and indicate that the judgement is Marian's 
alone. That Marian's own need to rationalise her surroundings 
might be paramount is suggested by the way in which narrated 
monologue here borders on quoted monologue: this last sentence is 
clearly a character's mental discourse cast into the grammar of 
objective narration that is, narrated monologue but the 
temporal immediacy of the perception (despite, paradoxically, the 
past tense) indicates a semi-conscious articulation, necessary 
perhaps to suppress the unease that Marian - and we - unconsciously 
feel. The combination of psycho-narration and narrated monologue 
that we see in this passage is, as we saw in The Bell, 
particularly effective in exposing the efficiency of the conscious 
mind's ability to neutralise disturbing feelings through the action 
of verbalisation. 
The obviously subjective nature of these narrated impressions is 
in keeping with Marian's clearly defined role - both in the novel 
and for the reader - as an outsider who must piece together the 
(con)text in which she finds herself. It also serves, however, to 
prefigure the consistent act of interpretation required by the 
"tale" of Hannah "within" the novel; an act faithfully performed by 
almost all of the characters who construe different accounts of her 
calm acceptance of immurement by her absent husband Peter, for her 
"crimes" of adultery and for his accident at the cliff edge. All 
accounts of Hannah and of the "situation" at Gaze are partial and 
subjective ones, and the absence of a dissonant and omniscient 
r 
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narrating voice suggests that there is no central truth to be 
found; that Hannah, like the unicorn, is a talismanic object on to 
which the other characters bring all the force of their symbol-
making powers. In the last chapter of Part One (significantly 
divided into seven chapters?), Marian learns the facts about 
Hannah's past from Denis, who loves and serves her with 
deliberately unquestioning devotion, and reacts immediately by 
perceiving these as part of a plotted sequence of events: 
Why have I come?" said Marian. Her own place in the story 
occurred to her for the first time. The ghastly tale had 
become a reality all about her, it was still going on. And it 
was a tale in which nothing happened at random . 
.. . . A prophetic flash of understanding burnt her with a 
terrible warmth. That was what she was for; she was for 
Gerald Scottow: his adversary, his opposite angel. By 
wrestling with Scottow she would makt her way into the story. 
(75-6) 
The compelling power of "the story" seduces Marian, like nearly all 
the other characters, into an act of interpretation that 
foregrounds her own role, an act tempting and satisfying because it 
confers identity and form upon the self. Unable to resist having 
"her own place in the story", the alien world of romance is 
transmuted into "reality", parodying her resolution upon arrival at 
Gaze: "Well, whatever here there was, sr,e would take it with her 
full and devoted attention. Perhaps the era of realism was 
beginning." ( 23) Marian's activity here allegorises the reader's 
own in the attempt to understand the significance of events, 
ironically underlining the gothic ("the ghastly tale .... in which 
nothing happened at random") while attempting its assimilation. 
1 
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Leaving Marian to "make her way into the story", the narrative 
perspective shifts to Effingham Cooper who is already part of it, 
and for whom we have been prepared by several references. Denis 
tells Marian that he "is a harmless man"(75), and both his 
pomposity and underlying sense of inadequacy are subtly 
communicated in the opening paragraphs of Part Two as he examines 
himself in the railway carriage mirror: 
He looked like a man; and he certainly passed, in the society 
which he frequented, as a clever successful enviable one. As 
he lifted his chin pensively to his image he recalled that 
Elizabeth, who was the only person who dared to mock him, had 
once said that his favourite expression was one of 'slumbrous 
power'. He smiled ruefully at himself and sat down. (82) 
The use of narrated monologue here skilfully counterbalances 
Effingham's need for reassurance through self-definition ("He 
looked like a man") against the narrative implication that this 
definition is a fraudulent one, measured against the social 
standards of a milieu in which he has already "passed" as "manly". 
The ambiguity of "voice" that narrated monologue sustains suggests 
his own sense of inauthenticity, but also, in the next lines, his 
pleasure in this "insight" and in toying with alternative persona. 
We are immediately alerted to his need to play a part, made 
explicit by the analeptic recounting of his falling in love with 
Hannah: after hearing "the outline of the story" (84) on a visit 
to Riders, he becomes "obsessed" by her, eventually meeting her 
when forced by a storm to take refuge at Gaze. 
No space-man about to step into his 
meticulously fitted to go into orbit than 
moment was ready to fall in love with 
supposed that the clever Elizabeth was the 
rocket was more 
Effingham at that 
Hannah .... He had 



















But the odd spiritual tormented yet resigned beauty of 
seemed to him now the castle perilous toward which he 
all his days been faring. (85-6) 
The chauvinism implicit in the valuation of "manliness", and which 
is later evidenced by his inability to treat women as equals, 
predisposes Effingham to inhabit a situation that he perceives as 
having "all the qualities of a wonderful story" (88); a medieval 
romance complete with a quest and a symbolic and necessarily 
unattainable Holy Grail, as opposed to Marian's Gothic ''ghastly 
tale". 
That the construction of such "fictions" sets up expectations and 
preconceptions that blur the perception of "reality" is both part 
of the message and the process in which the reader is involved: 
Hannah becomes increasingly incomprehensibl~ to the other 
characters because, like us, they are unable to see her other than 
in the terms of their own interpretations. Hannah herself is aware 
of this: "I'm a story for you, we remain on romantic terms" (108), 
she tells Effingham. Our dissatisfaction with Hannah as a 
"realistic" character is part of our intuition of her as an "absent 
centre" (Conradi, 123), as somehow less than the symbol that the 
other characters - and we - wish to make of her, yet available only 
"on romantic terms". In an important discussion of Hannah's 
"meaning" that parallels the one between Marian and Denis, Max 
Lejour offers an interpretation that attempts to take this into 
account: 
"In a way we can't help using her as a scapegoat. In a way 





She is our image of the significance of suffering. But we 
must also see her as real. And that will make us suffer too." 
"I'm not sure that I understand," said Effingham. "I know 
one mustn't think of her as a legendary creature, a beautiful 
unicorn-" 
"The unicorn is also the image of Christ. But we have to do 
too with an ordinary guilty person." (115) 
Max goes on to suggest that she may be "a pure being who only 
suffers and does not attempt to pass the suffering on" (116), but 
recognises that this may just be his "own form ... of romanticism". 
The effort to see Hannah as "an ordinary guilty person" proves, 
whether Murdoch intends this or not, to be well nigh impossible -
only Alice sounds a prosaic note when she tells Effingham "I don't 
dislike her, one couldn't, but we just don't get on" (90) - and 
this is compounded by the range of romantic truism and device that 
is bestowed upon her and which subtly suggests her complicity in 
the creation of fantasy. "Hannah makes romantics of us all" (93), 
Effingham tells Alice, and on apprehending Marian as "uncorrupted" 
(101), asks himself "Were the rest of them corrupted then?" The 
implication here seems to be that Hannah's spirituality does not 
possess the value accorded by the characters, that the "theories" 
of redemptive suffering, ' 5 of aspiration toward the good, are in 
fact her own fantasies, imposed upon reality by her will and 
unconscious needs, and by the concomitant needs of those around 
her. 
Part Three reverts to Marian's point of view, opening with a 
letter to her from Geoffry, with whom she has been unreciprocatedly 
, 5 A.S. Byatt points out that this idea derives from the thought 
of Simone Weil and suggests that it is "our touchstone for the 












in love and from whom she has escaped to Gaze. Its' breezy tone is 
in sharp contrast to the last chapter of Part Two, in which Marian 
tries to persuade Effingham that they should abduct Hannah in order 
to "make her realise that she is free" (139), and we may measure 
the extent of Marian's and our "corruption" or investment in "the 
story" by the sense of how alien this reminder of the "external" 
world feels. Her primary energies at this point, however, are 
devoted to retaining a grip on this world and its' values of 
personal liberty and individual choice: "She felt above all, as a 
sort of categorical imperative, the desire to set Hannah free, to 
smash up all her eerie magical surroundings, to let the fresh air 
in at last; even if the result should be some dreadful suffering" 
( 14 7). The tension between the worlds of realism and romance is 
evident in the vocabulary, confusions and contradictions of this 
statement, in which narrated monologue edges close to quoted 
monologue. As Robert Scholes notes, "that Kant phrase of modern 
morality, the categorical imperative ... [is] an attempt to generate 
an absolute and systematic morality without justification from the 
invisible world" (70); and it's ready usage here points to its 
(literal) part in Marian's vocabulary of morality even as the 
remainder of the statement conveys her sense of the frightening, 
incomprehensible terrain of "the invisible world" through it's 
vehement and vague language. 
The process of corruption, of habitation of the "ghastly tale", 
is exacerbated by the oddness of Marian's talk to the (rather self-
consciously) weird Violet Evercreech that follows this self-












Jamesie, but the end of the chapter sees Marian denying Denis's 
assertion that "Everyone here is involved in guilt": "'Except me,' 
said Marian half to herself after a moment. 'Except me, except me, 
except me ' " ( 1 5 7 ) . The momentum and suspense of Part Three, in 
which the "rescue" of Hannah is attempted and fails, acts, however, 
as an analogue of Marian's capitulation to the complicity she is 
finally forced to admit in significantly romantic and gothic 
language: "She had been taken to some place of ultimate surrender, 
and she had given in without a moan" (182). We too "give in" to 
"the pattern" (182), giving up any notion of an objective "truth" 
about matters as the narrative perspective shuttles between Marian 
and Effingham in the last four, steadily shortening parts of the 
novel, and the folkloric superstition that something apocalyptic 
will happen after seven years seems magically to come true. The 
plot proliferates as the literary conventions of the thriller and 
the gothic novel are heaped upon one another; Effingham almost 
drowns in the bog and is saved just in time, Peter's imminent 
return is announced, causing widespread hysteria, Gerald seduces an 
apparently willing Hannah and declares his intention of taking her 
away, nature erupts, murder and suicide follow with startling 
rapidity; to mention just some of the turns of the screw. 
The novel thus highlights its own excesses, drawing our attention 
to the ease with which we are lured into a fictional world that we 
perceive as "unrealistic" by allowing us to retain the vantage 
points that enable this perception. The mediation of narrative 
through the liberal, utilitarian world-views of Marian and 









seduced into the Romanticism that Conradi describes as "the 
apocalyptic yearning for redemption" ( 121 ) ; our desire for 
structure, resolution, a "story". The world of realism, in which 
reason "sees", is shown to be inadequate to the symbolic 
externalisation of psychic forces that "the story" enacts, yet so, 
by implication, is the surrender to the world of gothic romance. 
In the single moment of real spiritual enlightenment in the novel, 
as he faces death in the bog, Effingham perceives the world without 
the supporting structures of a "mythology", and experiences a 
sublime release from the burden of his own self-consciousness. 
This moral ascesis is believably momentary, however, and fades from 
his awareness as he returns ineluctably to the ordinary world of 
fantasy and egotism, or "reality". That this world is 
paradoxically one of self-satisfying fictions is evident in 
Effingham's analysis of events as he departs for London: 
It had been a fantasy of the spiritual life, a story, a 
tragedy. Only the spiritual life has no story and is not 
tragic. Hannah had been for them an image of God; and if she 
was a false God they had certainly worked hard to make her so. 
He thought of her now as a doomed figure, a Lilith, a pale 
death-dealing enchantress: anything but a human being. (317) 
The worlds of realism and romance are, in this way, shown as 
equally delusive conditions; the real-ising of romance and the 
romancing of the real are both evident in this passage, and both 
result in distortion and falsification. The novel, then, sustains 
a debate about exactly the problems and excesses that it appears to 
"suffer"; in a broad sense it is about the Romantic and Gothic 
power of the imagination to construct the private drama in which we 













suggests this through the externalisation of a "real"-unreal 
Romantic and Gothic drama. Through its' almost exclusively figural 
narrative, The Unicorn suggests the strivings of the imagination to 
reconcile the disjunction between mind and world, and presents 
itself in the service of such a (dis)enchanting enterprise. 
*** 
In a 1968 interview, Murdoch describes her work as alternating 
"between a sort of closed novel, where my own obsessional feeling 
about the novel is very strong and draws it together, and an open 
novel, where there are more accidental and separate and free 
characters. 1116 Although Murdoch has argued for the centrality of 
naturalistic character and written about the ways in which too 
great an attention to the form of the novel can detract from the 
illusion that the characters are free, 17 she does not suggest that 
these two aspects are irreconcilable; indeed, her point is the 
necessity and the difficulty of this reconciliation: "Ideally, and 
if one were a great writer, one could, I think, combine both these 
things in a single work and not have to oscillate between them". ,a 
It is not, then, merely a matter of resisting "a tendency too 
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thinking about and to rest upon that", ' 9 but also of knowing that 
"the mythical is not some thing "extra": we live in myth and 
symbol all the time". 20 
The Unicorn and The Bell might be seen as two sides of the 
Murdochian coin, evidence of the conflict between the author's 
desire to create "free", realistic characters, and her belief that 
human beings are essentially trapped by their own mythological 
structures. Part of my point in examining the techniques of these 
two novels has been to show the relationship between form and 
effect to be less simple than one might expect: the sense of 
"openness" in The Bell is created by an omniscient authorial voice 
who retains control over a familiar, knowable world, while the 
"closed" claustrophobic "feel" of The Unicorn is partially the 
result of "reading" it through two deliberately subjective and 
incomplete points of view. In equal but opposite ways, both urge 
on us - as do many of the early novels - a sense of the world's 
multiplicity and mystery ( The Bell through "objectivity", The 
Unicorn through "subjectivity") which they cannot yet adequately 
enact. The publication of A Fairly Honourable Defeat (1970) marks 
a new phase in her career in which she is often able to achieve a 
synthesis of these two modes: in this novel, the structure is 
allegorical, but functions in an enabling rather than a determining 
manner . I would like, however, to conclude this chapter by looking 
at the next novel, An Accidental Man (1971 ), where it seems to me 
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that Murdoch achieves notable success in the mediation between 
strongly imagined, "free" character, and the "myth" embodied in the 
plot; and that she does this through the transmutation of an 
omniscient narrating voice into multiple perspectives while 
preventing a subjective, figural "take-over" of the story through 
the use of other formal devices. 
In her early essays and interviews, Murdoch points to the 
temptation for the author to articulate different aspects of the 
self through the characters, who are then set to work, as it were, 
for their creator's salvation: 
One starts off hoping ... that a lot of people who are not me 
are going to come into existence in some wonderful way. Yet 
often it turns out in the end. that something about the 
structure of the work itself, the myth as it were of the work, 
has drawn all these people into a sort of a spiral, or into a 
kind of form which ultimately is the form of one's own mind. 
(Kermode, 114) 
In the 1968 Rose interview, Murdoch notes that ''if I could have a 
novel which was made up entirely of peripheral characters, 
accidental people like Dickens' people, this would be a very much 
better novel", and in a BBC interview after the publication of An 
Accidental Man, she refers to the book as "a deliberate attempt to 
exclude the central nucleus and to have a lot of different 
attachments pulling the plot and the interest away into further 
corners". 21 The title of the novel points to the paradox inherent 




of the characters. Perhaps the single greatest 
by Todd, Richard, Iris Murdoch: The 












convention of written literature, the title is, as Michel Foucault 
has noted, 22 part of the "template" used by a reader in order to 
generate meaning: functioning as a boundary around a text which 
separates it from all the other texts in the author's oeuvre - much 
as the name of a text's author functions to separate that oeuvre 
from the other components of what Foucault calls "the general text" 
the reader is pre-disposed toward a particular "reading". Here, 
the conflation of indefinite article and particular character 
indicate both the "sense in which Austin [the eponymous "hero"] is 
to be regarded as representative of everybody" (Todd, 45), and as 
part of a careful structure of pattern and ideas. 
Murdoch's activity in generating a character exemplifying through 
random chaotic development the notion of unintentionality 
paradoxically necessitates a proliferation of technical devices; in 
order to "free" Austin from apparent authorial control, Murdoch 
deflects the reader from the apparent centre that the title 
provides by concentrating her obvious formal attention at the 
"peripheries". The novel is thus remarkably successful in evoking 
both the sense of a centre around Austin that is necessary to a 
"realistic" tale, and a "meta-realistic" context in which the 
activities of centralising and marginalising events are shown as 
pursuits of authors, characters and readers. In a sense, An 
Accidental Man makes "real" (that is, fictional) the allegory of 
artistic manipulation that its predecessor enacts: unlike the 
22 Foucault, Michel, "What is an Author?", in Harari, Josue 
(ed.), ·Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist 




devilishly cynical and organised Julius King of A Fairly Honourable 
Defeat, Austin is without plan or intent, entirely "accidental", 
although almost equally destructive. Intentionality as a theme has 
been transmuted here into the content of the novel - that is, the 
characters feel themselves to possess intentions - but is seemingly 
removed from the formal structure that contains them. A closer 
look at the narrative techniques employed in the novel will reveal 
the way in which this balance is achieved. 
An Accidental Man is written in the third-person, but presented 
largely through dialogue, narrated monologue, letters and choral 
party scenes, without formal chapter divisions. The authorial 
voice makes way almost exclusively here for the figural 
consciousness, and the effect of these multiple points of view is 
almost to suggest a polyphonous first-person text. An absence of 
the moral "stance" that characterises nineteenth-century realist 
novels is made palpable by this polyphony, which oddly suggests an 
"objectivity" about the spiritual decay and mediocrity of its 
"intentional" characters while simultaneously recounting Austin's 
"undeserved" and accidental transformation from a self-tortured 
demonic bungler into a comparatively happy man. In On 
Deconstruction, Jonathan Culler discusses literary meaning as 
"produced by a process of grafting", a model offered by Jacques 
Derrida for thinking about the "logic" of texts; "a logic that 






strategies for proliferation". 23 In An Accidental Man, three 
principal techniques might be seen as grafted together in order to 
produce a work in which the ambiguities of form and an apprehension 
of the real battle fruitfully against one another: these are 
"scenes", epistolary sequences and dramaturgical episodes. 
Like many Murdoch novels, An Accidental Man starts with a 
dialogue that enacts a fait accompli which it then "freezes" while 
an explanatory account of how the characters have reached this 
point is given through narrated monologue. This both provides us 
with information about the (con)text in which they have been placed 
and reveals much about the "character" through whom the information 
is disseminated. An Accidental Man opens with Ludwig's proposal to 
Gracie, and accompanying retrospective musings that introduce all 
of the main characters as he perceives them. These perceptions are 
useful in providing a base layer for the grafting process that 
occurs as they are counterbalanced, confirmed and enriched in 
several subsequent "scenes" of this type, as well as conveying what 
Dipple describes as Ludwig's "earnest American aspect" (Dipple, 
210). These swift and shifting opening "scenes" "feature" 
characters in a way that echoes cinematic techniques, starting and 
ending at climactic and arbitrary points that are unmediated by an 
"external" narrative voice while at the same time offering the 
uniquely literary internal view of narrated monologue. As the 
novel progresses, the scenes tend to focus less exclusively upon 
23 Culler, Jonathan, 
after Structuralism. 
Henley 1983, 79. 
On Deconstruction: Theory and 




one character and to utilise shifting points of view that 
constitute an extradiegetic (Genette, 238) comment upon the 
particular states of mind that are evoked. Murdoch effectively 
conveys in this way the condition of self-absorption that humankind 
is prone to, making the point with an almost surreal lack of 
connection in a scene between Dorina, Charlotte and Mavis: 
"Will you come and stay with me, Dorina?" 
"Dear Charlotte-" 
"Don't press her, let her think about it." 
"You think Austin felt she might come and stay with you in 
his flat as a sort of halfway house?" 
"Yes" 
A grass snake got in with the goldfish once. Dorina's 
father tried to lift it out with a stick. It would have eaten 
the fish. Accidentally he killed it. Dorina ran away 
weeping. There were such terrible things in the world. 
Mavis felt a great void where her faith had been. This 
feeling was new, she had not missed it before. Yet it was not 
that she suddenly felt it was valuable. She had sacrificed 
her life for so1111:::thing of no value. Yet the sacrifice itself 
was of value. Could that be so? 
Mrs Carberry had seen such awful things on the telly before 
her husband came home and switched over to the World Cup. She 
saw some men out in the East shooting a prisoner. He was all 
tied up and they held his head down and shot him with a 
pistol. Sometimes the television men would say, hold it, 
don't kill him till our cameras are ready. 
"I do think Dorina should come and stay with me." (145-6) 
Ironically, it is the commonality of their experience of isolation 
and futility that renders them irrevocably separate from one 
another, a point suggested by the juxtaposition of "characteristic" 
narrative idioms that offer each person's "interpretation" of such 
an experience; Dorina's childlike parable of undeserved suffering, 
Mavis's philosophical self-searching, Mrs Carberry's inarticulate 




The narrative here offers an intensification of the techniques 
that Murdoch uses throughout the novel's "scenes", which 
consistently depict the characters' attempts to fend off or cope 
with the knowledge of the "terrible things in the world". This 
underlying fear of the accidental is subtly suggested by a strategy 
of internal motifs and echoes that link quite different "types" of 
character: Dorina's words here duplicate Gracie's after Ludwig's 
opening proposal, Mavis's sense of pointless self-sacrifice is re-
stated in almost identical words later in the scene, speaking for 
Charlotte's real abnegation in caring for her mother and consequent 
ill-treatment after Alison's death. Dreams, too, are used to link 
characters and events and to suggest the consistency and infectious 
quality of unconscious fears: Dorina, particularly sensitive to 
her environment,is effectively victimised by Austin's dreams of 
Betty's death, and both dreams and eventually enacts this drowning; 
Gracie's dream of a mystical childhood experience is linked to 
Garth's silent following of her in the street, which, in turn 
parallels the fateful moment that Ludwig sees but ignores Dorina, 
creating for her, in Gracie's words, "a sense of a world without 
order" ( 396). 
These implicit linkages and repetitions at the level of narrative 
prepare us for the thematic concern with recurrent action that 
Conradi calls "the single most notable feature of Murdoch plots" 
( 77). He points out that in The Bell, Nick is twice the agent of 
Michael's destruction and that in The Unicorn "the repeating plot 
is Gothicised into a fairy-tale of suffering over seven-year 





Matthew as complicit in his first wife's death, creating a 
situation in which Matthew does become ambiguously implicated in 
the similar death of his second wife. The sibling relationship 
between Charlotte and Clara dimly echos this reliance on life-myths 
which engender and draw from feelings of guilt, dependence and 
jealousy. The achievement of the later novel, however, is to show 
the "myth" as the property of the characters rather than (as the 
"symbolic" titles of the two early novels indicate) allowing it to 
feel like the product of authorial manipulation. Lorna Sage's 
description of the Murdochian turns of the screw as a "plot against 
plot" 24 succinctly captures the fine tension that is achieved in An 
Accidental Man between an ironically overwrought formal 
construction and its usage as a demonstration of the characters' 
own self-protective/dest.cuctive desire to contain their experience 
through the creation of fictions. 
This authorship is made "literal" by the second major formal 
device employed by the novel: the multi-faceted perspectives 
offered by the techniques already considered are further extended 
by the epistolary sequences that punctuate the narrative. Not only 
does each letter offer a version of the character's "voice", 
confirming or contradicting what we already know, but also a series 
of microcosmic plots and interpretations. Murdoch succeeds 
superbly here in demonstrating the complexity of seemingly 
frivolous people, as through the assumption of various social 
facades the characters reveal their particular ethos and expose 
24 Sage, Lorna, "The 
Quarterly, XIX, no.2, 62. 







their innermost needs: Ludwig's fierce desire to rationalise his 
decision about Vietnam, Austin's manipulative self-pity, Dorina's 
unhappiness, are (amongst other things) all apparent in their 
differing formulations of the events and emotions to which we have 
been made privy in preceding scenes. For the central characters, 
the letters provide us with a "check" against the "scenes" which 
are at once more "reliable" and at the same time solipsistically 
exclusive in their figural mediation of the narrative. 
"Literally" aside from the central characters, the epistolary 
sequences encompass a "peripheral" cast of writers who do not form 
part of the "story", but who attach the reader's attention to an 
extended world. In two radio interviews, Murdoch cites 
Shakespeare's comic characters, Shallow and Silence, as an example 
of supreme moral and aesthetic achievement 25 in the felt 
particularity of their existence on the edges of the action. Both 
the letters and "party" sections of pure dialogue provide fringe 
benefits of this sort in An Accidental Man, implying the chaos and 
"crowdedness" of reality through the proliferation of alternative 
plots (love affairs, pig farms and boutiques are begun and ended, 
fatal accidents bleakly reported) that challenge the centrality of 
"our" story, and a choral commentary that offers varying readings 
of it. The stylised realism of these devices constitutes the 
novel's own comment upon the ways in which form can intimate and at 
the same time limit reality; an issue echoed thematically and 
critically by Garth's sublimation of a life-changing experience 
25 With Ronald Bryden and A.S. Byatt, 1968, and A.S.Byatt, 1971. 









into a novel, the publication of which precludes his life from 
changing in the way that he has temporarily seen to be necessary. 
The line between consoling fantasy and the healthful creative 
exercise of the imagination is shown to be ambiguously blurred, and 
this is pointed to by the very form in which the idea is embedded. 
It is pointed to also by the consistency with which the 
characters employ the vocabulary of their cultural past and use it 
in the attempt to satisfy the endemic spiritual thirst of a secular 
age. A golden idyll of childhood is mythologised by many 
characters as a substitute for an age in which God existed and 
medieval romanticism is, as in The Unicorn, overtly utilised in its 
aspects of knight, princess, castle and quest in the attempt to 
colonise a barren experience of "reality". Murdoch has said that 
"creative imagination and obsessive fantasy may be very close, 
almost indistinguishable forces in the mind of the writer" 
(Conradi, 50), and this is shown to be true too of her characters 
through the very clarity of her imaginative formulation. 
The narrative techniques of An Accidental Man work towards the 
effect of an "objective" presentation of subjectivity, giving it 
"the almost documentary aspect of a report on how the human 
imagination tries, and fails, to sort out its confusion" (Dipple, 
207): the occasional emergence of an evaluative narrative voice is 
almost always in the context of figural meditation, and so serves 
almost as a heightened consciousness that is able to articulate the 
gnomic truths that characters suddenly and dimly intuit, rather 




Now there was neither home nor duty any more. She owned 
her toothbrush, but not the mug in which it stood 
Everything was entirely as usual, and yet entirely 
alienated, as if what one had taken to be someone's house had 
turned out to be an antique shop. Just for a moment all these 
things were proclaiming a secret truth .... Ownership was an 
illusion. 
Hardship reveals eternal truth, but only for a moment, since 
human beings soon recover and forget. Charlotte had not yet 
forgotten and still saw with the awful eye of vision. Of 
course it was a matter of pride to continue polishing and 
dusting. (94-5; my emphasis) 
Narrated monologue, mediating as it does between character and 
narrator, contrives here to blur the movements into and out of the 
authorial pronouncement. Only once, and tellingly, is this 
contextualisation dispensed with: 
Alone, Matthew sat down and poured himself another stiff 
whisky. He was drinking too hard these days. 
When a man has reflected much he is tempted to imagine 
himself as the prime author of change. Perhaps in such a mood 
God actually succeeded in creating the world. But for man 
such moods are times of illusion. What we have deeply 
imagined we feign to control, often with what seem to be the 
best of motives. But the reality is huge and dark which lies 
beyond the lighted area of our intentions. 
I came to set him free, thought Matthew. I came to change 
magic into spirit. It was all to be brought about by me .... I 
wanted that bond to be cut, but I did want to cut it myself. 
And now I am sad as if I had lost a beloved. (400; my 
emphasis) 
The articulate intelligence and philosophical speculation of this 
central statement could easily be attributed to Matthew, in many 
ways the most self-aware character in the novel, and indeed he goes 
on to "think" along similar lines. The use of quoted monologue at 
this point emphasises, however, the differences between these two 
passages: that his thoughts are presented in such an articulated 
and finalised form suggests that his disappointment at the failure 




conceptual inadequacy. As in the previous passage, the authorial 
voice is here deeply related to the figural consciousness that it 
glosses. Unlike other moments of moral didacticism in the novel, 
however, the passage is not (con)textualised by the figural, and so 
draws attention to itself as a discrete statement rendered by the 
omniscient creative voice. 
That the one moment of authorial emergence concerns the nature of 
creativity, and the relationship between art and reality, is of 
course no "accident". The task that both Matthew and Dorina 
describe in An Accidental Man as changing "magic into spirit" is 
soberly evaluated here as both dangerous and yet essential to the 
artist's endeavour. Through the imaginative act, man incarnates 
himself as "the prime author of change", and may do this so 
successfully that he is able to create/control all about him: in 
this way, everyone is shown as engaged in the creation of character 
and plot and thus prone to defamation of the reality which is "huge 
and dark". Almost at an end, the novel offers a critique of its 
own enterprise, ironically pointing to the ways in which it has 
sought to evoke the real and the accidental as coercive devices 
employed by its own characters. "Our revels are now ended", a 
cocktail party person quotes from The Tempest in the last lines of 
the book, and as Dipple puts it: "The artist as magician is 
Murdoch herself as a technician" (199); the tight formal design of 
the ending is both like a Shakespearian masque-drama and a refusal 





That the imposition of form and control is a human activity that 
is part of "reality" has been suggested in both The Bell and The 
Unicorn. In An Accidental Man, the narrative techniques provide an 
"allegory" of the difficulty of taking this into account without 
underestimating the world's darkness and unintelligibility, while 
simultaneously showing human beings as both possessing a subjective 
freedom and behaving in ways that are psychically predetermined. 
As Conradi says of A Fairly Honourable Defeat, "for want of any 
better term, the achievement of such balance might still be praised 






It is not true, as some writers on the art maintain, that the 
probity of the speaker contributes nothing to his 
persuasiveness; on the contrary, we might almost affirm that 
his character [ethos] is the most potent of all the means to 
persuasion. 
Aristotle, Rhetoric (I.1 .2) 
Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward 
form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the 
thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing 
is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for 
entirely different purposes. The tacit conventions on which 
the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously 
complicated. 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus: 4.002. 
A narratological examination of Murdoch's third-person fiction 
has revealed the ways in which orthodox verisimilitude, melodrama, 
philosophical discourse and romance combine to constitute a 
"contentedly impure" (Conradi, 258) mode that is capable at best of 
marrying competing views of reality and simultaneously suggesting 
that "truth"/"realism" are in infinite regress from the "dream of 
communication"' that attempts to contain them. I want now to 
examine an early and a more recent first-person text and to propose 
that the specific qualities of first-person narration are utilised 
by Murdoch to articulate this insight - that "reality is not a 
given whole" (AD, 20) through her narrators' own struggles to 
reconcile the tension between perception and interpretation. I 
suggest, then, that these novels "allegorise" the difficulties of 
Hartman, Geoffrey, Criticism in the Wilderness: The Study of 




re-presentation through their constituence as first-person 
narratives, as well as through the content of their "story", and 
that it is for this reason that they achieve a consistent 
excellence not always present in Murdoch's third-person novels. As 
in the last chapter, I will outline my conceptual framework through 
a discussion of the specific texts. 
In The Rhetoric of Fiction, the book that exercised the most 
extensive critical influence on early Anglo-American narrative 
studies, Wayne Booth arrives at the conclusion that "the most 
overworked [formal) distinction is that of person. To say that a 
story is told in the first or third person will tell us nothing of 
importance unless we become more precise and describe how the 
particular qualities of the narrators relate to specific effects." 2 
This methodological truism makes the necessary connection between 
"the particular qualities of the narrators" and "specific effects" 
so "obvious" as to deprive it of any real impact, and so allows 
Booth rather to emphasise the opposition between a "dramatised" and 
"undramatised" narrator that applies to both first- and third-
person narration alike. While this typology is in itself quite 
accurate a first person narrator may be centrally or only 
peripherally involved in the "story", and we have seen that third-
person narration may range between "omniscient", "figural" and 
"authorial" positions 3 - it does not account for what Cohn well 
2 
3 
Booth, Wayne, The Rhetoric of Fiction, The 
Chicago Press: Chicago and London 1961, 150. 
University of 
These terms are taken from Franz Stanzel's Narrative Situations 













describes as "the profound change in narrative climate"(14) between 
the two modes; an omission ironically criticised by Booth himself 
in an otherwise appreciative appraisal of Genette's structuralist 
approach to the narratological enterprise: 
"There is no hint in Narrative Discourse about how the 
narrating serves to heighten our sympathy for those like 
Marcel whom we travel with or to build our antipathy (whether 
serious or comic) toward any of the characters. Despite the 
quiet unmelodramatic tone, here be heroes and villains. But 
one would never suspect it, reading Genette." (Booth's 
italics) 4 
Booth implicitly takes note here of the intensification of 
meaning resulting from the nature of the first-person form that 
David Goldknopf has termed the "confessional increment": 
"everything an I-narrator tells us has a certain characterising 
significance over and above its data value, by virtue of the fact 
that he is telling it to us"." This is an aspect that Genette 
cannot, in a sense, acknowledge, since he maintains that all 
narration is logically in the "first-person", and that "The real 
question is whether or not the narrator can use the first person to 
designate one of his characters" (Genette, 244). The way that 
Genette uses the term "narrator" in fact corresponds to Booth's 
concept of the "implied author" rather than indicating the 
narrating "voice", seeming to designate the verbal collocation of 
norms that inform the work, and which might be said to create 
"uttering instances". His typological model is thus based on what 
4 
'5 
Booth, Wayne, "Rhetorical Critics Old and New", Reconstructing 
Literature. (ed.) Lerner, Laurence, Basil Blackwell: Oxford 
1983, 138. 




Nilli Diengott terms the "perceptibility of the narrative 
instance 116 rather than on "person"-alised "narrators", and he 
expresses, in a footnote, the need for "a more neutral or more 
extensive term which would not unduly connote, as this one does, 
the "humanness" of the narrative agent, even though in fiction 
nothing prevents us from entrusting that role to an animal ... or 
indeed to an 'inanimate' object'' (Genette, 244). 
In effect, Genette attempts to evaluate narrating techniques in 
"purely" structural terms, to keep his critical metalanguage free 
of the mimetic notions that may permeate the texts it examines: 
thus first-person retrospective narration is equated with third-
person authorial narration, since the schism between the "narrating 
instance" and the character is equally absolute in narrative rather 
than mimetic terms. While this stress on the non-personality of 
the uttering instance seems to me to be appropriate in considering 
"third-person" narration (what Genette would term "extradiegetic-
heterodiegetic"; a "nonembedded" narrative communicated by a non-
participatory "voice"), it is surely willfully "technical" in its 
application to a form that is centered around the revelation of 
personality through a specifically "subjective" language. Even if, 
as Genette suggests, the role of the narrating agent is entrusted 
to "an animal" or "inanimate object", the point is surely that we 
will attempt to endow that agent with "person-ality" by virtue of 
6 Diengott, Nilli, "The Mimetic Language Game and Two Typologies 






its employment of an "I". 7 In fact, Genette's typology clearly 
acknowledges the role of the "person" in that the heterodiegetic 
and homodiegietic categories define the degree of narratorial 
participation in the recounted events, and thus imply a mimetic 
unity of presence in the narrative "position". 
For different reasons, then, both Booth and Genette leave out of 
account the altered relationship between the narrator and the 
protagonist when that protagonist is his/her own past self, 
although both note the possibilities of employing the first-person 
narrator as hero(ine) or as an observer of the narrative action. 
This relationship, between the first-person "narrating self" and 
the "experiencing self", may seem superficially similar to that of 
a third-person narrative "voice" (whether overtly authorial or 
figurally mediated) to "its" characters, in that presentation, 
commentary and evaluation are involved in both cases: it is, 
however, essentially different in that everything that is narrated 
in first-person form is existentially relevant for the narrator. 
To put it another way, past thought must be presented as remembered 
7 The desire to recuperate 
mimetically is interestingly 
Alain Robbe-Grillet's novel 
the narrating agent or instance 
evident in critical readings of 
La Jalousie (1957), where the 
modernist convention of limited "point of view" is employed with 
extreme rigour without an attached "I". The effect of this is 
to place the reader in the locus from which the "world" of the 
novel is seen, to experience la jalousie by seeing through la 
jalousie. The obsessive precision with which the je-neant 
narrator (Morrissette, 114) delineates the spatial disposition 
of objects serves, however, to position the effaced 
consciousness so precisely as to make it readily recuperable in 
mimetic terms: the reader "deduces" the figure of the jealous 
husband, and thereby duplicates "his" voyeuristic act of 
reconstruction. (See Morrissette, Bruce, Les Romans de Robbe-
Grillet. Paris 1963; McHale, Brian, Postmodernist Fiction. 






as well as expressed by the self, and this imaginative recreation 
of the past may itself become an important thematic and 
characterising aspect of the novel. 
The yoking of the two "selves" through the first-person pronoun 
means that the experiencing self is always viewed by a 
retrospective narrator who "knows the plot", and who is free to 
slide along the connecting temporal axis. The presentation of this 
plot is, however, necessarily limited by the narrator's perception 
and understanding of his or her own past, so that, contrary to our 
instinctive expectations, the omniscient narrator of a third-person 
fiction has a more plausible access to the psyches populating that 
narrative than does the first-person narrator. Thus, where psycho-
narration can evoke unacknowledged sub-verbal depths of 
consciousness, its first-person equivalent, self-narration (Cohn, 
14), can only reveal what the character already knows and comes to 
learn about him/herself. The correlation pointed to in third-
person narration between a sense of the real and the "artifice" or 
"mediacy" of the technique that evokes this sense is to some extent 
dissolved by the evident (and literal) "self-consciousness" of the 
enterprise: since the text cannot attempt to render itself 
transparent in the service of reality, it must attempt the opposite 
process of "solidifying" and authenticating its own material by 
emphasising the process by which the protagonist is transformed 
into the narrator of the story. That is, the first-person novel 
tends to reveal both a psychomachia and its successful completion 
by showing how its "hero(ine)" has acquired enough self-knowledge 






Under the Net is Murdoch's first published novel, 0 and the first 
of her often masterly expositions of the first-person male voice, 
of which there are six to date. Perhaps her most "philosophical" 
fiction, it anticipates poststructuralist concerns in its 
concentration on the relationship between language and 
representation, yet embodies these in a comic picaresque quest of 
stylish and sophisticated narrative allure. The book's immediate 
popularity was connected to its literary relationship to the 
absurdist writings of Samuel Beckett and dedicatee Raymond Queneau, 
whose novels its hero cherishes, and to its identification with the 
post world-war II renascence of "angry" social realist novels. As 
I suggested in Chapter One, however, both ascriptions are 
fundamentally misplaced; in its overt concern with the way in which 
artistic form both redeems and deforms the real, Under the Net took 
on "anxieties about realism many decades before these became 
fashionable in England" (Conradi, 27), while at the same time 
insisting upon the reality and difficulty of the relationship 
between words and actions. The interest of this novel is now 
partly in its thematic prefiguring of the Murdochian oeuvre, one 
aspect of which is the usage of the first-person to "embody" these 
anxieties. A closer look at Under the Net, using Cohn's 
narratorial definitions, will give substance to these points. 
As third-person narration may choose a variety of positions 
between the poles of authorial or figural evocation of 
consciousness, so first-person narration ranges between a 





retrospective voice, consciously presenting the "story", and a 
monologic voice that seems unaware of its textuality (the "case-
limit" of which would be what is usually referred to as "interior 
monologue"). Within the retrospective mode, to which Murdoch 
adheres in the first-person novels, Cohn finds the same basic types 
of presentation of consciousness as she has described in third-
person narrative; psycho-narration becomes "self-narration", and 
monologues either "self-quoted" or "self-narrated". Like psycho-
narration, self-narration encompasses a range of possible styles 
whose poles are similarly termed dissonant and consonant: from the 
enlightened and distanced memorialist who discursively elucidates 
the confusions of earlier days, to the narrator who identifies so 
closely with the past self as to ostensibly renounce all cognitive 
privilege. Consistent adherence to one position is, however, 
relatively rare, most retrospective first-person novels tending to 
modulate between the "narrating self" and the "experiencing self" 
in order to use the expectation and tension that dissonant 
commentary can evoke, through its display of retrospective 
knowledge, to heighten our perception of the "consonant" action. 
Under the Net initially appears to practise this modulation to 
just such ends; in the first chapter particularly, passages of 
consonant self-narration are consistently interrupted by 
discursive, "dissonant" narratorial asides in the present tense, 
comprising commentary and reflection upon people and events that 
would seem to issue from Jake-as-narrator. Later in the novel, 
however, events prove much of this to be part of a structure of 






example, that Finn has "very little inner life", and that "[he] is 
always saying he will go back to Ireland ... but he never goes'' (22). 
The events of the novel prove these early conclusions to be 
erroneous and suggest that they are based on an immensely 
inadequate conception of Finn's personality that is a consequence 







subtly to the 
around the 
organising consciousness: "I count Finn as an inhabitant of my 
universe, and cannot conceive that he has one containing me; and 
this arrangement seems restful for both of us" (9). Jake-as-
narrator is, of course, perfectly aware of his past 
misapprehensions and their implications, and it is, in a sense, the 
process of becoming-aware that the novel enacts; the recognition of 
his misreadings that "enables" Jake, as it were, to write the story 
that is Under the Net. Murdoch's use of apparently dissonant 
narration that is later revealed to have conveyed "consonant" 
information makes palpable the necessities and dangers of formal 
organisation; by means of this technique, we are lulled, like Jake, 
into interpreting and solidifying the "facts" through a too-easy 
adherence to the literal and metaphoric presence of the "first-
person", and are similarly compelled eventually to "re-read" 
characters and events. 
The necessity of a perpetual re-reading of one's "context" in 
life is one of the novel's central ideas, articulated explicitly 
through the character and ideas of Hugo Bel founder and 
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author. At the time of the story, Jake is a writer who tells us 
that he lives by "literary hack-work, and a little original 
writing, as little as possible" (21). Part of the "hack-work" is 
regular translation of the French novelist Breteuil, whose "bad 
best-selling stuff" allows Jake to feel superior as an artist, 
while retaining a defensive refusal to grapple with the realities 
of art, as he refuses the reality of personal relationships: 
Le Rossignol would be a best-seller, and that meant money in 
my pocket. It's about a young composer who is psychoanalysed 
and then finds that his creative urge is gone. I enjoyed this 
one, though it's bad best-selling stuff like everything that 
Jean-Pierre writes. 
Dave Gellman says I specialize in translating Breteuil 
because that's the sort of book I wish I could write myself, 
but this is not so. I translate Breteuil because it's easy 
and because it sells like hot cakes in any language. Also, in 
a perverse way, I just enjoy translating, it's like opening 
one's mouth and hearing someone else's voice 
emerge .... Anything rether than original work, as Dave says. 
( 20) 
Like (self-)narrated monologue, this offers the character's time-
bound thoughts in the guise of "objective" narration, and like 
(self-)quoted monologue, casts them partly in the narrative 
present. This combination of recognisably past thought ("Le 
Rossignol would be a best-seller"), "fact" ("It's about a young 
composer ... "), and feeling ("I enjoyed this one") is fused into a 
judgement that, as later becomes clear, is Jake's at the time of 
the "story" rather than the time of narration. This sleight-of-
hand is employed throughout the novel, "deceiving" the reader, 
whose knowledge of what Barthes calls the "semic code" 9 (cultural 
9 Barthes, Roland, S/Z (trans. Miller, Richard). Hill and Wang: 







stereotypes like dissonant narrators who, sadder and wiser, review 
their past) produces a belief in what seems to be an authoritative 
narrating-self: we take Jake's presentation of "fact" here as 
still applicable to his life as it is at the moment of narration 
("now"), and this effects in us a comparable shock to Jake's when, 
in this case, Jean Pierre Breteuil wins the Prix Goncourt despite 
the initial decisive dismissal of his work. 
Jake in fact warns us at the outset of his unreliability as a 
narrator and connects this explicitly to his being as an artist: 
when tempted to tell Mrs Tinkham about his homelessness: 
I gritted my teeth against speech. I wanted to wait until I 
could present my story in a more dramatic way. The thing had 
possibilities but as yet it lacked form. If I spoke now there 
was always the danger of my telling the truth: when caught 
unawares I usually tell the truth, and what's duller than 
that? (18) 
He has a rule of "never speaking frankly to women in moments of 
emotion" (13), confesses that he has misinformed the reader about 
paying Madge "a little rent" (he pays none), notes that when 
questioned directly he usually lies (96) and twice mentions 
"uttering my first lie" (43, 220). He concomitantly assumes that 
others are lying back, and this allows him to disregard any version 
of events that is uncongenial to him. When Sadie Quentin, sister 
of a past love, Anna, tells Jake that she is being pursued by his 
erstwhile friend, Hugo, he refuses to believe her, and sets in 






I knew from old that Sadie was a notorious liar and would tell 
any falsehood to procure herself even a quite temporary 
advantage. Also the sheer improbability of Hugo being in love 
with Sadie was, when I considered it, overwhelming .... That 
there was some stratagem going forward which involved Hugo was 
very possible; but a more likely explanation of it was that 
Sadie was up to some professional caper which Hugo was trying 
to circumvent .... Indeed, it was even possible that it was 
Sadie who was in love with Hugo and was trying to entangle him 
in some way. This, when it occurred to me, seemed a very 
plausible hypothesis indeed. 
When I had come to this conclusion I felt better. Somehow 
the idea of Hugo gone on Sadie had been extremely distasteful 
to me. (68; my emphases) 
Self-narrated monologue here conflates the "experiencing" 
thoughts and the "narrating" tense to produce both a demonstration 
of self-delusion and the experience of its plausibility: the 
(re)formulation of "facts" into "a more likely explanation", with a 
"plausible hypothesis", and thenceforth into a "conclusion", hints 
at the inaccuracy of Jake's musings and at his need, stated early 
on, for "everything in ... life to have a sufficient reason" (24). 
When Hugo, for whom Jake has been searching throughout the course 
of the story, starts unwittingly to reveal the true nature of the 
relationships between himself and the Quentin sisters, Jake feels 
himself to begin to "get the facts; theories could come later" 
( 225). Ironically, however, he is at this point still "someone in 
the grip of a theory" (43), as he early decides Anna to be: having 
decided that Hugo cannot be in love with Sadie, he smugly presumes 
that it is Anna that they are discussing: 
"What made you think that?" I asked. "I mean, that she was 
keen on me." 
"She talked about you a lot," said Hugo, "and asked me 
questions about you." 
"What a bore for you," I said, and I smiled to myself. 






of one's interest about the object of hers, should that object 
not be you. (225) 
We are kept firmly in the domain of the experiencing self here as 
Murdoch makes use of the gnomic statement that is the province of 
the all-knowing, authorial narrator in order to reinforce our 
collusion in Jake's misprision of people and situations. When 
Hugo's revelations open up all the events and relationships in the 
book to new interpretation, Jake notes that "[a] pattern in my mind 
was scattered and the pieces of it went flying about me like birds" 
(225), an image later reinforced by the entry of the starlings 
"whirring" around Hugo's empty flat. The effect of consonance-in-
disguise is seen here to offer the reader a fictional experience 
that parallels the character's in "life": we too are forced to 
abandon the pre-scribed "pattern" in the light of this new 
knowledge, and to take in the different "point" of many events. 
Ross Chambers argues in Story and Situation that twentieth-century 
narratology has ignored the phenomenon of "narrative point", 
offering for analysis a model of "a stable text whose characters 
are determined by an overriding vision and/or voice that takes 
responsibility for the act of narration and determines 'our' 
understanding, as readers, of character and event". 10 It seems to 
me, however, that narratological examination reveals here how the 
first-person form of Under the Net works, paradoxically, to de-
stabilise the very notion of "an overriding vision", through an 
, 0 Chambers, 
the Power of 
1984, 19. 
Ross, Story and Situation: Narrative Seduction and 




explicit demonstration of how different situations produce 
different "point" for both narrator and reader. 
The realisation that he "knew everything", but "got it all the 
wrong way round", "dislocate[s] past, present and future" (227), 
and teaches Jake to attenuate his desire for cognitive absolutes: 
I had no longer any picture of Anna. She faded like a 
sorcerer's apparition; and yet somehow her presence remained 
to me, more substantial than before. It seemed as if, for the 
first time, Anna really existed now as a separate being and 
not as a part of myself. To experience this was extremely 
painful. Yet as I tried to keep my eyes fixed upon where she 
was I felt towards her a sense of initiative which was perhaps 
after all one of the guises of love. Anna was something which 
had to be learnt afresh. When does one ever know a human 
being? Perhaps only after one has realized the impossibility 
of knowledge and renounced the desire for it and finally 
ceased to feel even the need of it. (238; my emphasis) 
This question is to be re-articulated by another Murdochian 
writer-narrator, Bradley Pearson in The Black Prince (1973), and 
explicitly connected there to the problems of realistic 
representation in art: the tension between the need to tell, or 
see, the truth, and the need for concepts and form. These two 
positions are given specific "voice", both literally and 
metaphorically, in the earlier novel, through the reported 
conversations with Hugo which Jake works up into stylish, flowery 
philosophic dialogues and publishes as "The Silencer". Hugo is 
deeply suspicious of mimetic art and describes language as "a 
machine for making falsehoods" (60). "Try describing anything", he 
tells Jake, "our conversation for instance, and see how absolutely 
instinctively you ... " "Touch it up?" "It's deeper than that," 




really was." ( 59) It is, of course, a deliberate irony that Jake 
finds himself "touching up" their talks, "constantly supplying just 
that bit of shape, that hint of relation, which the original had 
lacked" (63), and a subtler one that, as Conradi points out, 
despite the presentation of a unified "original" conversation 
between Jake and Hugo, we are told that "it took half a dozen cold 
cure sessions to reach this point", so that the version that we 
receive is also an "artistic" conflation that is at least one 
remove from "the truth". 
This postulation of truth as infinitely receding across 
intervening cultural conceptions anticipates postmodernist doubts 
about representation and knowledge,,, but unlike contemporary 
deconstructionists, Hugo exhibits no anxiety about the 
impossibility of unmediated vision. Jake comments that for Hugo, 
"each thing was astonishing, delightful, complicated, and 
mysterious" (58), and it is the acquiring of this Hopkins-like 
sense of the unclassifiable particularity of things that finally 
frees him from artistic stasis. Paradoxically, he must then 
immediately begin to use concepts and constructs, the 
Wittgensteinian net of language to which the title alludes;' 2 the 
only means of describing the world and yet the simultaneous 
mechanism that transforms its "reality". The link between Jake's 
habit of untruth and his care for verbal and written shapeliness is 
, , 
, 2 
Christopher Bigsby suggests this to Murdoch, who replies: "Oh 
yes, all the stuff that Barthes and Co. think they invented. I 
knew all about that in the 1930s." (The Radical Imagination and 
the Liberal Tradition. Junction Books: London 1982, 228.) 






not, in Under the Net, a final judgement about conceptualisation, 
theory or art: re-reading "The Silencer", Jake notices "a variety 
of ways in which the position of Tamarus might be strengthened" 
(81 ), and Hugo, the source of the ideas, later tells him that he 
"learnt an awful lot from it" (220), anticipating Murdoch's 
statement that "the final and best discoveries are often made in 
the formulation of the statement". ' 3 What Jake learns is that this 
formulation must take cognisance of its own desire to suppress the 
detail and contingency of the world, to impose the net of 
interpretations and assumptions that controls and "fixes" what is 
"brute and nameless" behind words. 
Conradi notes that the critic too has to struggle to crawl under 
the net: "it is easy enough to speak about "structure", but hard 
to find a context in which to celebrate those particulars which 
break away from and blur the structure, and give us the artful 
illusion that the work is overflowing back into life. Jake's 
problem is also the reader's" (43-4). There is much incident, 
event, story, in Under the Net that is not colonised by formal 
necessity, but "meaningful" just because it has happened, as are 
both Pierrot's and Murphy's experiences in the two novels alluded 
to in the first chapter. The consonant narrative techniques keep 
us within the realms of the "story", emphasising the "pure 
pleasure"' 4 of the fiction while attempting to alert us to the 
, 3 
, 4 
Murdoch, Iris, The Fire and the Sun. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford 1977, 87. All further references will be to this edition 
and will be abbreviated as FS. 
Haffenden, John, Novelists in Interview. Methuen: London and 




dangerous pull of the imagination, and are thus expressive of 
Hugo's anti-theory "theory"; that one should be "ruled by the 
situation itself"(80). The novel ends in "story-time" rather than 
the "now" of narration, leaving Jake's new access to the real 
appropriately open-ended and imperfect as he eschews classification 
of Mrs Tinkham's kittens, half of whom are pure Siamese, half pure 
tabby: "It's just one of the wonders of the world", he says in the 
novel's closing words. 
Under the Net might itself be seen as a celebration of these 
wonders rather than as an attempt to contain them within a 
realistic structure, its picaresque, episodic organisation around 
specific ideas lending it the form of a philosophic fable in which 
the settings are often strange or fantastic, the action sometimes 
unreal, and the patterning overtly deliberate. It is a tribute to 
Murdoch's narrative power, however, that these elements of the 
"unreal" at the same time direct the reader's attention toward the 
sensory world, infusing the ordinary with a vertiginous strangeness 
that makes us "real-ise" it anew. Literature "creates a "vision" 
of the object instead of serving as a means for knowing it" 15 
argued Russian Formalist critic Victor Shklovsky, discussing 
literature's unique ability to "defamiliarise" our habitual 
perceptions of the world through its inventive subversion of the 
patterns of ordinary language, ideological forms and literary 
codes. Murdoch here attempts this disorganisation of our 
categories of the real/unreal, literary/lifelike at the levels of 
, 5 quoted by Bennett, Tony, Formalism 
London and New York 1979, 24. 
and Marxism. Methuen: 
,· 
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both form and content: Conradi points out that in the picaresque 
novel it is traditionally "the quest of the knight that matters, 
while that of his Sancho Panza takes second place" (31), 16 and 
Jake's acknowledgement of the solipsism that leads him to ignore 
Finn's "story" might be seen as an ironic deconstruction of the 
novel's own participation in this genre. It is the relinquishing 
of such solipsism that, paradoxically, allows Jake to speak in the 
"first-person": his ability to accept the kittens' "difference", 
and by implication the world's incomprehensibility, suggests that 
he has begun, by the end of the novel, to learn to "see" rather 
than always attempt to "know"; a process that Under the Net, the 
novel that he has been fictively enabled to write, demonstrates in 
turn. 
*** 
If Under the Net displays anxieties about realism that anticipate 
a later literary climate, The Black Prince is of its time in 
formally embodying these in an integumental framed narrative that 
is both a realist tale - an "adventure story", a "celebration of 
love" - and a fable about artistic creation and its relation to 
truth. Bradley Pearson's sad and funny account of his love for the 
daughter of a friend and rival novelist is enclosed in fictive 
editorial matter and contradicted in postscripts "by" several of 
the characters. The novel thus foregrounds its own "fictionality" 
and suggests an allegiance to a contemporary novelistic movement 
1 6 Bennett points out that this archetypal picaresque couple can 
in turn be read as "a device of "defamiliarisation" in relation 





that has been termed "metafiction"' 7 in order to denote its overt 
formal and/or thematic self-awareness. In Narcissistic Narrative, 
a critical study of metafiction, Linda Hutcheon discusses our 
contemporary cultural desire to highlight the construct-ive nature 
of our artefacts in the light of art's dual propensity toward 
realism and social documentation on the one hand, and towards form, 
"narcissism" and self-exposure on the other: a duality that 
Murdoch differently describes in "Against Dryness" in terms of a 
contemporary fictional degeneration into the "journalistic" and the 
"crystalline". Hutcheon argues that mimesis has always included 
diegesis, that Don Quixote is "not only the first 'realistic' novel 
but also the first self-reflexive one", ,e and that the explicitness 
and intensity of modern textual self-preoccupation differs only in 
the degree of emphasis on process (the "making" of the fictive 
artefact) rather than product (the presented story): presumably 
the formal and thematic self-awareness of metafiction reflects a 
poststructuralist consciousness of the instability of the 




The term seems first to have been used by Robert Scholes in 
The Fabulators, London and New York 1967, and is perhaps best 
exemplified by John Fowles's self-consciously pseudo-Victorian 
novel, The French Lieutenant's Woman, to which I have referred 
in Chapter One. 
Hutcheon, Linda, Narcissistic Narrative. Methuen: London and 
New York 1984, 4. 
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The dependence of what Robert Scholes and Robert Kellogg describe 
as "empirical" narrative' 9 on stable linguistic referents is an 
issue that Murdoch discusses in her early critical book on Sartre, 
and which is clearly important to her. 20 The recognition that all 
speech is in a sense distortion, that "the whole language is a 
machine for making falsehoods", is one common to the narrators of 
both Under the Net and The Black Prince, men who want to be serious 
artists and who are bedeviled by this paralysing knowledge: Jake 
has concluded that "the present age was one in which it was not 
possible to write an epic" and stops himself "just short of the 
point at which it would have become clear ... that the present age 
was not one in which it was possible to write a novel" (19); 
Bradley meditates upon art's function and relationship to "life": 
, 9 
20 
Art ... is the telling of truth, and is the only available 
method for the telling of certain truths. Yet how almost 
impossibly difficult it is not to let the marvels of the 
instrument itself interfere with the task to which it is 
dedicated .... How can one describe a human being 'justly'? How 
can one describe oneself? With what an air of false coy 
humility, with what an assumed confiding simplicity one sets 
about it! 'I am a puritan', and so on. Faugh! How can these 
statements not be false? Even 'I am tall' has a context. How 
the angels must laugh and sigh. Yet what can one do but try 
to lodge one's vision somehow inside this layered stuff of 
ironic sensibility, which, if I were a fictitious character, 
would be that much deeper and denser? (55-56) 
Scholes, Robert and Kellogg, Robert, The Nature of Narrative. 
Oxford University Press, 1966, 254. 
I have quoted the relevant passage in the introduction: "We 
can no longer take language for granted as a medium of 
communication. We are like people who for a long time looked 
out of a window without noticing the glass - and then one day 
began to notice this too". This metaphor is used again in the 
Black Prince where its source in 1 Corinthians, 13 is made 
explicit: "We conversed as angles might converse, not through a 





The-chinese box structure of The Black Prince is further 
complicated here since Bradley is indeed a fictitious character, 
engaged in fictitious autobiography. The usage and adeptness of 
formal irony in this novel can be measured against the "simple" 
thematic embodiment of these issues in Under the Net, where their 
collaboration with the picaresque produces a philosophic fable 
fully aware of its tangential angle to the realist enterprise. In 
the later novel, Murdoch has adopted with relish and skill the 
various devices of style and structure that a self-reflexively 
"fictional" 21 mode has offered, without accepting or promulgating 
the wider demoralising implications: as Lorna Sage puts it, 
reality certainly does elude words, but "novels can be made out of 
their unending approximations and wasteful clashes". 22 A closer 
look at the "making" of The Black Prince (and "The Black Prince") 
will reveal Murdoch's formal development of, and play with, the 
problematics of representation that are already thematically 
evident in Under the Net, as well as a strong moral attachment to 
the values of "realism"; a combination that led an early reviewer 




Scholes and Kellogg use this word to designate a romantic and 
didactic tradition of narrative that is 
with the ideal rather than the real, with 
rather than a representational way. 
Narrative, 13-14.) 
essentially concerned 
truth in an "artistic" 
(See The Nature of 
The 
69. 
Sage, Lorna, "Female Fictions", 
Contemporary English Novel. 
in Bradbury and Palmer (eds.), 
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The novel opens with a brief "Foreword" by a suppositious 
"Editor", P. Loxias, whose account of his circumstantial possession 
of the manuscript "belongs to a tradition of realism going back as 
far as Defoe" (Conradi, 187), while his name indicates his symbolic 
function as the Apollo figure who serves here as both inspiration 
and addressee. Dipple remarks that "The identification probably 
has its source in Aeschylus, where in the Agamemnon Cassandra 
addresses her god Apollo as Loxias as she strips herself of her 
prophetic garment and prepares to die" (112), and in his postscript 
Loxias endorses an ironically modernised description of himself 
that provides a clear reference to the mythical flaying of the 
mortal Marsayas by Apollo for his hubristic challenging of the god 
to a musical contest: "The name conceals the identity of a 
notorious rapist and murderer, a well-known musical virtuoso, whose 
murder by a peculiarly horrible method of a successful fellow-
musician made the headlines some considerable time ago" (355). The 
myth too images a stripping in preparation for death - Edgar Wind 
describes the flaying as "a tragic ordeal of purification by which 
the ugliness of the outward man was thrown off and the beauty of 
his inward self revealed" 24 - and this prepares us for a tale that 
is both about divinely inspired ascesis and real human pain and 
24 Edgar Wind, Pagan Mysteries in the Renaissance. 






fictional layer; Bradley's own "foreword", which acts as a 
prosopopeia to his "past self", and which he begins with an 
explication of his methods for rendering that self and that past: 
Although several years have now passed since the events 
recorded in this fable, I shall in telling it adopt the modern 
technique of narration, allowing the narrating consciousness 
to pass like a light along its series of present moments, 
aware of the past, unaware of what is to come. I shall, that 
is, inhibit my past self ... (xi) 
The precise delineation of a consonant narrative position, the 
slightly stiff technical vocabulary ("the modern technique of 
narration"), the careful rhythm balance of the prose; all of these 
immediately suggest Bradley's intellectual, fastidious personality 
as well as an "author-ity" over the material that is confirmed by 
his subsequent identification with a later narrating-self, "a wiser 
and more charitable man" (xi). Interestingly, Bradley's opening 
explanations about the mechanics of his narration sound remarkably 
similar to James Joyce's comments about the prototype for his own 
employment of interior monologue in Ulysses,: "In that book 
[Dujardin's Les Lauriers sont coupes] the reader finds himself 
established, from the first lines, in the thought of the principal 
personage, and the uninterrupted unrolling of that thought, 
replacing the usual form of narrative, conveys to us what this 
personage is doing or what is happening to him". 27 Cohn remarks 
that the "vast majority" of first-person novels present themselves 
as written memoirs, or as "spoken discourse subsequently recorded 
by a listener"(175), and identifies this authenticating impulse as 






absent from the interior monologue, 20 which can only effect an 
illusion of immediacy by effacing the reality of its own linguistic 
existence. In Joyce's description it is somehow the thought itself 
that "conveys" the action, whereas Bradley feels a converse need to 
account for the "obvious" fiction of immediacy/the effacement of 
mediacy, that is an essential constituent of "realism", "the usual 
form of narrative". Where interior monologue offers the illusion 
of bypassing the machinery of language, The Black Prince might be 
said to expose its cogs and wheels in order to suggest "the 
direction in which the acquisition of a true unmediated vision 
might lie" (Conradi, 187; my emphasis), rather than to reveal 
itself as a locus of "truth" in a metafictional spirit of self-
exposure. 
The Neoplatonism already evidenced by Loxias is extended in 
Bradley's foreword, which combines "factual" background and 
philosophic discourse on virtue and its relation to art and life. 
Both the narrating and the experiencing selves are evidenced as 
Bradley offers a description of himself that is "in the persona of 
the self of several years ago" (xii), but "irradiated", as he puts 
it, by the light of a later wisdom. This (con)fusion of voices 
arouses and maintains various levels of expectation and curiosity: 
we are told of the "fabulous" and "dramatic" nature of "the story 
28 Cohn points out that the term has been conflated to designate 
two quite different phenomena: "1) a narrative technique for 
presenting a character's consciousness by direct quotation of 
his thoughts in a surrounding narrative context; and 2) a 
narrative genre constituted in its entirety by the silent self-
communion of a fictional mind." (Transparent Minds, 15) The 
latter, to which she refers here, should thus more accurately be 






that follows" (xii) but that its narrator's past work has "reached 
and doubtless will reach only a perceptive few" (xii); we are told 
too that "human life is horrible" and "utterly unlike art" (xviii), 
but that "Good art speaks truth, indeed is truth" (xi). The 
disparity between the comments and observations of the narrator who 
describes himself as "conventional, nervous, puritanical, the slave 
of habit" (xviii), and the author of these gnomic observations is 
evident but the demarcation still unclear here: the "story" will 
reveal the pulling of the self from the self ("the taking away of 
faces'') that provides for the transmutation from the one to the 
other. "The Black Prince", like Under the Net, will show life as 
stranger than fiction ("fabulous", "dramatic") and yet ironically 
constituting the means by which life is able to become fiction. 
The "real" oppositions between life and fictional form are 
pointed to by Bradley in the opening of the central narrative, 
extending the emphasis on the writing of the tale that has already 
been made evident: 
It might be most dramatically effective to begin the tale at 
the moment when Arnold Baffin rang me up and said, 'Bradley, 
could you come round here please, I think I may have just 
killed my wife'. A deeper pattern however suggests Francis 
Marloe as the first speaker, the page or house-boy (these 
images would appeal to him) who, some half-hour before 
Arnold's momentous telephone call, initiates the action. For 
the news that Francis brought me forms the frame, or counter 
point, or outward packaging of what happened then and later in 
the drama of Arnold Baffin. There are indeed many places 
where I could start. I might start with Rachel's tears, or 
Priscilla's. There is much shedding of tears in this story. 
In a complex explanation any order may seem arbitrary. Where 









A number of effects are skilfully achieved here through the 
retention of perspective by the narrating self: the suggestion 
that the sensational aspects of the story are not appropriate to 
its "deeper pattern" subtly accomplishes as "dramatic" an opening 
as could be wished for, while the "shock value" of this startling 
statement is nicely balanced against, and increased by, the 
subsequent measured evaluation of formal strategies. In a sense, 
this opening statement encapsulates much of the "meaning" of The 
Black Prince, balancing as it does form against formlessness, genre 
(the thriller, the murder mystery) against "reality", a centre of 
(Bradley) against many others (Arnold, Rachel, significance 
Priscilla), and simultaneously offering the real lure of an 
exciting and suspenseful story ("Art is adventure stories" Loxias 
tells us at the end {363}). Retrospectively too, we realise that 
beginning with Arnold's telephone call about Rachel would be 
"dramatically effective" in its balancing of Rachel's call to 
Bradley about Arnold at the end of his narrative. The way in which 
such neat circularity is indicated, yet avoided, is a measure of 
the novel's skilful enlargement of "the drama of Arnold Baffin" 
into an area of quite different concerns while still retaining a 
primary sense of the importance of the foregrounded subject matter. 
Early on in the novel, Bradley describes its subject matter as 
"the story of my relations with Arnold and the astounding climax to 
which these relations led" {8); reminiscent, as Conradi points out, 
of Jake's statement in Under the Net that "my acquaintance with 
Hugo is the central theme of this book" (53). Like Jake also, 





novelist, using the deficiencies of the other to compensate for his 
own failure. We receive Bradley's opinion early on, mediated 
through the guilty memory of his review of Arnold's latest novel 
whilst arguing with him about their respective conceptions of art: 
"Arnold Baffin's work was a congeries of amusing anecdotes loosely 
garbled into 'racy stories' with the help of half-baked unmeditated 
symbolism .... Arnold Baffin wrote too much, too fast. Arnold Baffin 
was really just a talented journalist" (27). Together with 
Julian's description of her father's novels as "Jesus and Mary and 
Buddha and Shiva and the Fisher King all chasing round and round 
dressed up as people in Chelsea" (107), this provides a parodic 
account of Murdoch's own work, 29 and an exemplification of 
"journalistic", as opposed to Bradley's "crystalline", writing as 
Murdoch describes it in "Against Dryness": Bradley believes in 
long-suffering and apprenticeship, "the condensing and refining of 
a conception almost to nothing"(152), but lacks curiosity about the 
world, whereas Arnold "regard[s] art as "fun"", liking and 
accepting everything, failing to "make distinctions" ( 152). In 
both cases, extended imaginative endeavour is absent: "Fantasy 
operates either with shapeless day-dreams (the journalistic story) 
or with small myths, toys, crystals .... Neither grapples with 
reality" (AD, 19) . The "story" enacts Bradley's progressive 
tuition in contingency, enabling him to write the very 
29 As many critics have pointed out: Byatt, A.S., "People in 
Paper Houses", 35; Conradi, 192; Dipple, 117; Pearson, Gabriel, 
"Simultaneous and Quadratic", Guardian, 22 Feb, 1973. 
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"Baffinesque" 30 tale of his love for Julian. Similarly, although 
his "story" remains opaque to us, Arnold feels that his love for 
Christian has "completely transformed" (212) him as a writer: "I 
have never been in a grimmer mood in my life .... I shall write much 
better harder stuff in future, as a result of this, whatever 
happens", he tells Bradley in the letter that precipitates his 
final and fatal quarrel with Rachel. 
Both men thus undergo the ministrations of Eros, and feel 
themselves to be metamorphosised both as men and as artists; or 
rather, to see that the one thing is the same as the other. "[M]y 
development as an artist was my development as a man" (113), 
Bradley says early on, but he is unable to breach the gap between 
life and art until the cataclysmic experience of his unlikely love 
for Julian. Murdoch has described Eros as ''the ambiguous spiritual 
mediator and moving spirit of mankind" (FS, 34), and this ambiguity 
is central to the The Black Prince: if in its higher incarnations 
it fires the creation of art, it also manifests itself in 
"possession and vindication of self"(359), as Julian puts it in her 
postscript. Conradi suggests that one of the most original 
elements in Murdoch's work is "the extraordinary marriage between 
Freud and Plato that she has effected, between a mechanical model 
of the psyche and a moral one" (77), and these different 
manifestation of Eros image the simultaneous apprehension of human 
beings as both "powered by mechanical energy of an egocentric kind" 
and as motivated by the desire for God and Good. 
30 Byatt, A.S., 
English Novel. 
"People in Paper Houses", in The 





displays the works of this sacred and profane love machine through 
the alternating voices of "narrator" and "character", who in turn 
demonstrate the progressive stages of "de-facement" and the 
enlargement of self that the tuition of Eros facilitates. The 
point is, perhaps, that each is given its due: the gravitational 
pull of the "story" is balanced by the educative clarification of 
passion that the "narrating" undertakes, and each is mediated 
through the other: "one might reductively say that the 'myth' in 
[Murdoch's] books comes out of Freud, but the expansion away from 
it out of Plato" (Conradi, 77). 
Seizure by Eros is experienced at each "level" 3 ' by both the 
characters and the reader: in The Bell, Michael feels that both 
his religious and sexual impulses spring "deeply from the same 
source" (99), and Bradley too, writes of "my love and my art, as 
aspects of what was ultimately one and the same" (172). Even the 
puritanical Julian of the postscript admits that ''Soul-energy may 
be called sex down to the bot tom. ( Or up to the top) " ( 3 5 9) . The 
Black Prince demonstrates these ambiguities through the ambiguities 
of the narration, which highlights the paradoxical relations 
between "fiction" and "truth" in a way that oddly enhances our 
sense of its realism. Bradley's tripartite tale is told primarily 
"by" the experiencing self, but amended and commented upon by its 
reflective, wiser narrating-self. The punctuation of the story by 
"soliloquies" from its "author" functions as an interrogative, 
disruptive, and yet pleasurable deference, invoking a central 
31 Conradi, to whom the previous paragraph is greatly indebted, 
frequently refers to "high" and "low" Eros. 
' 
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convention of the first-person genre: we know that the "story" is 
also the story of the movement from "character" to narrator, and 
the gap between these two "positions" constitutes the novel's 
central interpretive aporia. As Bradley himself remarks: "There 
is ... an eternal discrepancy between the self-knowledge which we 
gain by observing ourselves objectively and the self-awareness 
which we have of ourselves subjectively: a discrepancy which 
probably makes it impossible for us to ever arrive at the truth" 
( 1 55). 
The first part of Bradley's narrative reveals a "subjective" 
self-awareness as, "feeling the proximity of enlightenment" (37), 
he is about to leave for a seaside retreat where he hopes to be 
able to break his writer's block. The hectic juxtaposition of 
crises that prevent him from leaving is perceived by Bradley as a 
sort of cosmic plot against his projected artistic fruition; after 
having been embroiled in the dreadful aftermath of the quarrel 
between his married friends Arnold and Rachel Baffin, he has 
(presciently) "a superstitious feeling that if I did not make my 
escape ... something would grab me" ( 28). This is an ironic 
counterpart to the tessellated crises of Part One - ex-brother-in-
law Francis arrives with news of Bradley's ex-wife, Christian's, 
return; Arnold phones to say he thinks he has murdered Rachel; his 
sister Priscilla appears, on the verge of a breakdown after leaving 
her husband - the "plotted" feel of which is reinforced by the 
rapid "cutting" between dramatic scenes of dialogue and 
explication, and passages of self-narration. In this way, we too 
are ensna·red in the events of the "plot" and subtly made to "read" 
' 
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them initially as Bradley does. The contrast, however, between 
this consonant presentation of self and his actions and responses 
to others serves as a "character-ising" device that prefigures the 
dissonant commentary of the authorial self, disrupting this primary 
reading. Despite a description of himself as "gentle to timidity" 
(xvi), a seeker and a perfectionist, Bradley displays a relentless 
self-interest in the face of these initial troubles, identifying 
them with an alien power destructive of his creativity: "I had 
within me at last a great book. There was a fearful urgency about 
it. I needed darkness, purity, solitude. This was not a time for 
wasting with the trivia of superficial planning and ad hoc rescue 
operations and annoying interviews" (97). 
This portentous declaration, with its denigration of the messy 
affairs of others, comes shortly after he has enmeshed himself 
further in the Baffin drama through a quasi-sexual encounter with 
Rachel, and discovered the real pitiability of Priscilla's 
estranged situation on his recovery mission to her house in 
Bristol, where her husband has installed his much younger, pregnant 
mistress. The authority of the statement invites us to acquiesce 
in Bradley's view of the paramountcy of his artistic vocation, but 
the consonant narrative almost immediately betrays the coexistence 
of the human needs that are unacknowledged as the sources of his 
art, and therefore unable to feed into the creative act: "I let 
Francis into my house because Rachel had kissed me. At that stage, 
a fluid all-conquering confidence was still making me feel 
benevolent and full of power. Also I wanted a drinking companion, 




iterative quarrel with Arnold, declares that "Art isn't chat plus 
fantasy. Art comes out of endless restraint and silence" (26), 
Arnold rightly replies that "If the silence is endless there isn't 
any art". This self-same debate is here demonstrated through the 
"unwitting" contradictions of the narrative in the consequent 
expression of a need for "silence" and a desire to "chatter", and 
is later explicated by the narrating voice: "any artist knows that 
the space between the stage where the work is too unformed to have 
committed itself and the stage where it is too late to improve it 
can be as thin as a needle. Genius perhaps consists in opening out 
this needle-like area until it covers almost the whole of the 
working time" (154). 
This comment is made in the course of a narratorial meditation 
upon virtue and its relation to art and morality that immediately 
precedes Bradley's realisation of his love for Julian. In this 
last section of Part One, Murdoch employs the two poles of self-
narration to both heighten the pace and excitement of the story, 
and to mediate its reception: the climactic final scene comes 
after this dissonant retrospective analysis, and achieves much of 
its effect by offering a consonant, dramatic "re-presentation" of 
the moment through a dialogue that subtly takes up the anterior 
ideas. In the course of a "tutorial" on Hamlet, Bradley perceives 
his condition through and in his ability to articulate the peculiar 
nature of Shakespeare's achievement in this play, "speaking as few 
artists can speak, in the first person and yet at the pinnacle of 




"Hamlet is nearer to the wind than Shakespeare ever sailed, 
even in his sonnets. Did Shakespeare hate his father? Of 
course. Was he in love with his mother? Of course. But that 
is only the beginning of what he is telling us about himself. 
How does he dare to do it? How can he not bring down on his 
head a punishment which is as much more exquisite than that of 
ordinary writers as the god whom he worships is above the god 
whom they worship? He has performed a supreme creative feat, 
a work endlessly reflecting upon itself, not discursively, but 
in its very substance, a Chinese box of words as high as the 
tower of Babel, a meditation upon the bottomless trickery of 
consciousness and the redemptive role of words in the lives of 
those without identity, that is human beings. Hamlet is 
words, and so is Hamlet. (163-4) 
Here Bradley - and Murdoch too - speak "in the first person and 
yet at the pinnacle of artifice"; the extraordinary eloquence and 
originality of the disquisition reminiscent of the soliloquising 
narrating-self, yet also wildly digressive from the "character" so 
far exhibited. Murdoch has remarked that she feels the presence of 
.. Shakespeare in Hamlet "as a kind of trembling emotional excitement" 
(Bellamy, 132), and the self-referentiality that Bradley comments 
upon in that play might be taken to apply to her own novel too. 
One might perhaps say that The Black Prince is words, and so is the 
Bradley Pe(a)rson(a), but that for all that, as in Shakespeare's 
work, the words succeed brilliantly in conferring identity. A 
self-referentiality is suggested in another way by the 
appropriateness of Bradley's reading of Hamlet for our own reading 
of the novel that he narrates ("The Black Prince"), as well as to 
the novel in which he is "the narrator" (The Black Prince): both 
Hamlet and this text "invite and require a Freudian reading, and 
neither can be satisfied or exhausted by it" (Conradi, 196). As he 
puts it to Julian: "It is true but it doesn't matter. A 







As much as Julian, the reader here undergoes tutelage in 
sophisticated critical evaluation: eschewing any retrospective or 
narrative commentary, his unabashedly eloquent and difficult 
interpretations force the reader to attend to the text with the 
same "immediacy"/un-mediacy that Bradley extends to Hamlet. The 
consonant presentation of these ideas paradoxically enables a 
demonstration of a momentary transcendence of the consonant 
persona; Bradley suddenly appears to be speaking "out of character" 
and offering us "in-sight" into both self and subject in a way that 
is comparable in its effect to the persuasive artificiality of 
Hamlet's soliloquies. We are thus directed to "read" him anew, and 
to differently feel the effects of his strong persona(lity) in a 
way that suggests how Julian might .see him. The deliberate 
selectivity of reportage in this scene ultimately works 
interestingly to defer its "meaning" for Bradley while indicating 
"meanings" of Bradley, although the opening of Part Two ingenuously 
assumes that "What it was that had happened the percipient reader 
will not need to be told. (Doubtless he saw it coming a mile off. 
I did not. This is art, but I was out there in life)" (169). The 
effect, however, of the artfully "realistic" limitation of our 
knowledge of the consciousness of another, is to make us feel "out 
there in life" despite a pervasive sense that "this is art". 
Part Two enacts "the whole history of 'being in love'" (204), 
demonstrating a partially real and partially delusive experience of 
ascesis through a similarly mixed narrative mode. As in the first 
part, the narrating voice regularly intercepts, "irradiating" and 









"condition". In this section, however, the retrospective vision 
colludes with rather than works against the story, leaving any 
apprehension of Bradley's insensitivity to and misprision of others 
to arise from the "evidence" of dialogue and event. This collusion 
implies a narratorial sanctioning of the validity of his experience 
that is reinforced by an early anticipation of readerly scepticism 
and reductive interpretation: 
.... those who have 
someone whom they 
this can occur. 
to me. (169) 
never fallen desperately in love with 
have known for a long time may doubt whether 
Let me assure them that it can. It happened 
Some readers may feel that what I am describing is a condition 
of insanity, and in a way this is true. (171) 
I spoke earlier in this rigmarole of my whole life travelling 
towards what had now occurred. Perhaps my friend the 
percipient reader may be excused for having interpreted this 
conception in the following terms: that all this dream of 
being a great artist was simply a search for a great human 
love .... I should say at once that this was not my case. (172) 
The reader, especially if he has not had the experience I have 
been describing, may feel impatient with the foregoing 
lyricism. "Pshaw!" he will say, "the fellow protests too much 
and intoxicates himself with words .... All he means is that he 
suddenly felt intense sexual desire for a girl of twenty" .... I 
will not pause to answer this reader back. (173) 
In the opening pages of the novel, Bradley describes Francis 
Marloe as belonging "to that sad crew of semi-educated theorizers 
who prefer any general blunted 'symbolic' explanation to the horror 
of confronting a unique human history" (xiv). Uniqueness is 
insisted upon here through and by the intense "peculiarity" of the 
feelings, but it is interesting to note that Bradley does not 





"words" and "feeling". As he initially notes, in an echo of 
Wallace Stevens, language does mark the moment of division from 
that which it seeks to render: '"I had fallen in love with 
Julian. ' The words are easily written down. But how to describe 
the thing itself?" ( 169). 32 
Try, however, he does, fulfilling the promissory subtitle of his 
novel and demonstrating the way in which Eros transfigures his 
world. "Is the real like this, is it this?" (54), he early ponders 
in a consideration of "truth" in art, and this section abounds with 
attempts to answer the question. The experience of "absolute love", 
the loss of self and concomitant apprehension of the world, the 
presence of the sexual within the spiritual, the strangeness of 
sleep and tears, the horror of jealousy, even the sensation of 
vomiting; all of these and more are brilliantly evoked, and convey 
both a consonant state of mind and "truthful" perception through 
the constant validation and modification of such descriptions by 
the eloquent narrating voice: 
32 
... what I experienced that evening on the Post Office Tower 
was a kind of blinding joy. It was as if stars were exploding 
in front of my eyes so that I literally could not see. 
Breathing was fast and difficult, not unpleasant. I was 
conscious of a certain satisfaction in being able to go on 
pumping myself full of oxygen. A quiet and perhaps outwardly 
perceptible shuddering possessed my whole frame. My hands 
vibrated, my legs ached and throbbed, my knees were in the 
condition described by the Greek poetess ..... These are the 
merest physical symptoms. They can readily be sketched in 
words. But how to convey the rapture of the mind, as it 
mingles with the body, draws apart into itself, and mingles 
again, in a wild and yet grateful dance? (200) 
See Stevens's "Not Ideas about the Thing but the Thing Itself", 








As is true for its general formal construction, the incorporation 
of "fictive" self-doubt here serves to reinforce the illusion of 
the real: we are made to simultaneously identify with both the 
consonant and dissonant narrating voices as we are engaged in the 
concrete detail of the feelings and the perception of the 
impossibility of "real-ly" expressing them linguistically. Here, 
as elsewhere, this perception "allows" a cross-over into a 
substitutive poetic and metaphoric language: 
My body ached with a painful delightful sensation of desire 
and gratified desire, somehow merged into a single mode of 
being. I groaned softly over myself. I was made of something 
else, something delicious, in which consciousness throbbed in 
a warm daze. I was made of honey and fudge and marzipan, and 
at the same time I was made of steel. I was a steel wire 
vibrating quietly in the midst of blue emptiness. These words 
do not of course convey my sensations, no words could. I did 
not think. I was. ( 231 ) 
Bradley's ability to use this kind of language in coexistence with 
an admission of its "superfluousness" points to the artistic 
development of the blocked, neurotic experiencing-self of the 
novel's opening, who implies that he would rather wait mutely all 
his life than "profane the purity of a single page .... with anything 
less than what is true" (xii). It also confirms his early 
intuition, after Rachel makes sexual overtures to him, of writerly 
liberation through the visitation of Eros: "was this perhaps in an 
unexpected form the opening itself of my long-awaited 'break 
through', my passage into another world, into the presence of the 
god?" ( 112) . His subsequent impotence in bed with her is 
paralleled by the controlled and analytical description of the 








of his failure as an artist and distance from "the presence of the 
god". Bradley's premonition of change is, however, sound, although 
as the narrating-self remarks, "the happening may be curiously 
different from its prefigurement" (113). The difference is 
underlined in the later passage by the expansion and relaxation of 
Bradley's creative "vocabulary" and techniques, which formally 
reinforce the validity of his sense, upon recognising his love for 
Julian, that "She had filled me with a previously unimaginable 
power which I knew that I would and could use in my art" (172). 
The urgency and intensity of the focus upon Julian is heightened 
by this additional descriptive "power", but essentially conveyed 
by the narrative inattention to the other "characters": although 
Bradley several times mentions Francis's pleas that he visit and 
help Priscilla, he does not discuss her obvious plight or his 
duties in this regard, and appears to take Christian's hospitality 
to, and Francis's care for her wholly for granted. He similarly 
mentions but then ignores the fact that Rachel seems to be "in some 
state of emotion" (215) that is related to him, and Arnold's 
astonishing epistolary confession of love for Christian merely 
elicits the comment that "love can so deaden one to external 
matters that I might as well have been perusing the laundry bill" 
( 215). The mutation of other "voices" to telephone calls and 
letters is the narrative equivalent of Bradley's inability to "see" 
anyone other than Julian, and exerts an equivalent pressure upon 
the reader to dismiss the implications of any information that is 
"extraneous" to this central affair. Arnold's similarly unlikely 








symbolic equivalence, and point to the ways in which the apparent 
loss of self in the loved one is both very real to the 
protagonists, and an illusory state which "provokes tunnel vision 
and makes the rest of the world invisible" (Conradi, 203). 
Part Three enacts a "real" exclusion of the rest of the world as 
Bradley flees with Julian from her parents' fury to Patara, the 
seaside cottage for which he was about to leave at the start of the 
story. The consonant narrative keeps us wholly within their 
briefly idyllic existence, and is tellingly retained even after the 
obtrusion of the external world when Francis manage~ to contact 
Bradley to tell him of Priscilla's suicide: 
Of course I was stricken with guilt and horror at my 
unforgivable failure to keep my dear sister alive. But as I 
drove along I was also employed in minute calculations about 
the immediate future. I was perhaps absurdly influenced by 
the idea that it was a pure accident, a mere contingent by-
product of my carelessness, that Francis had known where to 
find me. And if that terrible telephone call had been so 
little determined, so casually caused, it made it seem that 
much less real, that much easier to obliterate from history. 
In acting as if it had not happened I was scarcely distorting 
the real course of events at all .... Anyway, there was nothing 
more I could do for Priscilla. (278) 
The formulaic language of the first line ("stricken with guilt", 
"my unforgivable failure", "my dear sister"), evidences Bradley's 
suppression of a real response to Priscilla's death, as does the 
subsuming of a tentative retrospective analysis of events ("I was 
perhaps absurdly influenced ... ") by a relentlessly purposive 
ratiocination that allows him to reject ''the simple and obvious 
promptings of duty" ( 278). The rhetoric of self-persuasion by 









Julian is "a symbol of the whole dilemma", "the next obstacle" 
(279) serves to bind us to its internal logic through the consonant 
enactment of its own processes: "I had already of course decided 
not to tell Julian .... if we left our refuge now .... the process 
which would ensure our liberation from doubt and our eternal 
betrothal might never take place at all. It was something which, 
for both of us, I had to do, it was my destined ordeal to keep 
silent" (279, my emphases). The instinctive decision ("of course") 
is immediately validated by a rationale that invokes the language 
and significance of myth and romance ("liberation", "eternal 
betrothal", "destined ordeal") in order to blur the realities of a 
situation that is far from defined or guaranteed in this way. 
"Emotions cloud the view, and far from isolating the particular, 
draw generality and ev~n theory in their train'' (56), Bradley notes 
early on, and in conveying a sense of the progression of his 
thought, the narrative is able to illustrate this principle and 
suggest the similarly inaccurate generality of the social judgement 
of his conduct: "His sister dies and he won't leave his love-
making" (287), as Arnold puts it . 
Arnold's sudden arrival brings with it the presence of the world 
and the past, coalescing the pattern of inexorable cause and effect 
that Bradley (as imaged by the consonant narrative) has felt 
himself to be dis-located from. That the coalescence is of course 
due to his very attempts to ignore causality in life (not telling 
Julian about Priscilla or his quasi-affair with Rachel, or 
correcting the lie about his age), is the grand irony of the novel 








concealment of formal organisation: by conceiving of his love for 
Julian as "on a different plane" (305) from, and able to exist 
independently of ordinary life, Bradley creates the circumstances 
which ensnare him in the "total dense mesh of tiny 
interconnections" (95) that make up daily "reality", and which also 
form the "plot" of the novel. The link between a perception of the 
interconnectedness of action and consequence, self and others, and 
the achievement of moral and artistic worth, has been asserted 
throughout by the narrating voice: 
In 
In art, as in morality, great things go by the board because 
at the crucial moment we blink our eyes. When is the crucial 
moment? Greatness is to recognize it and be able to hold it 
and to extend it .... Thus works of art, and thus whole lives of 
men, are spoilt by blinking and moving quickly on. (xiii) 
There are no spare unrecorded encapsulated moments in which we 
can behave "anyhow" and then expect to resume life where we 
left off. (95) 
As I said at the beginning, any artist knows that the space 
between the stage where the work is too unformed to have 
committed itself and the stage where it is too late to improve 
it can be as thin as a needle. Genius perhaps consists in 
opening out this needle-like area until it covers almost the 
whole of the working time .... There is an analogous transition 
in the everyday proceedings of the moral agent. We ignore 
what we are doing until it is too late to alter it .... Perhaps 
some kind of integrity of the imagination, a sort of moral 
genius, could verify the scene, producing minute sensibility 
and control of the moment as a function of some much larger 
consciousness. Can there be a natural, as it were 
Shakespearian felicity in the moral life? (155) 
this last section of his tale, Bradley's consonant realisation 
of the connection between a continuous sense of self and one's 
moral and artistic output is part of the "story", and thus Part 









the tale. The analysis of events that follows Julian's flight from 
Patara and Bradley's return to London is marked by the self-
conscious attention to scrupulous re-presentation and the clarity 
of perception that characterises the narrating voice, as well as 
enacting the immediate emotional torment: 
My state of mind, which I shall in a moment attempt to 
describe, is not easily conveyed. I felt that if I could not 
build a pattern of at least plausible beliefs to make some 
just bearable sense out of what had happened I should die. 
Though I suppose that what I was conceiving was not true 
death, but a torture to which death would be preferable. How 
could I live with the idea that she had simply left me in the 
night without a word? It could not be. (300) 
The narration here conveys both Bradley's mental anguish, and his 
concomitant understanding of the human need for "plausible beliefs" 
and "patterns" in order to make sense of existence. This consonant 
insight echoes (and by implication "prefigures") the narratorial 
preoccupation with the problematic relationship between form and 
reality that punctuates the novel, and so its consequent amendment 
("Though I suppose ... ") amplifies the feelings that underlie the 
rhetorical question and answer of the experiencing self, rather 
than distancing us from them . 
This "sympathy" between the narrative voices suggests that a 
deeper and truer ascesis has followed the partial loss of self of 
Part Two. In a shattered state after rapidly destroying Arnold's 
entire oeuvre in an act of compensatory (and prophetic) violence, 
Bradley perceives the way in which the experience of love should. 
extend rather than delimit one's capacity to love: "Because I love 







day" ( 315) . Believably, however, egoism reasserts itself, and on 
receiving Julian's inept letter of parting, Bradley manifests a 
need to construct a pattern of self-supportive beliefs that is 
shown to be unattended by his former insight: 
The letter had, of course, been written for Arnold's 
eye .... She had continued writing a vague repetitive effusion, 
in the hope of being able to put in a real message at the last 
moment, hence the references to "not being able to end" .... she 
had also managed to convey her destination. "Snow and ice", 
to which she had drawn attention, patently meant Venice. The 
Italian for "snow" is "nerve", and together with the reference 
to "Italian words", the anagram was obvious. ( 321) 
The "implausibility" of this relentlessly focused "reading" makes 
it clear that, despite the tone of authoritative rationality, these 
are the delusions of the time-bound character, spinning a plot out 
of the self rather than attending to the reality with which he is 
"literally" confronted. The seizure by the "real" plot - that is 
"the real" thus takes him completely by surprise; as he 
proleptically notes in a cliched phrase that comically predicts his 
subsequent interpretive activity, "it was not anything that I could 
have conceived of in my wildest imaginings'' (317) . 
The neat symmetry of concluding "The Black Prince" with Rachel's 
call to Bradley and his arrest for the murder of Arnold, is 
unlikely to have been part of readerly expectation either. By 
foregrounding the formal design through an almost purely consonant, 
"realistic" rendering of a bizarrely improbable compound of 
circumstances, Murdoch achieves an ingenious conjunction of realism 
and illusionism that effectively duplicates the shocking surprise 







and disjunctive commentary from the retrospective self. We are 
left in the "present" of the story with the police's repetitive 
question - "Why did you do it?" - predominating over his already 
perceptibly ineffectual replies and so indicating the turn that 
events will take. 
"The story is over" (329), as Bradley says in his postscript, but 
the "story" is not: we learn from the addenda to the tale that he 
is given life imprisonment for the murder of Arnold and dies of 
cancer in prison, attended by Loxias. Bradley's postscript 
provides a brief account of the trial by way of a discussion of its 
"meaning" for him, and if its remorseless and mechanical injustice 
reminds us of Kafka's trial, so is Joseph K. 's dislocated sense of 
culpability echoed by Bradley's comment that he felt "almost mad 
with guilt, with a sort of general guilt about my whole life" 
( 3 31 ) . His interpretation of the trial as both evocative of and 
designed for this guilt, as "a sizeable ordeal labelled with my 
name" (331 ), alters the apparent focus of his story from the 
transformation of self through the "trials" of love to the true 
metamorphosis through this "real" trial. Fr.om "the vantage point" 
of his "new consciousness" (331), Bradley elaborates upon the way 
in which he feels that the "public drama and horror was a necessary 
and in some deep sense natural outcome of the visitation with which 
I had been honoured" (336); that is, his love for Julian: 
Human love is the gateway to all knowledge, as Plato 
understood. And through the door that Julian opened my being 
passed into another world. 
When I thought earlier that my ability to love her was my 









1 1 1 
had disciplined my life to be, I was in the truth, but knew it 
only darkly (337). 
The eloquence and authority of the Postscript takes much from the 
dissolution and incorporation of the "discrete" narrative levels 
within an enlarged narrating voice, as for the first time it speaks 
without reference to an enclosing context and within the temporal 
framework of the novel. Human love is, as the subtitle promises, 
celebrated in and for itself in Bradley's tale, but it is Loxias's 
definition of love as the image of "man's creative struggle ... for 
wisdom and truth" (ix) that is articulated in his postscript, 
providing an image of his creative metamorphosis through its own 
movement out of an autobiographical mode. Far from a traditional 
summation that "explains" the self in terms of the past, the 
postscript points at the way in which the formal properties of art 
can only feign aesthetic unity: 33 
"This little book is important to me and I have written it as 
simply and as truthfully as I can. What kind of thing it is 
dark to me as I am dark to myself. The mechanical aspects of 
our humanity remain obscure to us .... Every man is tiny and 
comic to his neighbour. And when he seeks an idea of himself 
he seeks a false idea" (337) . 
Bradley remains dark to us too; as Conradi points out, "both his 
guilt and its "final exorcism" in the trial seem excessive", and 
33 In "Molestation and Authority in Narrative Fiction", Edward 
Said considers "the institution of narrative prose fiction as a 
kind of appetite for wanting to modify reality", and remarks 
that "The sheer length of the classic novel can almost be 
accounted for by the desire to initiate and promote a 
reduplication of life and, at the same time, to allow for a 
convincing portrayal of how that sort of life leads inevitably 
to the revelation of a merely borrowed authority." (Miller, J. 
Hillis (ed.), Aspects of Narrative. Columbia University Press: 







his hard-won sense of transcendence and serenity is an "ambiguous 
apotheosis" that is "untested and untestable in the real world" 
( 208). These uncertainties are in some ways reinforced by the four 
postscripts by dramatis personae, who, although evidently self-
motivated in undermining and diminishing Bradley and his account of 
events, weaken our "dependence" upon the narrating voice through 
the proffering of these other "points of view": Christian, Rachel 
and Francis all maintain that Bradley was "really" in love with 
each of them, while Julian maintains a puzzling silence about the 
affair and chooses to speak portentously about "art" in a way that 
offers us little connection to her "character" in "The Black 
Prince". Finally, however, these aporias provide resonance rather 
than mystification, a confidence in the endless possibilities of 
art rather than an exposure of their exhaustion. Realism and 
formal self-awareness investigate one another tirelessly throughout 
the novel, the multiple narrative shifts of the novel demonstrating 
Loxias's different definitions of art as "to do with joy and play 
and the absurd" (362), and as telling "the only truth that really 
matters" (364), even if it can only approximate "reality". Hearing 
that ''it has even been suggested that Bradley Pearson and myself 
are both simply fictions, the inventions of a minor novelist", 
Loxias offers the "evidence" of the bronze water buffalo lady and 
the gilt snuff box, and then undercuts such "realism" by attesting 
to the higher truth of the fiction: "Bradley Pearson's story, 
which I made him tell, remains too, a kind of thing more durable 















of a work (or of a text) cannot be created by the 
the author never produces anything but presumptions 
forms, and it is the world which fills them. 
Roland Barthes, Critical Essays. 
However sad and awful the things it narrates, the novel belongs 
to an open world, a world of absurdity and loose ends and 
ignorance. In real life, that which is horrible lacks the 
significance of art. The novel is intensely aware of this fact. 
In fact, particular novelists endeavour very often to close the 
form by various artifices, to make it more like a poem, and this 
may work; but I think that the nature of the novel is somehow 
that a sort of wind blows through it and there are holes in it 
and the meaning of it partly seeps away into life. 
Iris Murdoch. 
I contended in the last chapter that the usage of the first-person 
form in fiction is not just a pragmatic alternative to the potential 
"transparency" of the third-person voice and omniscient "authority", 
but also a decision to draw attention to the problems of 
(self)representation: as Mur~och puts it in the University of Caen 
address, it is "the disunified self which disunifies the object and 
the story", 1 and the disjunctions within her particular composition of 
fictional modes are perhaps for this reason more happily reconciled in 
the "first (-person) world". I would like now to turn to The Sea, The 
Sea (1978) as the novel that initiates what seems to be a progressive 
attempt to open the "forms" of the fictional "world" away from their 
own "presumptions of meaning", and to mark it as a highpoint at which 
Murdoch, Iris, "Art is the Imitation of Nature", Cahiers du Centre 
de Recherches sur les Pays du Nord et du Nord-Quest, no.1, 
Publications de la Faculte de Lettres et Sciences Humaines de 









her work achieves a superb balance between "the world that fills them" 
and the seepage back "into life". My theoretical approach will follow 
my interpretive bias, as, in considering what I believe to be an 
expansion away from the simpler and more rigid forms of the earlier 
novels, I move from a technically specific discussion of Murdoch's 
fictional techniques to look at broader questions of formal 
organisation and genre. 
Like Under the Net and The Black Prince, The Sea, The Sea is 
narrated by a male "artist" who undergoes the tutelage of "the story", 
and like The Unicorn, it is a Gothic story of enclosure and obsession 
that insistently ironises its own structures in the attempt to "unlock 
an appropriately contemporary "realism" from the Castle Perilous of 
romance" ( Conradi 1982, 30) . The achievement of the later book lies 
perhaps in its fusion of these two Murdochian fictional "types"; 2 the 
un(self)conscious attempts of the first-person narrator to legislate 
meaning exert their usual fascination for the reader at the level of 
"realistic" characterisation, while also demonstrating the haunting of 
the self through the mechanisms of fantasy that the presence of the 
overtly "un-real" modes makes "literal". Unlike the earlier first-
person novels, where the retrospective narrator "knows" the story 
whose "telling" the novel enacts and comments upon, The Sea, The Sea 
employs an apparently indeterminate, "contemporaneous" narrative mode 
that mixes the forms of diary, "memoir", autobiography and "novel". 
Since the narrator is not positioned as the "survivor" of the story, 
enabled and authorised by that set of experiences to begin to record 
2 Other examples might be A Severed Head and A Word Child in the 







them, his fallibility and consequent education must speak entirely 
through the form, which is thus made to serve character while 
providing its own satisfactions and energies in the way that Murdoch 
has consistently recommended; most popularly for purposes of critical 
exegesis in "Against Dryness". 
This early and influential essay is inevitably alluded to in any 
discussion of Murdoch's "thought", and its attractively compact thesis 
of a split in the contemporary novel between a "journalistic" social 
realism and "crystalline" psychological inwardness is usually cited as 
if it described two clearly opposed and self-contained fictional 
forms. Interviewed in 1987, Murdoch said that these terms were 
appropriate to the time in which the article was written, and were 
never meant to label "real novels, although of course there are some 
that one could categorise in this way", 3 but rather to describe the 
"positions" between which the novelist - and the novel always 
mediates, 4 and can sometimes (as in the case of Shakespeare, or the 
great nineteenth-century writers) integrate. I have already quoted 
her comment, made almost thirty years earlier in a discussion of her 
first four fictions, about her desire to combine the "open" novel in 
which "the characters move about freely", and the "closed", "intensely 
integrated" novel: possible, perhaps only "if one were a great 
writer" (Anon, Bookman, 26). Ideally, it seems, aesthetic interest 





informal interview with Iris Murdoch in February 
David Lodge discusses this in "The Novelist at the Crossroads", in 
Bradbury, Malcolm (ed.). The Novel Today. Fontana/Collins: Great 








dynamic tension between the two: what Murdoch wants in the novels, 
says Conradi, "is "character" sufficiently strongly embodied to hold 
its own in living tension with the 'myth' embodied in the plot" 
(Conradi, 24). 
The Sea, The Sea evinces this tension from its very beginnings, as 
narrator Charles Arrowby, newly-retired famous theatre director, self-
consciously speculates about the form that his writings will take 
after an opening "word picture" (2) of the sea that evokes "the 
blisses of the romantic novel" (Dipple, 276) while literally and 
literarily setting the scene. The smooth elegance of his description 
is immediately belied by a disjunctive second paragraph that exposes 
its "writing" and intentionality, confirming an initial sense of 
control and construction, but making this relevant to the hitherto 
impersonal "I" rathe..:- than authorial manipulation: "I had written the 
above, destined to be the opening paragraph of my memoirs, when 
something happened that was so extraordinary and so horrible that I 
cannot bring myself to describe it" (1). This instant rending of the 
projected form ("memoir" itself suggestive of a selective recording of 
the past) mimics Charles's mysteriously unpleasant and disruptive 
experience, and is ironically extended by his vigorous and vaguely 
comic attempts to impose a shape upon his new enterprise: 
I spoke of a memoir. Is that what this chronicle will be? 
Time will show. At this moment, a page old, it feels more like a 
diary than a memoir. Well, let it be a diary then. ( 1) 
I have considered writing a journal, not of happenings for 
there will be none, but as a record of mingled thoughts and daily 
observations: 'my philosophy', my pensees against a background 
of simple descriptions of the weather and other natural 








Of course there is no need to separate 'memoir' from 'diary' or 
'philosophical journal'. I can tell you, reader, about my past 
life and about my 'world-view' also, as I ramble along. Why not? 
It can all come out naturally as I reflect. Thus unanxiously 
(for am I not now leaving anxiety behind?) I shall discover my 
'literary form'. In any case, why decide now? Later, if I 
please, I can regard these ramblings as rough notes for a more 
coherent account. (2-3) 
The effect of this explicit preoccupation with the configuration of 
the writing is, paradoxically, of a formal "openness" which suggests 
the narrator's inability to maintain control over the expression of 
the self, despite visible "anxiety" about giving it a discernable 
structure and meaning through orthodox form. Murdoch's portrayal here 
of the attempt to discover/cover the self through literary projection 
comments subtly upon the line that convention draws between fiction 
and "reality", without requiring, as does contemporary metafiction, 
that the two categories be brutally compressed into a discernible 
indivisibility; indeed, her fictional project might be described as an 
exploration of the essential differences between these categories 
through those who almost always confuse the two. As John Bayley puts 
it in The Uses of Division, "the modern reflective consciousness 
cannot in some sense but see itself as taking part in a novel, the 
novel being the standard literary reflection of the individual in our 
age",'5 and The Sea, the Sea demonstrates through Charles how the idea 
of identity as "character" is "usefully and almost unconsciously 
extrapolated back 
unconscious needs . 
Bayley, John, 
1976, 18. 
into life" (Bayley, 18) in the service of 









That the self is constituted in and by language has been the topic 
of much contemporary critical discourse, as, following Jacques Lacan's 
rewriting of Freud's metapsychology, literary theorists have 
acknowledged the "fictive" unity of the "I" and discredited the 
possibility of a univocal presentation of the self. 6 In "The 
Subversion of the Subject", Lacan writes of the way in which conscious 
knowledge is "ignorant" of the disturbing truths spoken by the 
unconscious because it cannot understand the "language" in which these 
truths are inscribed. The psychoanalyst's task is thus to ''decipher a 
'structure' in which the unconscious represents itself". 7 This 
perfectly describes the way in which the first-person narrator must be 
ignorant of the play between conscious knowledge and unconscious 
desire that "structures" his/her own narrative, while the reader 
engages in an interpretive activity that "deciphers" it. This opening 
section of The Sea, The Sea prepares just such a structure through the 
disjunctions between Charles's perceptions of his strong desire to 
write as "necessary" to his new undertaking - to "learn to be good" 
(2) - and his clear motives of self-definition and self-validation 
that his ambivalencies about form suggest . 
These early indications of his need to retain the power and control 
that he was legitimately able to exercise in the theatre are amplified 
by his rhetorical identification with Prospero as he contemplates the 
6 
7 
I have already cited Paul de Man's article on "Autobiography and 
De-facement"; see also Frederic Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in 
Lacan: Marxism, Psychoanalytic Criticism, and the Problem of the 
Subject", Yale French Studies, No.55/56, 1977. 
Benvenuto, Bice, and Kennedy, Rodger, The Works of Jacques Lacan. 
Free Association Books: London 1986, 167. 
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extended renunciation of directorial power into his private life: 
"Have I abjured that magic, drowned my book? Forgiven my enemies? 
The surrender of power, the final change of magic into spirit? Time 
will show" ( 39). Rather than disclosing a true interest in the 
disinvestment of illusion and obsession that The Tempest enacts, the 
desire to continue "role-playing" is paradoxically made explicit here 
through the expression of a renunciatory intent that itself suggests 
the taking up of a particular posture: in fact that of his "last 
great role" (39), and the only major Shakespearian character whom 
Charles considers himself to have successfully acted. "To repent of 
egoism: is autobiography the best method?" (3), he wonders, 
unwittingly undermining both the self-authenticating drive and the 
confessional project by demonstrating the way in which the very act of 
signification alienates the writing self from the subject. In Julia 
Kristeva's phrase, "the desire of signifying and the signifying of 
desire" 8 emerge through Charles's writings in the play between the 
narrative form and his formal intentions, alerting us to his equivocal 
impulses towards the abdication and acquisition of power and identity. 
The motivational ambiguity behind the "need" to write is formally 
displayed in the opening section of the novel, entitled "Prehistory", 
which alternates between diary-like reportage of and commentary upon 
the quotidian, rather self-conscious "memoir" ( "My paternal 
grandfather was a market gardener in Lincolnshire"), and descriptions 
of friends, family and relationships. Despite oft declared intentions 
of systematic self-scrutiny through autobiographical inquiry into the 
e Quoted by Harland, Richard, Superstructuralism. 









past, and particularly into his long and formative affair with the 
much older, famous actress Clement Makin, Charles reveals himself to 
be consistently unable to impose order upon his narrative: after 
authoritively declaring that he will "now describe the house" (7), he 
delivers a vastly entertaining disquisition on food and cooking, and 
late at night, concluding that "It is time for bed", finds himself 
writing about the "horrible" occurrence of the novel's opening; the 
"real" sighting of a huge green-eyed monster rising from the sea . 
Similarly, after commenting that "it is not going to be easy to write 
about the theatre .... I had better get straight on to Clement" (32), he 
offers a description of it that simultaneously introduces us to many 
of the book's preoccupations and suggests a considerable amount about 
his personality: 
The theatre, even at its most 'realistic', is connected with the 
level at which, and the methods by which, we tell our everyday 
lies. This is the sense in which 'ordinary' theatre resembles 
life, and dramatists are disgraceful liars unless they are very 
good. On the other hand, in a purely formal sense the theatre is 
the nearest to poetry of all the arts. I used to think that if I 
had been a poet I would never have bothered with the theatre at 
all, but of course this was nonsense. What I needed with all my 
starved and silent soul was just that particular way of shouting 
back at the world. The theatre is an attack on mankind, carried 
on by magic: to victimize an audience every night, to make them 
laugh and cry and suffer and miss their trains .... the theatre 
must, if need be, stoop - and stoop - until it attains that 
direct, that universal communication which other artists can 
afford to seek more deviously and at their ease. Hence the 
assault, the noise, the characteristic impatience. All this was 
part of my revenge. 
How vulgar, how almost cruel it was, I gloatingly savour now 
that I am absolutely out of it at last, now that I can sit in the 
sun and look at the calm quiet sea. (33-4; my italics) 
The Sea, The Sea too is concerned with "the level at which, and the 
methods by which, we tell our everyday lies", and the revelation here 





itself exposes the mendacity of his belief that he is "absolutely out 
of it at last". One might say that the "methods" that the novel 
itself uses collude "deviously" to exert an alluring "magic" in the 
service of such exposure; like the drama, it "stoops" to lure us into 
its world so as to attain "that direct, that universal communication" 
that appears to transcend the mechanisms of technique. This is 
achieved through the skilful deployment of the diary as a "private" 
writing that is opposed to the various "public" forms mooted by 
Charles at the start of his narrative. Like the interior monologue, 
the diary form allows a fragmented and allusive narrative that lends 
itself naturally to a focus on the present because it conventionally 
represents a wholly subjective self-communion. Unlike the more 
contemporary mode, however, it presents itself as a mimetic form whose 
conventions are themselves "borrowed" by the sys~2m of fiction from 
the system of letters in general. The eclectic subject matter, 
varying length and differing tone of the opening section's "pieces" 
accommodates Charles's writing to these conventions, the "artlessness" 
and a-chronology of the autobiographical excursions effecting their 
dissolution into the vaguer, apparently more "shapeless" structure. 
Charles notes that he seems "to be writing everything down all at once 
in a sort of jumble" (39), but it is this particular juxtaposition of 
"unmeditated" and "self-conscious" forms that gives depth and 
resonance to his "character", "showing" him, in Wayne Booth's sense, 
to be amongst other things witty and intelligent as well as selfish 
and emotionally manipulative. 
The diary thus becomes, by "default", the subsuming form in terms of 
which the "other" modes are "read", and bestows upon them the validity 
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acquired through the imitation of a "real" form: it occurs to Charles 
himself, after rereading his "pieces" about his cousin James and 
friend Peregrine Arbelow, that he could "write all sorts of fantastic 
nonsense ... in these memoirs and everybody would believe it!'' (76). In 
an examination of the diary as a fictional genre, Lorna Martens notes 
that the idea of "sincerity" was associated with the nineteenth-
century journal intime and culminated in an apprehension of the diary 
as an almost exclusively confessional genre: "the assumption is that 
because the diarist writes secretly he writes sincerely, and that the 
self in the diary is the 'true' self and stands in contrast to the 
outward facade presented to the public". 9 This view of "man against a 
background of values, of realities, which transcend him", as Murdoch 
puts it in "Against Dryness" (26), is clearly in opposition to a 
poststructuralist conception of the self as essentially unknowable 
because "pre-scribed" by an unknown "language" rather than by society; 
a notion which interestingly emerges in The Sea, The Sea to do battle 
against Murdoch's own positive evaluation of the former condition. 
Charles's inability to find or implement a single "representative" 
form supports his early claim that, despite being described by the 
press as "a "tyrant", a "tartar" ... a "power-crazed monster", he has 
"in fact very little sense of identity" (3). "I might now introduce 
myself - to myself, first and foremost, it occurs to me" (3), he 
writes in the entry after this comment. The suggestion is, that like 
all Murdoch's power figures, he has played a particular part with the 
collusion of others, fulfilling their unconscious need to "elect other 
9 Martens, Lorna, The diary novel. 
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people to play roles in their lives" (Bellamy interview, 138), as well 
as his own: "I liked that handy picture of myself as a 'tartar'", he 
remarks. "I fostered my reputation for ruthlessness, it was extremely 
useful. Actors expected tears and nervous prostration when I was 
around. Most of them loved it; they are masochists as well as 
narcissists" (37). 
Charles is partly aware that he knows himself only as this 
"character", and confidently hopes to recover what he perceives as the 
innocent, uncorrupted self "beneath"; "the precious thing that has 
come with me, as if it were a talisman which I can now unwrap" (4). 
It is soon clear, however, that "character" does not necessarily 
change by virtue of an altered "context", and that, for Charles, 
personal transformation will not be as easily effected as the 
geographical relocation which he takes as a concrete metaphor for such 
change: 
It is evening. The sea is golden, speckled with white points of 
light, lapping with a sort of mechanical self-satisfaction under 
a pale green sky. How huge it is, how empty, this great space 
for which I have been longing all my life. 
Still no letters. (15) 
The protestations of solitary contentment and need for "emptiness" are 
amusingly betrayed here by the final remark, which indicates Charles's 
lack of dislocation from the "court" of friends over whom he has 
exercised his power. We learn that the letter that Charles is really 
awaiting is a response from an ex-mistress, Lizzie Scherer, who is 
still in love with him, to overtures that he vaguely describes as "a 
sort of test, or game, or gamble" (41). This careless emotional 
manipulation proves to be "characteristic"; Lizzie's answering missive 
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begs him not to use his power to separate her from a sexless but 
happy, loving relationship with the homosexual Gilbert Opian who 
"worships" Charles and is similarly afraid of him. "The habit of 
obeying you is strong in both of us", Lizzie writes. "You could drive 
us both mad" (46). Later, when "making some notes for a character 
sketch" (71) of his friend Peregrine Arbelow, he reveals not merely 
manipulativeness, but a real cruelty in the description of his affair 
with actress Rosina Vamburgh, then Peregrine's wife: 
A furious mutual desire for possession dominated the whole affair 
while it lasted. At one stage she certainly wanted to marry me, 
whereas I never had the slightest intention of marrying her. I 
simply wanted her, and the satisfaction of this want involved 
detaching her permanently from her husband. (72) 
A "desire for possession" informs all of Charles's relationships and 
has clearly been the goading impulse behind his successful career: 
the creation of a power figure is in fact particularly effective in 
The Sea, The Sea because the mechanisms of the power are so believably 
grounded in Charles's history in the theatre, rather than an 
imponderable "given" as happens in The Flight From the Enchanter, A 
Severed Head or The Unicorn. The roots of the psychical need and 
greed evident in his description of the theatre are indicated, in 
turn, by his evocation of childhood into which "all the idealism of 
his emotional energy" (Dipple, 280) is projected, and where indeed it 
resides. Particularly firmly in residence is his belief in the 
supreme experience and importance of his adolescent love-affair with 
Mary Hartley Smith, which he describes as "the most important thing in 
my life", and in a manner that is instructively dependent upon 







la premiere" ( 77). Hartley, as he calls her, broke off their 
relationship for reasons that he was, and still is, unable to fathom, 
and he describes this rejection as making "a permanent metaphysical 
crisis" of his life. The portrayal of their youthful affair is 
invested with an amount of emotion that indicates its real importance 
and "truth" for the young Charles, but also its power as a structure 
by means of which he has orientated the rest of his life: "Hartley 
destroyed my innocence, she and the demon of jealousy. She made me 
faithless. But with her I would have been faithful, with her my whole 
life would have been different, less rootless, less empty" (84). 
This obsessive belief in the permanent scarring caused by Hartley's 
defection has allowed Charles to refuse to take responsibility for 
subsequent relationships and deeply motivates his need to retain 
emotional control over any personal connection, no matter how badly or 
cruelly he has behaved. (Peregrine, he tells us casually, "remains 
very attached to me, and I value this" (74)). As Dipple says, 
"Charles's whole middle history can be seen as a revenge, a shouting 
back at the world which had recalcitrantly refused his deep childhood 
longings" (281), but the point is perhaps that at one level this is 
precisely how Charles sees it. "What style can I adopt or master 
worthy of such a sacred tale?" (77; my emphasis), he asks himself at 
the outset, unconsciously betraying the idealisation and construction 
at work in its recollection. The values of purity and innocence that 
he determinedly invests in this particular section of his past are 
seen by Charles as recuperable through the recollection of the past 
that he feels his retirement to the sea to have provoked: by the end 
of his attempt to tell the "sacred tale", Charles feels "calmer now 
• 
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already about Hartley, as if the thought of her has somehow been 
mercifully absorbed into the sane open air" of his "new environment" 
( 88-9). The way in which he has identified the lost love and golden 
age of youth with a notion of redeeming its virtue and happiness in "a 
glorious Act v" (Dipple, 281) of life is made clear at the end of the 
emotional recollection which ends "Prehistory", and which we can 
retrospectively see as a pre-lapsarian idealism that "History" will 
teach Charles to forego: "I left in store with that first love so 
much of my innocence and gentleness which I later destroyed and 
denied, and which is yet now perhaps at last available again. Can a 
woman's ghost, after so many years, open the doors of the heart?" (89; 
my emphasis) 
The heightened emotion and consequent intuitions of emotional 
redemption that attend the telling of the Hartley tale is sharply 
undercut by the change in tone that marks the start of the novel's 
central section. "History" opens in an overtly retrospective vein 
that confirms its appellation and immediately suggests a narrative 
teleology and "point" that the first section has eschewed: "I did not 
look at the crabs after all. I became obsessed with the idea of 
carrying a chair and table out to the tower ... " (91). Charles goes on 
to detail the arrival of Gilbert Opian, who has come to ask him to 
acknowledge and respect the reality of his new relationship with 
Lizzie, and then of Lizzie herself, whom he dismisses with the 
injunction to "get rid of Gilbert" if she ever wants to see him again. 
We are brought back to the narrative present as Charles explains that 
he has just written all of this "as a story": "it has somehow excited 






the whole of one's life thus bit by bit as a novel how rewarding this 
would be" (99). This prepares the way for the following six parts of 
"History", in which Charles's initial idyllic prediction of a journal 
that records "not ... happenings for there will be none, but ... mingled 
thoughts and daily observations", gives way to the narration of a 
"history" that will conclusively disprove such confidence in the 
ability to control and step outside of experience . 
Various unpleasant "happenings" have, in fact, already permeated 
"Prehistory" in the intrusive and uncanny manner of the sea-monster 
sighting: a "remarkably hideous" green vase shatters without apparent 
cause, as does a beautiful old mirror; a face peers from the window of 
an inner room in the house. Significantly, some of these are 
explained by the appearance of Rosina, who has set out to "haunt" 
Charles as revenge for his current overtures to Lizzie, for whom he 
abandoned her in the past. Her intense jealousy and expressions of 
hatred make clear the delusory nature of his selective attempt to 
eradicate "history", both by their "haunting" of his newly acquired 
solitude, and by their palpable manifestation of the controlling 
emotions that we have intuited in Charles, and which make him such an 
unfit candidate for ascesis. That he subconsciously recognises and 
identifies with Rosina's violent emotions is indicated by his 
momentary perception of her in an early meeting "with the snake-like 
head and teeth and pink opening mouth" of "his" sea-monster; a subtle 
linkage of hauntings that blurs the question as to which are "real". 
"I suppose it was not really a vision but just a thought", he 
comments, seemingly unaware of the implications: "My nerves were still 







memory of Hartley seems to "'body her forth'", so that he sees "shadow 
forms of her imposed on quite different women" (86). 
The incomplete rationalisation of the uncanny thus partly services 
the sense of realism that the diary form has helped to evoke, and 
partly anticipates the uncanniness of the "real" events to follow. 
Charles discovers that one of the phantom Hartleys, "an old woman in 
the village" on whom her sees "a transient look of her head placed 
like a mask on someone quite different" (86), is in fact his lost 
childhood love. Writing "the story of Rosina's arrival and what 
happened just after it" (111) from his London flat, he reveals the 
full force of his obsession as he describes his reaction to Hartley's 
ordinary elderly dowdiness and suburban existence in terms that are 
clearly a product of his deepest longings rather than a perception of 
reality. "Hartley", now called by her rather less romantic first name 
of Mary, lives in the village and is married to a retired ex-soldier 
and salesman, Benjamin Fitch. They have an eighteen-year old adopted 
son, Titus (who has been missing for two years) and live in a bungalow 
called "Nibletts". The account of their awkward early meetings 
demonstrates the inappropriateness to this quotidian present of 
Charles's frenzied attempts to renew the emotional intensity of their 
youthful relationship. Hartley, as he persists in calling her (rather 
comically noting with triumph that Ben does not know her "real" name), 
shows no desire to resume any kind of friendship with Charles, but he 
is simply unable to comprehend this and is driven by the force of his 
obsessive love to "deduce" her marital unhappiness. When Ben 
clumsily, and with some measure of aggression, tells Charles to leave 
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them alone, this assumption is happily allowed to extend to her 
desperate need of rescue from the imprisoning cage of her marriage: 
As the violent feelings became calmer another emotion, darker, 
deeper, came slowly up from below .... I had been attempting to 
block out altogether certain reactions to the situation, certain 
pictures, certain terrible sensations. The other emotion which 
now ... rose dark and gleaming to the surface was: a kind of 
frightful glee. Ben was just as I had - feared - and hoped. He 
was a hateful tyrant. He was a thoroughly nasty man. And 
so ... And so ... (152) 
Consonant self-narration gives way here to self-narrated monologue, 
holding us in the temporal domain of the tale and demonstrating the 
transmutation of clearly subjective emotions into purportedly 
"factual" statements: "He was a hateful tyrant. He was a thoroughly 
nasty man". These qualities that Charles attributes to Ben are of 
course the very descriptions of himself that he has early disavowed, 
and again, the act of projection is suggested by his illustration of 
his emotions as an externalisation of the terrifying vision of the 
sea-monster, rising "dark and gleaming to the surface". Hartley, on 
the other hand, is imaged as the Good itself through the Platonic 
metaphor of the "one great light" (77) in the dark cavern of the 
mind.' 0 "Perhaps I would indeed", he writes after their first 
meeting, "through her and through our old childish love ... be enabled 
to become what I had hoped to become when I came away to the sea, pure 
in heart" ( 122) . The workings of the psyche that these different 
wish-fulfillments indicate are re-enacted at the narrative level by 
the change from naturalistic representation to an overtly "fictional" 
, 0 Conradi makes this point, noting that "all forms of 'absolute' 






mode, "explained" by Charles in a reversion to the diary form that 
breaks into his past tense narrative: 
So much has been happening, I thought I would write it as a 
continuous narrative without too many reversions to the present 
tense. So I am writing my life, after all, as a novel! Why not? 
It was a matter of finding a form, and somehow history, my 
history, has found the form for me. There will be plenty of time 
to reflect and remember as I go along, to digress and 
philosophize, to inhabit the far past or depict the scarcely 
formulated present; so my novel can still be a sort of memoir and 
a sort of diary. The past and the present are after all so 
close, so almost one, as if time were an artificial teasing out 
of a material which longs to join" (153). 
Intruding upon the narrative at a particularly suspenseful point, 
the explanation both "naturalises" the previous "novel-ty" of 
presentation, and points up the fallacious sense of "authority" and 
control evoked by the use of the past tense: we are reminded that the 
narrating self is the still-experiencing self, writing the story under 
the influence of its events. This rapid transformation of experience 
into a formulated narrative betrays the desire for a coherent life 
"story" that has already been revealed by Charles in "Prehistory", and 
is further suggested here in the appropriation of the in-formal 
eclecticism of his diary by the "fictional": "So I am writing my 
life, after all, as a novel!" His sense that Hartley's miraculous 
reappearance has bestowed this appropriate "form" and meaning upon his 
life contrasts with our sense of its "fictiveness" as such a governing 
principle. "I want to do the deep thing, real analysis, real 
autobiography" (175), he tells his cousin James, who gently points out 
that one cannot just "walk into the cavern and look around. Most of 




know ourselves we are fake objects, fakes, bundles of illusion." 
( 175) 
James's words are given added resonance by immediately following 
Charles's viewing of Titian's Perseus and Andromeda at the Wallace 
Collection in London, where, feeling hungover and "unreal" after a 
drunken evening with Peregrine, he is beguiling the time until his 
evening train home. He notices in the painting "his" sea monster in 
the mouth of the dragon upon which Perseus flies; an image which he 
implicitly identifies with his desire to "save" Hartley from Ben, but 
which might also be allegorically read as Charles's "propulsion" by 
the force of his own illusions. This is given subtle weighting by the 
coincidental appearance of his cousin, who has figured as a central 
source of envy and jealousy in Charles's recollections of his 
childhood: another projected, fictional "picture" of events that 
reveals the power and consequent reality of such "illusions", and 
which confirms James's deprecating view of the potential for self-
knowledge: 
"We are all so good at inflating the importance of what we think 
we value. The heroes at Troy fought for a phantom Helen, 
according to Stesichorus .... If even a dog's tooth is truly 
worshipped it glows with light. The venerated object is endowed 
with power, that is the simple sense of the ontological proof" 
( 175). 
This can clearly be set against Charles's belief in the illumining of 
his own mind's "cavern" by the "one great light" of his love for 
Hartley, and when in the subsequent conversation he finds himself 
unintentionally speaking of his reawakened love, James perceives both 





potential reality of its effects on the present: "I cannot attach 
much meaning to your idea of such a long-lasting love for someone you 
lost sight of so long ago. Perhaps it's something you've invented 
now. Though of course what follows from that is another matter" 
( 178). 
The rest of "History" is devoted to what follows from "that", and 
its exploration of the myth-making powers of the imagination is 
appropriately mediated through a decreasingly "naturalised" narrative. 
An overheard dialogue between Hartley and Ben is interpreted by 
Charles as "exactly the evidence" (200) that he has wanted to confirm 
her need of "rescue"; the implausibility of the perfect reportage 
partly explained by the foregrounding of Charles's own auditive 
prejudice: "I have written this out as I remember it" (199), he 
writes, "as in a play". Ben's jealous bullying and Hartley's 
reiterated apologies are in fact an extended version of an early 
dialogue between Charles and Lizzie, and as clearly a part of a 
habituated and structured relationship in which certain roles are 
ritually enacted. Charles partly recognises "a sense of the strength 
and texture of the cage" (201) in the awful quarrel, but it is his 
perception of her as encaged that predominates and points to his own 
"incarceration" of her memory: "In many ways my life in the theatre 
now seems like a dream, the old days with you the only reality. I 
have few friends and no 'amorous ties', I am alone and free" (204), he 
writes in a letter that begs Hartley to end her "suffering" by leaving 







The evident untruth of this self-description again marks the gap 
between conscious perception and unconscious motivation, highlighted 
by the last of the "diary's" interjections: 
As I write this now it is the next day, and the letter to Hartley 
in its fat envelope still lies upon my sea-facing table in the 
drawing-room. I have been writing this diary during the morning. 
Soon I shall have lunch: the remains of the corned beef with 
plain boiled onions .... Why am I delaying, waiting? Why am I 
almost pretending that life is ordinary, that it is as it once 
was? ( 206) 
This last "truly" consonant moment of "History" indeed marks the final 
vestiges of "ordinariness" and the point at which "history" does 
finally takes over the narrative: from here until the end of this 
section, the story proceeds without "interruption" from the present 
while making use of the interplay between the experiencing and 
narrating selves to develop and sustain the intensi:7 of tension and 
pace. Hartley does come to Charles, but only to tell him of Ben's 
irrationally jealous belief that he is the father of Titus, whom the 
Fitches adopted after a lengthy separation while Hartley was nursing 
her father. A long and impassioned conversation juxtaposes her 
desperate, muddled attempts to impress upon Charles the necessity of 
leaving them well alone against his declamatory statements of love and 
injunctions to abandon her husband that quite literally ignore her 
words; a technique repeated throughout this section and which offers 
us the full contrast between the force of Charles's obsession and the 
truth that it shuns without needing to invoke narratorial hindsight. 
"That's what mad people do, see everything as evidence for what they 
want to believe" (223), he replies to Hartley's tale of Ben's jealous 




self-defense against a reality that threatens to inflict pain and 
loss: 
I let memories from the far past come and go as they would. But 
about the terrible present and the gulf of those suffering years 
my imagination was squeamish and discreet .... So I reverted to the 
past when she was the unspoilt focus of my innocent love, seeing 
her as she had been when she seemed my future, my whole life, 
that life which had been taken away from me and yet still seemed 
to exist somewhere as a packaged stolen possibility. (245) 
The combination here of retrospective reportage ("I let memories from 
the far past come and go") and self-narrated monologue ("But about the 
terrible present") is a complex one that creates an extensive time-
frame in which a sense of the "terrible present", a sense of that 
"present" perspective on the "past", and of the past vision of the 
"future" is evoked. Extended consonant narration of this kind 
enmeshes us in the obsessive and diligent workings of Charles's 
imagination, creating an atmosphere of intense subjectivity that 
partly legitimises his fantasy by strongly suggesting its "truth" and 
relevance for him. This is subtly reinforced by the dissonant 
interjection that opens Part Four with an assurance of the sustained 
mimetic "integrity" of re-presentation invoked earlier by the diary 
form: 
What follows this, and also what directly precedes it, has been 
written at a much later date. What I have now written is 
therefore more deeply reflected and more systematically 
remembered than it would be if I were continuing to write a 
diary. Events, as it happened, did not leave me much time for 
diary-writing, although what immediately follows has something of 
the air of an interlude (perhaps a comic one). This novelistic 
memoir, as it has now become, is however, as far as its facts are 
concerned (although, as James would say, what indeed are facts?), 
accurate and truthful. I have in particular, and this may be a 
professional attribute, an extremely good memory for dialogue, 
and I am sure that a tape-recording of my candlelit conversation 
with Hartley would differ but little from what I have 
C 
transcribed. My account 
substance and faithfully 
very deeply indeed many 
recorded in this book, 
(239) 
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is curtailed, but omits nothing of 
narrates the actual words spoken. How 
of the conversations, past and to come, 
are engraved upon my mind and my heart! 
While offering the assurance of verity that is traditional to 
realism, the insistence here on accuracy and truthfulness has far more 
to do with the imaginative verification of "mind" and "heart" than 
with the validity of the "facts": the business-like statements of 
this testament to "realism" are, in effect, subordinated to the final 
emotive exclamation of its imaginative "truth", or psychic reality. 
This last sentence momentarily, and almost exclusively in this 
section, bridges the gap between the narrating and the experiencing 
self, retrospectively endorsing the importance and relevance of the 
consonant experience by attesting to its continued significance 
"outside" of the time-bound story. Located exactly halfway through 
"History", this assurance of "truthfulness" precedes Charles's 
definitive return to the life of manipulation and trickery that he has 
sworn to renounce, as "facts" notwithstanding, he relentlessly enacts 
the drama of lost and regained love. In this he is unwittingly helped 
by the unexpected arrival of the runaway Titus, come to discover the 
truth of Ben's jealous suspicions about his parentage. Charles 
immediately perceives him to be "the key" (251) to the whole 
situation, a means of luring Hartley to his house, and also a magical 
confirmation that the life of peaceful familial happiness that he 
feels to have been "taken away" from him is imminently recoverable. 
"You might have been my son", he tells Titus; "in a curious way -
because of my old relationship with your mother - I am cast in the 





The appropriate and revealing theatrical metaphor that Charles uses 
in this statement to Titus is extended as he "stage-directs" what is 
to be the virtual abduction of Hartley: "I had told Gilbert the 
outline of the plan, though part of it I still concealed, even from 
Titus. Gilbert, who was now to play the key part ... was enjoying the 
whole drama disgracefully" (263). An accelerated narrative pace and 
heightened coincidence of events accentuate this aura of theatricality 
as "the plan" is carried out: Hartley is more or less forcibly 
immured in one of Shruff End's strange inner rooms; Rosina arrives 
and, enraged by Charles's description of Titus as his son, tells him 
that she had an abortion soon after he had left her; James and 
Peregrine turn up almost simultaneously, both claiming an invitation 
for that weekend. In a review of The Sea, The Sea, Margaret Drabble 
writes that "The biz,, .... re coincidences of the plot and its 
reverberating imagery have much in common with late Shakespeare - with 
the severed heads and fake adulteries of Cymbeline, the violent 
jealousies and resurrected queens of The Winter's Tale", 11 and this 
stylised concatenation of events has "the bland unconcern with 
probability of the late romances" (Conradi, 252). Like the later 
plays too, the novel is openly about the magical powers of the 
imagination, the ideative realism that informs Charles's obsessive 
reworking of the past and the present made manifest by its all too 
real consequences in Hartley's immurement. 
This is in turn described in theatrical terms: the "whole history of 
mental drama" - the "vast developments, changes, checks, surprises, 
, , 
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progresses, revulsions, crises" (297) that constitute the days of 
Hartley's incarceration - are presented through a consonant narrative 
that re-enacts his determined "rewriting" of her continued insistence 
that she return to Ben. 
She was spellbound, bound by a self-protective magic, which she 
had developed over the years to defend herself against the 
horrible pain of having married a foul insanely jealous bullying 
maniac. She had been brainwashed through fear of him, 
brainwashed by hearing the same things repeated to her again and 
again, and again. (303) 
The irony of his similar enslavement to "a self-protective magic" and 
of its consequences in precisely the sort of behaviour that is here 
attributed to Ben, once again suggests the projection of an 
unconscious self-knowledge that emerges through the formulation of 
events. This is confirmed by a dream significantly presented 
without narrative differentiation - of waking to find that Hartley has 
hanged herself, and its prompting of a temporary understanding of the 
enormity of his acts: "What was I doing, or rather what was happening 
to me? ... I had lost control of my life and of the lives with which I 
was meddling. I felt dread and a terrible fatalism; and bitter grief, 
grief such as I had never felt in my life since Hartley had left me so 
many years ago" (310). The linkage here between the early loss of 
Hartley and his current sense of a "loss of control" suggests that 
Charles's obsessive need to "direct" and dominate in both his personal 
and public lives serves as an anaesthetic against, and reven~e upon, 
the pain of the initial deprivation. The potential insi~ht is, 
however, lost to Charles as the more familiar lines of his own mental 
drama reassert themselves, and the next morning he convinces himself, 
without perceiving the contradictions, that "she must want to be free 
138 
and happy, everybody did .... It was just a matter of waiting and 
keeping her here and letting time enlighten her will" (311). 
The self-delusion of the obsessed imagination is made even clearer 
after a screaming fit on Hartley's part and the combined efforts of 
the various witnesses to the situation eventually persuade Charles to 
return her to Ben; an action that he at first denies responsibility 
for and then integrates into an overall "strategy": 
It was indeed clear that what had happened had been engineered 
against my will by James. If I had kept my nerve, if I had 
persevered, if I had only had the sense to take her away right at 
the start, Hartley would have abandoned herself to me .... Perhaps 
in a way, I reflected, it was just as well to let her go back, 
this time, for a short period .... A dose of Ben, after having been 
with me, after having had the seeds of liberty sown in her mind, 
might well wake her up to the possibility, then the compelling 
desirability of escape. ( 357) 
The process by which Charles is able to rationalise the obvious 
failure of his attempt to recover Hartley's love is re-enacted through 
this consonant evocation of his immediate reactions: self-narrated 
monologue presents the initial focusing of feelings of anger and loss 
upon an external agent and then its transference to recriminatory 
self-chastisement ("It was indeed clear .... if I had only had the 
sense ... "), while the usage of quoted monologue to justify events 
( "Perhaps in a way, I reflected, it was just as well ... ") indicates 
that Charles needs to "say" this to himself to annul his underlying 
fear of the breakdown of his structuring Hartley-myth. "I gave her 
the meaning of my life long ago" (362), he tells Lizzie, 
demonstrating, in Lacan's terms, the way in which the "writing" "says 
what it knows while the subject does not know it" (Benvenuto and 
Kennedy, 166); evidence of an unconscious wisdom that suggests a new 
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subliminal awareness of the discrepancy between the force of his 
desire and the reality of its object. The point is made more overtly 
by James, who again likens Charles's belief in the power of his bond 
with Hartley to the idea of the phantom Helen: "She is real, as human 
creatures are, but what reality she has is elsewhere. She does not 
coincide with your dream figure. You were not able to transform her" 
(353). 
Charles is, however, unable to relinquish his belief in such 
transformative powers, and maintains to James that Hartley will 
eventually come to him: "She's woven into me. Don't you understand 
how one can be absolutely connected with somebody like that?" (355) 
In a later, inebriated conversation with Lizzie, he asks her if she 
knows "what it's like when you have to guard somebody, to guard them 
in your heart against all damage and all darkness, and to sort of 
renew them as if you were God-" (361). The ideative realism that 
informs this recreation of the past and the present is made manifest 
by its all too real consequences: first someone pushes Charles into 
Minn's Cauldron, a lethally violent and deep whirlpool, from which he 
miraculously escapes, and then Titus drowns. Charles is immediately 
certain of Ben's culpability in both of these events, and constructs 
an elaborate "case" against him that serves to deflect his nascent 
awareness of the deeply illusory nature of his attachment to Hartley. 
"I sometimes felt that I hated him even more than I loved her" (393), 
he remarks revealingly. The extended rationale for this substitutory 
obsession is, however, punctuated by dissonant retrospective 
commentary that admits to a consonant awareness of its temporary and 
constructed nature: 
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I was sane enough to know that I was in a state of total 
obsession and that I could only think, over and over again, 
certain agonizing thoughts, could only run continually along the 
same rat-paths of fantasy and intent. But I was not sane enough 
to interrupt this mechanical movement or even to desire to do so. 
I wanted to kill Ben. (391) 
Those who are caught in mental cages can often picture freedom, 
it just has no attractive power. I also knew in the midst of it 
all, that some unexamined guilt of my own was driving me further 
into hatred; but this was no moment to be confused by guilt. 
(394) 
These interruptions of the consonant display of the "rat-paths of 
fantasy and intent" signal Charles's contemporaneous awareness of the 
falsity of his beliefs, and serve to distance us from them. We are 
thus prepared for Peregrine's admission that it was he who, still 
bitterly hurt and angry at the theft of Rosina and the casual 
destruction of their marriage, pushed Charles into Minn's Cauldron 
when drunk. The manifestation of this anger in such a serious form 
prompts Charles to a further contemplation of cause and effect, and 
the unexamined guilt that is connected to his hatred for Ben is 
located in the realisation that out of personal vanity and "a silly 
vicarious pride in his youth and strength" (402), he failed to warn 
Titus about the dangerousness and difficulty of getting out of a 
strong sea. The recognition of his own part in the boy's death 
displaces his former conjectures about Ben, and allows a perception of 
their projected nature: "my misery about Titus ... was the more intense 
now that my obsessive belief about Ben had been taken away. It had 
indeed been a consolation, and Ben had carried my guilt" (402). The 
mental cage that constitutes his obsessive beliefs about Hartley is, 
however, less easily dismantled, and only after an invitation to tea 
at the Fitches has displayed to Charles a "happy couple in their 
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pretty little house" (428), does he begin to attempt its 
deconstruction: 
I had invested so much, as the years went by, in my belief in 
Hartley's goodness .... It was only now clear to me how very much I 
had made that image, and yet I could not feel that it was 
anything like a fiction. It was more like a special sort of 
truth, almost a touchstone (428). 
Conradi writes that "The Sea, The Sea is a novel about how I ' seeing 
with the mind's eye' is more than a dead metaphor (244), and goes on 
to discuss the manifestation of "introspectabilia" (245) in the sea 
serpent "image" of jealousy and guilt. In this last part of "History" 
we see also the way in which the very real force behind Charles's 
feeling for Hartley has recreated her as powerfully for him as an 
opposing "good" image of purified, unselfish, unpossessive love: the 
"shadows" that his memory of her has "bodied forth" in the past are 
here given substance, despite (or perhaps because of) his 
understanding of how little his feelings relate to "reality". 
The strange thing was that there was still a source of light, as 
if Hartley herself shed light upon Hartley. I could take it all, 
I could embrace it all, whatever she was like it was her I 
loved ... As James said, 'If even a dog's tooth is truly worshipped 
it glows with light' (430). 
The idea of the ontological proof is again linked to the idea of 
Hartley as a light source, but marks the change from his early 
conception of her as the "one great light" that the exorcism of 
"history" has forced him to undergo. The ambiguous value of such a 
source of belief is alluded to by James in his final visit, where he 
describes the "real power" that the worshipper bestows upon the 
worshipped object as "dreadful stuff": "Our lusts and attachments 
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compose our god. And when one attachment is cast off another arrives 
by way of consolation" (445). James's own attachment to Charles is 
evident from his first "appearance" in letter form, and contrasts 
with Charles's apprehension of their relationship as deeply rivalrous; 
"Cousinage, dangereux voisinage", he is given to quoting darkly. The 
"rivalry" is soon shown up by James's affectionate behaviour as 
entirely one-sided, the projection of his youthful insecurities and 
jealousy on to a more accurate sense of a ground between them that is 
"both deep and old". "Our childhood memories are a common stock which 
we share with no one else" (57), he notes, acknowledging a bond that 
he later attributes only to his relationship with Hartley: "When 
you've known someone from childhood, when you can't remember when they 
weren't there, that's not an illusion. She's woven into me" (355). 
Charles only becomes aware that he is also "absolutely connected" to 
James through such an historical interweaving after he remembers, 
first, that the sea serpent had been in the Cauldron with him, and 
then that James had impossibly raised him out of the lethal water, 
perhaps using one of the "tricks" that his practice of Tibetan 
Buddhism has engendered. The memory fills him ''with the most piercing 
pure and tender joy, as if the sky had opened and a stream of white 
light had descended" (470), an apprehension of James as another light 
source that marks the real exorcism of the sea serpent of jealousy, 
and allows Charles to contemplate "history" without the projections 
that have fed his obsessions: 
James had always been the finder of lost things. Had he 
stretched out some tentacle of his mind and found Titus and 
brought him here and kept him as it were under his care upon a 
binding thread, a thread of attention that was broken when James 
C 
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became so strangely ill after I had been lifted from the 
sea? ... There is a relentless causality of sin and in a way Titus 
died because, all those years ago, I had taken Rosina away from 
Peregrine. ( 4 71 ) 
The new "light" on his relationship with his cousin, and consequent 
insight into the events of the recent past are immediately followed by 
the news of James's mysteriously willed death, leaving Charles with 
"an odd new sensation" of loneliness that exposes his early rhetoric 
of worldly renunciation as the playing of yet another part: "Without 
James I was at last alone. How very much I had somehow relied upon 
his presence in the world" (473). It is significantly the "departure" 
of James, and not that of Hartley and Ben for Australia, that he 
acknowledges here as the final stripping, inaugurating a shift of 
perspective that the ending of "History" subtly extends. After 
sleeping outside and seeing a magnificent star-scape, Charles wakes 
before dawn: "There was a complete yet somehow conscious silence, as 
if the travelling planet were noiselessly breathing. I remembered 
that James was dead. Who is one's first love? Who indeed" (476). 
The ellipses between these statements leave the question ambiguously 
suspended between a consonant, unsignaled quotation (''I thought to 
myself, 'Who is one's first love"'), and a gnomic conflation of the 
narrating and experiencing selves that conveys an ironic scepticism 
about self-knowledge and memory. Paradoxically this itself suggests a 
new wisdom and tolerance of indeterminacy that is confirmed by 
Charles's foreswearing of the "novelistic" end to his story provided 
by the sighting cf an entirely different kind of sea-creature; four 
friendly and playful seals who he perceives as "beneficent beings come 
to visit and bless me" (476). 
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That no doubt is how the story ought to end, with the seals and 
the stars, explanation, resignation, reconciliation, everything 
picked up into some radiant bland ambiguous higher significance, 
in calm of mind, all passion spent. However, life, unlike art, 
has an irritating way of bumping and limping on, undoing 
conversions, casting doubt on solutions, and generally 
illustrating the impossibility of living happily or virtuously 
ever after; so I thought I might continue the tale a little 
longer in the form of a diary. (477) 
This disruption of "History" by a "Postscript", (subtitled "Life 
Goes On") subverts the crafted form in a way that echoes the novel's 
opening, but reverses its content: there the malevolent image of the 
sea monster disproves Charles's confidence in his ability to structure 
his material, while here the beneficent sea vision is displaced by a 
fragmented narrative that eschews artistic self-definition. Living in 
James's flat amidst his oriental possessions, Charles reflects, in a 
disconnected series of "entries", on the events of the recent and 
further past, and comes, as James earlier predicts he will, to see 
Hartley as a wicked enchantress, and his "great 'illumination' a kind 
of nonsense": "She is gone, she is nothing for me, she no longer 
exists, and after all I fought for a phantom Helen. On n'aime qu'une 
fois, la premiere. What a lot of folly I have run through in aid of 
that stupid Gallicism!" (492). This implicit admission of the way in 
which literary codes and cliches have informed his interpretation of 
the past underlines the novel's play with its own generic conventions; 
"set literary ideas about love in the western tradition are here 
overturned", as Dipple puts it (287), and not least by the 
Postscript's devaluing of the "novel's" topic: 
I wonder if I shall ever write that book about Clement? It is as 
if this book has taken up forever the space which I might have 
given to her. How unjust this seems now. Clement was the 
reality of my life, its bread and its wine. She made me, she 
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invented me, she created me .... She, and not Hartley, was the 
reason why I never married (484). 
The Postscript thus offers an allusive rewriting of the story that 
undercuts the stability of "History" in a way that Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak describes in her translator's preface to Derrida's Of 
Grammatology: "the structure preface - text becomes open at both 
ends. The text has no stable identity, stable origin ... each act of 
reading 'the text' is a preface to the next". 12 The Postscript 
similarly destabilises our reading of Charles's story through its 
precluding of closure, but works at the same time to naturalise the 
aesthetic unity of the central section by "realistically" asserting 
the impossibility of a definitive "H/history". Several 
interpretations of Hartley's feelings and reactions are proposed and 
then rejected, making it clear that there is no definitive "truth" to 
be discovered or "final clarificatory statement to be made" (490). 
"Judgements on people are never final, they emerge from summings up 
which at once suggest the need of a reconsideration", Charles writes 
at the beginning of the Postscript, and the diary form's reassertion 
of hegemony in the novel's hierarchy of discourses 13 formally enacts 
the "loose ends and hazy reckoning" that characterise life, "whatever 
art may pretend in order to console us" (477). 
Some loose ends are tied up, others engendered, as Charles 
intersperses speculation about the past with sporadic gossip and 
, 2 Derrida, Jacques, Of Grammatology. Johns Hopkins University 
Press: Baltimore 1977, xii. 
, 3 The phrase is Catherine Belsey's in Critical Practise. Methuen: 
London and New York 1980. 
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discussion of both familiar and unknown characters: Lizzie and 
Gilbert get back together; Peregrine and Rosina start a theatre for 
"the people" in Ireland, where Peregrine is subsequently murdered by 
terrorists; Charles plays "celibate uncle-priest" to a variety of 
people, giving generously of both his money and his time; Peregrine's 
step-daughter, Angie, besieges him with letters asking him to give her 
a child. As Charles responds to all of this and struggles to 
accommodate his hard-won self-knowledge it becomes clear that readerly 
judgement must also forswear conclusiveness. "Am I after all alone 
now, as I intended to be, and without attachments? Is history over?" 
(501), he ponders, only to almost immediately record ''a very tempting 
invitation to Japan" and an arrangement to have lunch with Angie. 
Finally, James's wooden casket, said to be like the ones in which 
lamas imprison demons, f? 1 ls off the wall, bringing Charles's 
narrative to a wonderfully inconclusive halt: "Upon the demon-ridden 
pilgrimage of human life, what next I wonder?" 
Like Valery Is poem, "Le cimi tiere mar in", from which The Sea, The 
Sea takes its title, the novel meditates upon the difficulty of 
interpreting the world and the limitations of consciousness and 
perception. Conradi notes that "There is something awkward about 
trying to 'totalise' Murdoch's image of the untotalisable" (250), and 
that the sea "contains and represents 'everything', is a symbol for 
the uncoerced unconscious, source of all symbols, from which identity 
comes and to which it returns" (249). The brilliant evocation of the 
real that the novel achieves is imaged in this paradoxically "open" 
symbol, and produced through a superbly sustained tension between a 
tightly constructed form and a subversion of its own literary 
---
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premises: "presumptions of meaning" hold their own here against the 
"open world ... of absurdity and loose ends and ignorance", balancing 
the limitations and triumphs of art and the unknowable world that it 
imitates; "La mer, la mer, toujours recommencee!" 
**** 
CONCLUSION 
It will, I imagine, seem ridiculous that 
manifest through imitations in letters 
nevertheless it cannot be otherwise. 
Plato, Craytylus. 
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things are made 
and syllables; 
Since The Sea, The Sea, Murdoch has published four novels and a 
Platonic dialogue, Acastos; her output continues to be prolific and 
her variety of possible plots and characters seemingly 
inexhaustible. It is perhaps for this reason that it is so 
difficult to comment upon these later novels: a sense of their 
provisionality, of their part in an oeuvre, is oddly joined to an 
ever-increasing richness of detail, upholding what Lorna Sage has 
perceptively called her "aesthetic of imperfection". This, writes 
Sage, "mocks the critical demand for totalities, and makes fiction 
seem a living process" but can also show "the casual signs of haste 
and writing by formula which beset her". 1 The narrative strategies 
of the more recent novels seem to emphasise both these talents and 
weaknesses: a newly foregrounded omniscience coexists with an ever 
"untidier" fictional world in a way that insists on both its 
created-ness and its substantiality without always successfully 
maintaining a tension between the two. In The Philosopher's Pupil 
(1983), the artificiality of the fictional world, and the pleasure 
in imaginative creation are given "voice" through the employment of 
an anonymous first-person narrator, who describes himself as "a 
shadow, Nemo, not the masked presence or secret voice of one of the 
Sage, Lorna, "The Pursuit of Imperfection", Critical Quarterly, 
XIX, no.2 (Summer 1977), 68. 
.......... 
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main characters", but who is a "real" person in the novel's created 
world of Ennistone ("N's Town"), "an observer, a student of human 
nature, amoralist" (23). 2 The decision to use the first-person 
without the personality perhaps provides an allegory for Murdoch's 
awareness of the figurative nature of any representation of the 
world, and a concomitant desire to move away from the limitations 
of narrative structure that the deployment of a central character-
as-narrator imposes. It also suggests (and this is possibly where 
it jars upon poststructuralist sensibilities) an unfashionable 
confidence in the fictive version of the world that she can offer: 
N knows as much as any effaced omniscient voice, and tells us that 
he will allow himself "here and there the discreet luxury of 
moralizing" ( 23) . 
At the end of The Good Apprentice (1985), the central character, 
Edward, sees his tale as a "muddle, starting off with an accident", 
but also as ''a whole complex thing, internally connected, like a 
dark globe, a dark world, as if we were all parts of a single 
drama, living inside a work of art". Perhaps, he thinks, 
"important things in life are always like that, so that you can 
think of them both ways" (517-8). I have tried to show through an 
examination of her narrative techniques that Murdoch's best work 
needs to be thought of in both ways, and that where the earlier 
novels pull more strongly towards an "internally connected" world 
of their own, they also "provide lucid commentaries on themselves", 
2 In conversation with me, Miss Murdoch identified 
psychologist Ivor Sefton . 
"N" as the 
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as Murdoch has suggested that all good art does. 3 A consideration 
of The Bell and The Unicorn in terms of the correlation between 
"realism" and technical sophistication that Cohn implies in 
Transparent Minds suggests their respective enactment of 
"objective" and "subjective" ways of re-presenting the world; a 
division of narrative "purpose" that Murdoch describes in the early 
part of her career as an alternation between "open" and "closed" 
novels. Both of these, as Conradi says, offer "truth and pleasure" 
(159) of different kinds, and I suggested that these different 
readerly rewards are compounded by the combination of omniscience 
and polyphonously subjective perspective that Murdoch deploys in An 
Accidental Man. Here a sense of "muddle" and "accident" is allowed 
' 
to emerge through the figural mediation of the story, rather than 
through authorial pronou~~ement, while at the same time the 
stylised narrative techniques are designed to remind us that it is 
also a "work of art". 
The narratological examination of these third-person texts 
indicates also the ways in which Murdoch's fiction incorporates the 
comedic, the romantic and the gothic into a framework of orthodox 
verisimilitude, utilising the clashes between these genres to 
disclose the competing views of the real that constitute her 
version of "realism". I have suggested that the impossibility of 
unifying these competing realities is foregrounded in the first-
person novels through the problematics of self-representation in a 
way that paradoxically feeds into a sense of their "realism": like 
3 Murdoch, Iris, "Salvation by Words", New York Review of Books, 
15 June 1972, 4. 
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contemporary poststructuralist thinkers, Murdoch is convinced of 
the essential disunity of the self, but unlike them remains 
unafraid of "the fallacy of unmediated expression". 4 Both Under 
the Net and The Black Prince present a psychomachia and its 
"result" in the novel that we read, and both emphasise the process 
by which consonant character becomes dissonant narrator as a 
progressive tutelage in the "indecipherability" of the world. The 
enforced limitations of the first-person form naturalise the 
tensions between the structural organisation of the novels and the 
looseness and "muddle" that Murdoch sees as a partly necessary 
component of art: "'we are fake objects, 
illusion'", James reminds Charles in The Sea, 
fakes, bundles of 
The Sea when he 
declares his intention of doing ''the deep thing, real analysis, 
real autobiography", and the novel is to prove him ri~~t without 
sacrificing "character" by demonstrating the different value of the 
impulses toward inarticulate "truth" and formal self-definition. 
"Of course this chattering diary is a facade, the literary 
equivalent of the everyday smiling face which hides ... inward 
ravages", Charles writes after his education in the 
inauthenticities of a formal organisation of life; his newly 
acquired wisdom allowing him to recognise that "such pretences are 
not only consolations but may even be productive of a little ersatz 
courage" (483). 
There is thus for Murdoch no simple division between the evils of 
a formal imposition and the integrity of the "real", and I offered 
4 Salusinsky, Imre, Interview with Geoffry Hartman, in Criticism 
in Society. Methuen: New York and London 1987, 85. 
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The Sea, The Sea as an example of the mastery with which she 
utilises the first-person form to fuse "myth" with character 
through their incorporation into the very act of and motivation for 
narration. A narratological analysis of the early novels and a 
consideration of the differing implications of the first- and 
third-person modes has, I hope, provided a theoretical grounding 
for the broader speculations about the more complex and 
successfully realised later works, and offered a way of discussing 
these without resulting in classifications or collapsing them back 
into suppositious ideatory "sources". J. Hillis Miller remarks in 
The Linguistic Moment that "Interpretation, 'literary criticism,' is 
not the detached statement of a knowledge objectively gained. It 
is the desperation of a bet, an ungrounded doing things with words: 
'I bet this is a lyric ~nem,' or 'I bet this is an elegy,' or 'I 
bet this is a parable,' followed by the exegesis that is the 
consequence of the bet" (Salusinsky, 212). I have attempted to 
hedge my bets by employing narrative theory in the service of such 
exegesis, but would insist on its subservience to the fictional 
sources of the interpretive activity: Murdoch's novels are full of 
the "heterogeneous stuff" that Anne Cavidge in Nuns and Soldiers 
(1981) notes with amazement when she reads a novel for the first 
time in fifteen years, and are as such susceptible to as diverse a 
selection of readings. "What an extraordinary form it was, it told 
you about everything. How informative, how exciting, how funny, 
how terribly sentimental, how full of moral judgements!" (109): 
Anne's words may perhaps stand as an indication of the pleasures, 
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